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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to generate a random se-
cret key, which they can use to securely exchange a message. Unlike many
other cryptographic schemes, QKD offers information-theoretical security
based on the laws of physics. In recent years, major theoretical and exper-
imental advancements have been made. Among these are two novel pro-
tocols, memory-assisted (MA) QKD and twin-field (TF) QKD, which can
both improve the secret-key rate scaling with channel length, potentially
allowing QKD to be performed at longer distances. The main motivation
of this thesis is to incorporate more realistic assumptions into the security
proofs and performance analyses of these new protocols.
One common assumption made in QKD security proofs is that the protocol
is run for an infinitely long time, which allows the users to obtain a perfect
statistical characterisation of the quantum channel. In this thesis, we drop
this assumption for a TF-QKD variant that is well suited for experimen-
tal implementation, proving its security in the finite-key regime. We also
analyse the finite-key performance of MA-QKD, concluding that it is par-
ticularly resistant to its statistical fluctuation effects. Moreover, we develop
an alternative finite-key security analysis approach based on random sam-
pling theory, and apply it to the loss-tolerant protocol, which can ensure
security in the presence of flawed sources. Compared to previous finite-key
security proofs of the protocol, our analysis offers better performance.
Another common assumption is that the users can emit laser pulses with a
continuous random phase. In practice, this is difficult to achieve, and the
phase is often randomised discretely. In this thesis, we prove the security of
a TF-QKD variant that relies on discrete phase randomisation, and show
that, using certain post-selection techniques, it can provide higher secret-
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Over the past half century, our increasingly globalised society has come to depend on
the secure exchange of information between physically distant locations. To achieve
this, we rely mostly on certain cryptographic algorithms that can guarantee secrecy
even if the physical communication channels that carry the messages are compromised.
The security of an important class of these algorithms is based on certain mathematical
problems that are thought, but not proven, to be very hard for conventional comput-
ers to solve. For this reason, they are vulnerable to improvements in computational
hardware and software. Rapid advancements could put a halt to our ability to securely
exchange messages, potentially causing severe societal disruptions. Slow advancements
could give us time to update our cryptographic infrastructure, but they would still com-
promise the secrecy of the information being exchanged today, an important problem
for sensitive applications that need long-term security, such as DNA data or medical
records.
The appearance of a new computation paradigm, quantum computing, poses a
particularly severe threat, since quantum computers have already been shown to pro-
vide exponential speed-ups in solving the very mathematical problems that our cur-
rent cryptographic systems are based on. Interestingly, the emerging field of quantum
communications could also provide a solution to the problem. Namely, its most ma-
ture application, quantum key distribution (QKD), can provide information-theoretic
communication security based on the laws of physics, rather than on computational
assumptions. Thus, it is not vulnerable to future hardware or software advancements,
ensuring long-term communication security. In the last decades, intense research ef-
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1.1 Background
forts have resulted in tremendous progress, on both the theoretical and experimental
fronts of QKD. However, it still needs to solve important practical problems before
it can be deployed as an alternative, or a complement, to our current cryptographic
infrastructure.
In this thesis, we focus on two of the most important of these problems: (1) ensuring
that practical QKD implementations are secure, despite inevitable imperfections; and
(2) preventing QKD communication rates to drop sharply as the channel distance
increases. In particular, in the recent years, novel protocols have been proposed to
improve the key rate scaling with the channel length, potentially allowing QKD to be
performed over longer distances. Understandably, the first security and performance
analyses of these new protocols have assumed idealised experimental conditions. The
main motivation of this thesis is addressing the security and performance of these
protocols under more realistic assumptions.
In this introductory chapter, we lay down the relevant background to the work
presented in this thesis, and, in that context, we summarise our novel contributions.
In Section 1.1, we situate QKD in the wider field of cryptography, the problem it can
solve, and give an intuition of why it can do so. Then, we continue by reviewing
the fundamental ideas behind QKD and its security. After that, in Section 1.2, we
provide an overview of the challenges currently preventing QKD from becoming a global
technology, with a focus on how the work presented in this thesis has contributed
towards overcoming these challenges.
1.1 Background
The aim of cryptography is to provide secure communications in the presence of an
adversary. In this thesis, we focus on the problem of ensuring communication confiden-
tiality over an untrusted channel, one of the most fundamental goals of cryptography.
We assume that a sender, Alice, wants to send a secret message to a receiver, Bob,
through an untrusted channel that may be accessed, or even fully controlled, by an
eavesdropper, Eve.
Cryptography has a long history, but modern academic research on the field started
in the 70s, when public-key cryptography, and, in particular, the widely used RSA [1]
algorithm, was developed. In these schemes, Bob has two keys associated to him: a
2
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public key, which he publicly announces, used to encrypt messages destined to him; and
a private key that only Bob himself knows, which he uses to decrypt these messages.
That is, if Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she encrypts it with Bob’s public key,
and then sends the ciphertext to Bob, who decrypts it using his private key.
These schemes are widely used because of their convenience, as the same public-
private key pair can be reused to encrypt and decrypt many messages. However, their
security is based on certain problems that are thought (but not proven) to be very
hard for current computers to solve. For example, the security of RSA is based on
the assumed difficulty of finding the prime factors of very large composite numbers.
For this reason, public-key cryptography is vulnerable to breakthrough developments
in hardware and software. One of these would be the advent of quantum computers,
since Shor [2] devised a quantum algorithm that can perform prime factorisation in
polynomial time, much faster than the sub-exponential time needed by known clas-
sical algorithms [3]. Thus, if a large-scale quantum computer is ever developed, an
eavesdropper could use it to decrypt secret communications based on public-key cryp-
tography, including those made many years before, if she had the foresight to make a
copy of the ciphertext. Today, after decades of intense theoretical and experimental
research, small-scale quantum computers can already provide computational advan-
tages in some very specific tasks [4]. Given that multinationals around the world have
already invested billions of dollars in the race to build the first truly practical quantum
computer, the possibility that they may succeed in the next decades cannot be ignored.
Clearly, it is essential to update our cryptographic infrastructure before such a ma-
jor disruption occurs. One possible approach is to develop and deploy the so-called
post-quantum cryptographic algorithms: alternative public-key schemes that are not
vulnerable to currently known quantum attacks. They have the advantage of being
relatively easy to implement, since they would be compatible with the current cryp-
tographic infrastructure. However, their main drawback is that they have only been
shown to be secure against known quantum attacks, while the full potential of quantum
algorithms is far from being known today.
Ideally, we would like to employ cryptographic methods that are secure indepen-
dently of the computational power available to Eve; this is known as information-
theoretic security. In fact, such an encryption technique has been known for more than
one hundred years: the one-time pad [5], see Fig. 1.1. To use this technique, Alice
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and Bob need to share a completely random string that is unknown to everyone else,
including the eavesdropper. We call such a string a secure key. Using her copy of
the key, Alice can encrypt a message and send the ciphertext to Bob, who decrypts it
using his copy. It can be shown that, if Eve has no information at all about the key,
she cannot learn any information about the original message, even if she intercepts the
ciphertext. Importantly, the message to be encrypted needs to be of the same length
as the key, and each key bit can only be used to encode a single message bit. This
is the reason why, despite its incredibly strong security guarantees, the one-time pad
has received much less use than public-key cryptosystems: the former only allows Alice
and Bob to secretly communicate if they have some pre-shared secure key to spend.
If they do not, then Shannon [6] showed that it is impossible to generate a secure key
using an untrusted (classical) channel. This is known as the key distribution problem.
Intuitively, the idea is that any information exchanged by the users through the chan-
nel can be intercepted and copied by Eve, and any processing of this information to
generate the key can be replicated by Eve.
H    E    L    L    O
+    +    +    +    +
W    J    Q    F    L
D    N    B    Q    Z
D    N    B    Q    Z
+    +    +     +    +
W    J    Q    F    L








H  E  L  L  O
+  +  +  +  +
W  J  Q  F  L





D  N  B  Q  Z
- - - - -
W  J  Q  F  L




Figure 1.1: Intuitive representation of the one-time pad algorithm2. Each letter is en-
coded as an integer between 0 and 25, according to its position in the English alphabet.
The key is a random five letter string, shared by Alice and Bob. Alice encrypts the
original message with her copy of the key and publicly announces the ciphertext, after
which Bob decrypts the ciphertext using his copy of the key. The encryption and de-
cryption operations are addition and subtraction modulo 26, respectively. For Eve, who
has access to the ciphertext but no information about the key, all five-letter strings are
equally likely to be the key. Thus, from her point of view, all five-letter strings are also
equally likely to be the original message. In other words, the ciphertext alone provides
no information at all about the message.
2In a practical computer implementation, the message and the key are bit strings, and the encryp-
tion and decryption operations are both addition modulo 2.
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This impossibility result does not apply if Alice and Bob have access to an untrusted
quantum channel. The fundamental difference is that it is impossible to copy unknown
quantum states [7], which prevents Eve from obtaining exactly the same information
as the legitimate users. In fact, any measurement that attempts to distinguish non-
orthogonal quantum states necessarily disturbs them. Thus, the error rate of a quantum
communication attempt can be used to detect the possible presence of an eavesdropper,
or even to bound the amount of information that she may have gained, which opens up
an avenue to use quantum mechanics to solve the key distribution problem: quantum
key distribution (QKD).
The first and best known QKD protocol is BB84, proposed by Bennett and Bras-
sard [8] and based on earlier ideas by Wiesner [9]. It relies on Alice preparing two-
dimensional quantum states (qubits) that belong to two conjugate bases, commonly
referred to as Z and X. In each round, Alice chooses a random basis and a random
bit, encodes the bit in that basis, and sends the quantum state to Bob, who measures
the incoming states in a random basis. The idea is that Eve cannot know Alice’s basis
choice, and therefore, any attempt by Eve to learn information about the Z-encoded
states will necessarily introduce errors in the X-encoded states, and vice versa. Of
course, Bob does not know Alice’s encoding basis either, but their advantage over Eve
is that, once the quantum communication is complete, they can announce their basis
choices and discard all data in which their choices did not match. After that, Alice and
Bob compare some of their results and estimate the error rate of the quantum commu-
nication, which provides them a bound on the amount of information that Eve could
have learned. Using this knowledge, they are able to distil a secure key by applying
classical post-processing algorithms to their measurement results.
In the rest of this introduction, we review the basics of QKD. In Section 1.1.1, we
give an overview of the structure common to most quantum protocols, finishing with a
particular example, the BB84 protocol. In Section 1.1.2, we give a rigorous definition
of what it means for a key to be secure, and in Section 1.1.3, we see how one can prove
that the output of a QKD protocol is indeed a secure key.
1.1.1 Structure of a QKD protocol
Usually, a QKD protocol is divided in two phases: a quantum phase and a classical
phase. In the quantum phase, Alice and Bob encode and/or measure quantum states,
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obtaining some raw classical data. In the classical phase, Alice and Bob process this
classical data, turning it into a secure key.
Quantum phase According to their quantum phase, QKD protocols can be divided
in three types, as depicted in Fig. 1.2. In all of these, Alice and Bob assume that
anything that is outside of their labs is controlled by Eve; this includes the quantum
channel and, if it exists, the middle node Charlie. Usually, in prepare-and-measure
and measurement-device-independent protocols, the sending users choose a random bit
and a random encoding basis, and then encode the bit in that basis; and in prepare-
and-measure and entanglement-based protocols, the measuring users choose a random
basis, and measure the incoming states in that basis.
BOB CHARLIEALICE ALICE BOB
Prepare and measure Measurement device independent Entanglement based
CHARLIEALICE BOB
Figure 1.2: Classes of QKD protocols according to their quantum phase. The tail
(head) of each arrow indicates the party that emits (measures) the quantum states.
Classical phase Typically, the first step is a detection announcement : whoever per-
formed the measurements announces which rounds were successfully detected. Then,
Alice and Bob announce some choices that they made in the detected rounds, usually
the basis that they used, and according to these choices, they divide their raw classical
data in three groups: (1) key data, (2) test data, and (3) discarded data. This step
is called sifting and the key data is typically referred to as the sifted key. After that,
Alice and Bob perform parameter estimation: they announce their test data, and use
its statistics (typically its error rate) to estimate the amount of sifted-key information
that may have leaked to Eve. Then, Alice and Bob use classical error correction pro-
tocols to guarantee that their keys are identical with a very high probability. Finally,
Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification, turning their error-corrected key pair into
a shorter secure key pair, from which Eve’s information has been effectively removed.
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1.1.1.1 Example of a QKD protocol: BB84
The above discussion is very general, since it attempts to cover most QKD protocols.
It is useful to look at a particular example: the BB84 protocol. Here, we consider its
efficient version [10], in which the users’ basis selection probabilities are biased, in order
to maximise the sifting efficiency.
Quantum phase In each round u ∈ {1, ..., Ntot}, Alice selects an encoding basis
T ∈ {Z,X} with probability pTA , where typically pZA  pXA , selects a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1}, and then emits the quantum state |bT 〉 through the quantum channel. The
emitted states are such that |0Z〉 and |1Z〉 are orthogonal, and |bX〉 = 1√2(|0Z〉 +
(−1)b |1Z〉), i.e. Z and X are two mutually unbiased bases in a qubit space. For
example, Alice may emit polarisation-encoded single photons, in which case |0Z〉 and
|1Z〉 correspond to horizontally and vertically polarised single photons, while |0X〉 and
|1X〉 are 45◦ and 135◦ polarised single photons, respectively.
On his side, Bob selects a random measurement basis T ∈ {Z,X} with probability
pTB , and attempts to measure the incoming photons in that basis, obtaining either a
bit value or an unsuccessful result. As we will see in Section 1.1.3, modern security
frameworks of QKD only need a perfect characterisation for the devices of one of the
users, allowing for some imperfections in the other’s. Typically, Bob is chosen for the
latter, since measurement devices are more difficult to characterise than sources. Thus,
Bob does not necessarily need to perform perfect Z and X basis measurements on qubit
states, but his choice of basis needs to be completely random, and the overall detection
efficiency (i.e. the probability of obtaining a bit value) needs to be the same for both
measurement bases, regardless of the state that arrives to his lab.
Classical phase
Sifting and parameter estimation After Bob has finished all measurements, he
announces which rounds have been successfully detected, and then both users announce
their basis choices in those rounds. Then, Alice and Bob define their sifted keys as the
bit values associated to the detected rounds in which they both used the Z basis, and
define the test rounds as the set of detected rounds in which they both used the X
basis. After that, they announce the bit values associated to the test rounds, learning
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their error rate eX . Alice and Bob then use this information to estimate the phase-
error rate eph of their sifted keys, which quantifies the amount of information that
could have been leaked to Eve. In the limit of Ntot →∞, eph = eX ; for practical finite
values of Ntot, Alice and Bob need to apply a random sampling analysis to obtain an
upper-bound eUph on eph using the observed value of eX . We elaborate on this step in
Section 1.1.3.
Error correction and error verification Next, Alice and Bob use classical error
correction codes to correct errors in their sifted keys. Typically, Alice sends some
information about her key, the syndrome, to Bob, who uses it to correct all errors in
his key with very high probability. The cost of error correction is commonly expressed
as λEC = fNh(eZ), where N is the sifted key length, eZ is its bit-error rate, h(x) =
−x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon binary entropy function, and f > 1 is the
error correction inefficiency, since the actual cost is typically larger than the theoretical
Shannon limit of Nh(eZ). After error correction, Alice and Bob typically perform error
verification: they compute a tag of their respective keys, using a hash function, and
Alice sends her tag to Bob, who checks if the two tags are identical. If so, their keys are
also identical with a very high probability; if not, they abort the protocol. Note that
both the syndrome and the tag contain information about Alice’s key. To prevent Eve
from learning this information, Alice typically encrypts them using some pre-shared
secure key; the bits spent on this step need to be taken into account when computing
the net secret-key length of the protocol. Some security proofs allow Alice to publicly
announce her syndrome and tag, and then remove the extra information that Eve has
gained in the privacy amplification step. Both methods result in the same net secret
key length, but only the latter can be used if Alice and Bob do not share any secret
key to begin with. For simplicity, throughout this introduction we assume that Alice
encrypts the syndrome and tag.
Privacy amplification Finally, Alice and Bob transform their N -bit error-corrected
key into a secure key of length approximately K ≈ N − h(eUph) bits. For this, Alice
selects a random N -to-K two-universal hash function and announces it, and then both
Alice and Bob apply this hash function to their respective corrected keys, obtaining
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their secure key pair. In Section 1.1.2, we explain exactly what we mean by secure key,
and in Section 1.1.3, we review how one can ensure that the key is indeed secure.
Note on authentication Some communications in the classical phase need to be
authenticated; otherwise, Eve could easily perform a man-in-the-middle attack, dis-
guising as Alice to Bob, and as Bob to Alice. If one wants the whole QKD protocol to
be information-theoretically secure, the authentication method also needs to be. Fortu-
nately, symmetric-key authentication algorithms are information-theoretically secure,
and require only O(logm) secure key bits, where m is the length of the message [11].
However, this implies that Alice and Bob would need to share a short secure key to
be able to perform QKD and obtain a longer secure key. For this reason, it would
be perhaps more accurate to call the full scheme quantum key expansion, rather than
distribution [12].
If Alice and Bob do not share any previous secure key, they can rely on
computationally-secure public-key authentication schemes for their first round of QKD,
and then use a small portion of the resulting secret key to authenticate future rounds.
At first glance, this may seem strange; after all, Alice and Bob could have relied on
public-key encryption, rather than QKD, for their secret communications. There is an
important difference, however: if Eve is not able to break the authentication scheme
during the first QKD round, all the generated keys (and any messages encrypted with
them) will remain secure forever [13]. Conversely, messages encrypted using public-key
schemes will always be vulnerable to future technological advances, potentially allowing
Eve to retroactively break their encryption.
1.1.2 Definition of security
Ideally, the output of a QKD protocol would be a fully secure key pair: two identical
keys kA = kB = k that are completely random, and which Eve knows nothing about.






|k〉〈k|A ⊗ |k〉〈k|B ⊗ σE , (1.1)
where k runs over all possible binary strings of length K, and σE is the final state of the
eavesdropper, which is completely decoupled from the subsystems A and B, i.e. Eve
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has no information on k. Unfortunately, in a realistic QKD protocol, it is impossible to
guarantee that Alice and Bob’s key pair is ideally secure; there is always a possibility
that Alice and Bob end up with different keys kA 6= kB, or that Eve gains some side




Pr(kA, kB|K) |kA〉〈kA|A ⊗ |kB〉〈kB|B ⊗ σ
kA,kB
E . (1.2)
where Pr(kA, kB|K) is the probability that Alice and Bob obtain final keys kA, kB ∈
{0, 1}K , respectively, conditioned on them actually obtaining a key pair of length K,
i.e. not aborting the protocol; and ρkA,kBE is the final state of Eve conditioned on Alice
and Bob obtaining kA, kB
3. To evaluate the security of a QKD protocol, we need to
define a security parameter εsec using some sort of distance measure between the real
key σKABE and an ideal secure key σ
ideal,K
ABE . Moreover, since we want to use the key
in combination with other protocols (such as the one-time pad), it is important that
this definition of security is composable [14]. That is, if we have a set of cryptographic
protocols, each of which have a security parameter εisec, we would like to claim that




sec. In QKD, a composable security




∥∥∥σKABE − σideal,KABE ∥∥∥ ≤ εsec. (1.3)
If the key generated in a QKD protocol satisfies Eq. (1.3), the protocol is said to be
εsec-secure. The trace distance is related to the distinguishing problem: if Eq. (1.3)
holds, then it is impossible for anyone, including Eve, to distinguish the real key pair
from an ideal key pair with probability more than εsec. This implies that, if Alice uses
her half of the real key pair to encrypt a message, Eve cannot distinguish the ciphertext
from a fully random string with probability more than εsec; if she could, then she could
3Note that this definition assumes that Eve has already fixed her attack, but Alice and Bob have
not yet run the protocol; Pr(kA, kB |K) is the probability that Alice and Bob will obtain final keys
kA, kB once they run the protocol, conditioned on it not aborting. It is not possible to define the
security of the final key conditioned on the actual outcomes obtained in the protocol. For example,
there is always the possibility that Alice and Bob have been extremely unlucky, and Eve has managed
to (randomly) guess all of their basis choices correctly, allowing her to learn the key while introducing
no disturbance. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely, however, and is covered by the a priori security
definition in Eqs. (1.2) and (1.3).
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also tell that Alice has encrypted the message using the real key rather than an ideal
key, contradicting Eq. (1.3).
The definition of security can be divided into correctness and secrecy:
Correctness This criterion is met when Alice and Bob’s final keys are identical. A
protocol is εc-correct if Pr[kA 6= kB] ≤ εc.
Secrecy This criterion is met when Eve has no information about Alice’s key. A











Pr(kA) |kA〉〈kA|A ⊗ σkAE ,
σideal,KAE := TrB(σ
ideal,K




|k〉〈k|A ⊗ σE .
(1.5)
If a protocol is εc-correct and εs-secret, then it is εsec-secure, with εsec = εc + εs. This
decomposition is useful because the correctness criterion can be trivially ensured by the
use of error verification based on hashing; if the length of the error verification tag is
dlog2(1/εc)e, then the final key is εc-correct [11, 17]. Thus, the objective of the security
proofs of QKD is reduced to showing that Alice’s key is εs-secret.
The definition of εsec and εs in Eqs. (1.3) and (1.4) assumes that the length of the
final keys kA, kB is fixed and equal to K for all possible runs of the protocol, provided
that it does not abort. For protocols or security proofs in which this is not the case,












∥∥∥σKAE − σideal,KAE ∥∥∥ ≤ εs, (1.7)
where Pr(K) is the probability that the length of the final key is K. In the definition
above, K = 0 accounts for the events in which the protocol aborts, in which case the




It is often difficult to prove the security of a QKD protocol against any eavesdropping
attack. For this reason, security proofs have traditionally divided Eve’s possible attacks
into three classes of increased sophistication. In all of them, Eve is assumed to prepare
Ntot quantum ancillas, one corresponding to each pulse emitted by Alice, and they
differ in what Eve is allowed to do afterwards.
Individual attack Eve performs an independent and identical quantum operation
between each of Alice’s pulses and her corresponding ancilla. After the classical
phase of the protocol, she measures each ancilla separately.
Collective attack Similar to the previous, but after the classical phase of the protocol,
she performs an arbitrary joint measurement on all of her ancillas.
Coherent attack Eve performs an arbitrary joint quantum operation between all the
pulses emitted by Alice and all of her ancillas. After the classical phase of the
protocol, she performs an arbitrary joint measurement on all of her ancillas.
The latter class is also sometimes referred to as general, since any attack allowed by
the laws of quantum mechanics can be expressed as a coherent attack.
A QKD protocol is only information-theoretically secure when it is proven to be
secure against coherent attacks. However, it is a known result that, in the asymptotic
regime in which Ntot → ∞, proving security against collective attacks is equivalent
to proving security against general attacks, as long as the classical post-processing
satisfies some reasonable assumptions [19, 20]. Thus, asymptotic security proofs often
consider collective attacks, and regard Eve’s action as independent and identically
distributed (IID) between different rounds of the protocol, which often simplifies the
proof. Conversely, security proofs in the finite-key regime often prove security directly
against general attacks4.
4In the finite-key regime, one can also first prove security against collective attacks, and then apply
the aforementioned results to extend the security against coherent attacks. However, doing so results
in a degradation of the security parameter εsec, and proving security directly against coherent attacks
is, in most cases, much tighter.
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1.1.3 Security of QKD
The first proofs of the information-theoretic security of the BB84 protocol against
coherent attacks appeared around fifteen years after its introduction [21, 22]. Since
then, the ideas in these early proofs have been refined, and nowadays, mainly two
frameworks are used to prove the information-theoretic security of a QKD protocol:
 Phase-error correction approach: Based on showing the equivalence between the
actual protocol and a fictitious scenario in which Alice and Bob perform phase-
error correction based on quantum error correction codes. This method is essen-
tially a refinement of the early security proofs mentioned above. See Ref. [23] and
Ref. [18].
 Leftover hashing lemma approach: It is based on finding a lower bound of the
smooth min-entropy of the sifted key, after which the security of the final key is
guaranteed by applying the leftover hashing lemma. It was introduced by Renner
[24], see also Ref. [25].
Even though these two approaches are based on different mathematical tools, their
conclusions are very similar. In fact, Tsurumaru [26] has recently shown that both
approaches are essentially equivalent. In what follows, we treat them as a single security
framework, and summarise its conclusions.
1.1.3.1 Security framework
Let us assume that Alice and Bob share some unknown quantum state ρABE , where A
(B) represents Alice’s (Bob’s) system, and E represents anything else in the universe
that may be entangled with these systems, which we assume to be held by the eaves-
dropper, Eve. Let us further assume that, to generate her raw key Z of length N , Alice
performs a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) Z on A. For simplicity, we
assume here that the system A is composed of N qubit subsystems, and Alice’s mea-
surement can be decomposed as Z = Z(1) ⊗Z(2) ⊗ . . .⊗Z(N), where Z(k) is a Z-basis
measurement on the k-th qubit. Essentially, the objective of the security proof is to
estimate how much information Eve could have on Z. After doing so, this information
can be removed from the key in the privacy amplification step. To generate his sifted
key Z′, Bob also performs a measurement on B; however, since Bob will later correct
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his key to match Alice’s, the details of his measurement are not important for the task
of proving the secrecy of Alice’s key Z.
To estimate Eve’s information on Z, we consider an alternative fictitious scenario
in which, instead of Z, Alice performs an alternative measurement X on system A,
obtaining a string X. Alice’s alternative measurement X must be mutually unbiased5
with Z; for simplicity, we will assume that it can be decomposed as X = X(1)⊗X(2)⊗
. . .⊗X(N), where X(k) is an X-basis measurement on the k-th qubit. In this alternative
fictitious scenario, usually called the virtual protocol, Bob will attempt to predict Alice’s
string X by performing some measurement on his system B; we denote by X′ the result
of this measurement. The fundamental question to ask is: if Alice and Bob had run
the virtual protocol, what would be the error rate between X and X′? This quantity
is known as the phase-error rate, eph. Let us suppose that we could guarantee that, if
Alice and Bob had run the virtual protocol, they would have obtained an error rate of
eph = 0. Then, it would be impossible for Eve to have any information at all on Alice’s
actual key Z. Moreover, in general, if Alice and Bob could guarantee that there is some
upper-bound eUph ≤ 1/2 such that eph ≤ eUph with certainty, then Eve’s information on
Z is guaranteed to be at most Nh(eUph) bits.
In practice, due to the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, Alice and Bob can
never be certain that, if they had run the virtual protocol, they would have obtained
an error rate eph ≤ eUph for any eUph < 1/2. At most, they will be able to make a
statistical claim on eph, i.e. find an e
U






≤ ε for some
small failure probability ε. If they are able to do so, then, provided that they sacrifice
Nh(eUph)+log2 ε
−1
PA bits in the privacy amplification step, Alice’s final key is guaranteed






It is useful to see ε as the probability that Alice and Bob’s estimation of the phase-error
rate is wrong, and εPA as the probability that the privacy amplification step won’t
produce a fully secret key, even if the estimation of the phase-error rate is correct.
Taking into account the secret-key bits spent in the error correction and verification
5The leftover hashing lemma framework can prove security even if Alice’s measurement bases are
not mutually unbiased, but the performance degrades significantly.
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− λEC − log2 ε−1c − log2 ε−1PA, (1.9)
and the key is guaranteed to be εsec-secure, where εsec = εs + εc.
Asymptotic regime The previous equations imply that there is a trade-off between
the εs and εc parameters and the secret-key length: the more bits one is willing to
sacrifice in the privacy amplification and error verification steps, the more secure the
final key is. This trade-off is especially important for low values of N , but as N grows,
its effect becomes progressively less pronounced. In fact, in the limit of N → ∞, one
can choose any desired value of εs and εc with no penalty. To see why, note that, if we
divide the net secret-key length in Eq. (1.9) by the total amount of rounds Ntot, we
















where Qs = N/Ntot is the per-round probability to obtain a sifted-key bit. In the limit
of Ntot →∞6, for any (non-zero) value of εc and εPA, the last two terms in Eq. (1.10)
vanish; thus, we can take εc → 0 and εPA → 0 with no effect in the key rate. Moreover,
if Ntot →∞, all statistical fluctuations in the estimation of the phase-error rate vanish,
and we can take ε → 0 with no penalty in the estimation. Since εs is a function of ε
and εPA, see Eq. (1.8), we can take εs → 0 and εc → 0 with no key-rate penalty.
Many security proofs of QKD assume the asymptotic regime in which Ntot → ∞;
in these, the εs and εc parameters do not play an important role. Conversely, they are
relevant in the so-called finite-key security proofs, which take into account the statistical
fluctuations that arise in a real implementation of the protocol. In Section 1.2.1.4, we
elaborate on this distinction.
1.1.3.2 Example: BB84 protocol
At first glance, the security framework above seems to be applicable only to
entanglement-based protocols, in which Alice and Bob make measurements on the
incoming states, which they regard as having been prepared by Eve. However, for
6Note that, since the length of the sifted key N is an increasing function of the total number of
rounds Ntot, the conditions N →∞ and Ntot →∞ are equivalent.
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prepare-and-measure protocols, one can always find an equivalent entanglement-based
scenario in which, instead of preparing quantum states, Alice entangles the photonic
mode with a fictitious ancilla system, and then performs a measurement on the ancilla.
For example, in the BB84 protocol, when Alice chooses the Z basis, she randomly
selects and emits one of |0Z〉B or |1Z〉B, where B is the photonic system sent to Bob.




(|0Z〉A |0Z〉B + |1Z〉A |1Z〉B), (1.11)
and performed a Z-basis measurement on the qubit ancilla A. Similarly, when she
chooses the X basis, she randomly selects and emits one of |0X〉B or |1X〉B; instead,




(|0X〉A |0X〉B + |1X〉A |1X〉B), (1.12)
and performed an X-basis measurement on A. Note that |ΨZ〉 = |ΨX〉 =: |Ψ〉, implying
that Alice could generate the state |Ψ〉 in all rounds, and then randomly decide a basis
to measure system A. Moreover, since only Alice has access to system A, it does
not actually matter when she performs her measurement: we can imagine that Alice
waits until Bob has received all signals to randomly choose a basis and carry out the
measurement.
The security framework in Section 1.1.3.1 assumes that Alice’s (Bob’s) sifted key is
the result of a Z-basis measurement on the system A (B) of some state ρABE . Since in
the BB84 protocol Alice and Bob define their sifted keys as the outcomes of the detected
Z-basis rounds, we need to define the state ρABE for the systems A and B corresponding
to these rounds only. For this, in the fictitious entanglement-based scenario, Bob must
first learn whether or not each signal will produce a click in his detectors, and only
afterwards perform his actual measurement on these detected signals. More specifically,
we assume that Bob first performs a quantum-non-demolition (QND) measurement on
all incoming pulses and stores the surviving signals in a quantum memory. Then, for
each of the stored signals, Alice and Bob each choose a random measurement basis; the
state ρABE is defined as the systems A and B corresponding to the detected rounds in
which they both selected the Z basis, and E represents Eve’s side information on these




To prove the security, we consider the error rate that Alice and Bob would have
obtained if they had run the virtual protocol, i.e. if they had measured systems A and
B of ρABE in the X basis, rather than in the Z basis. Note that, in the virtual protocol,
Alice generates |Ψ〉 in all rounds, Bob performs a QND measurement, learning which
rounds are detected, and then, for each detected round:
1. With probability pZApZB , the round is considered a key round; Alice and Bob
measure their systems A and B in the X basis, obtaining strings X and X′, which
have an error rate eph.
2. With probability pXApXB , the round is considered a test round; Alice and Bob
measure their systems A and B in the X basis and announce their bit outcomes,
learning their error rate eX .
3. With probability pZApXB + pXApZB , the round is discarded.
That is, in the virtual protocol, Alice and Bob perform exactly the same measure-
ment in the key rounds and in the test rounds. Thus, in the limit of N →∞, the error
rates of both sets of rounds must be identical, i.e. eph = eX . For finite values of N , the
two error rates may not be exactly identical, due to statistical fluctuations. However,
the task of finding an upper bound eUph on eph from the observed value of eX is a simple
random sampling problem, which can be tightly solved using existing statistical results
[11, 18, 25].
Role of Alice and Bob in the proof The security framework in Section 1.1.3.1
introduces a fundamental distinction between Alice’s and Bob’s roles in the protocol.
Namely, its objective is to estimate the information that Eve has on Alice’s Z-basis key
Z, and it achieves this by considering how well Bob could predict Alice’s key X if she
had used the X basis instead. This asymmetry results in different assumptions about
the users: the security framework assumes that Alice’s measurements are performed on
qubits, and that her (X-basis) measurement of ρABE in the virtual protocol is mutually
unbiased with her (Z-basis) measurement in the actual protocol, while it makes no such
assumptions on Bob’s measurement. This has important consequences when using the
framework to prove the security of a prepare-and-measure protocol such as BB84, in
which Alice’s “measurement” is performed on a fictitious ancilla qubit. The requirement
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that she uses two mutually unbiased bases to perform her fictitious measurement means
that, in the actual protocol, Alice must encode her signals in two mutually unbiased
bases7. On the other hand, Bob does not need to use two mutually unbiased qubit
bases to perform his actual measurement; his devices can be imperfect, to some extent.
However, the proof in Section 1.1.3.2 does require two important assumptions on Bob’s
measurement setup:
1. Bob’s choice of basis is fully random; Eve cannot tamper with the probability
that in a given round Bob will choose one basis or another.
2. Bob’s overall detection efficiency (the probability that a given pulse is detected)
is independent of his choice of basis; this must hold for any signal that Eve may
send to Bob.
Note that we could also have applied the security framework to prove the secrecy of
Bob’s key, rather than Alice’s. If we did so, the assumptions on the two users would flip:
Bob must now perform a perfect qubit measurement in two mutually unbiased bases,
while Alice does not need to employ two mutually unbiased bases in her fictitious
measurement. In the actual protocol, this would allow for some flaws in her state
preparation. Namely, Alice’s source could be uncharacterised, as long as it is basis
independent [23, 27], i.e. ρZ = ρX , where ρZ (ρX) is the average state emitted when
Alice chooses the Z (X) basis. Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 1.2.1.3, Bob’s
measurement device is considered to be more difficult to secure and characterise than
Alice’s source; thus, in security proofs, one usually chooses to prove the secrecy of Alice’s
key. In fact, the above two requirements on Bob’s measurement setup are already very
difficult to meet in practical implementations of QKD.
1.2 Challenges and contribution
Here, we introduce two of the main hurdles that QKD needs to clear before it can be
widely deployed as an alternative to the current public-key cryptographic infrastructure:
(1) how to ensure that practical implementations are information-theoretically secure,
despite their inevitable imperfections; and (2) how to obtain higher secret-key rates over
7The condition on the encoding bases is actually slightly weaker than being mutually unbiased; see
discussion around Eq. (1.25) in Section 1.2.2.2.
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longer distances. In doing so, we review recent theoretic and experimental advances to
tackle these problems, including the contributions made in the works presented in this
thesis.
1.2.1 Challenge I: Practical security
Security proofs of QKD are essentially mathematical theorems that start from the
postulates of quantum mechanics and assumptions about the devices used by Alice
and Bob, and their conclusion is the information-theoretic security of the protocol,
as defined in Section 1.1.2. However, security proofs only apply to real-life scenarios
if the latter perfectly meet all the assumptions made in the former. Some common
assumptions made in QKD security proofs include:
 Alice and Bob’s labs are perfectly shielded from the outside; Eve can only interact
with the signals that travel through the quantum channel;
 Alice’s source emits perfectly-encoded single photons;
 Bob’s choice of basis is fully random, and the overall detection efficiency is the
same for both bases; and
 Alice and Bob run the protocol for an infinite number of rounds, allowing them
to perform a perfect statistical characterisation of their quantum channel.
These assumptions are often not met in real-life implementations of QKD. In the
following, we review the main imperfections, and the theoretical developments that
have been proposed to deal with them.
1.2.1.1 Single-photon sources, weak-coherent pulses, and the decoy-state
method
While many different systems have been proposed to implement quantum computers,
such as ions, atoms, light, or spins, the inevitable part of any QKD protocol is light,
since Alice and Bob are separated by a macroscopic distance [28]. The BB84 protocol
assumes that Alice emits qubit states, so it must be implemented using qubit states
of light, for example, the polarisation state of a single photon, or the relative phase
between the single-photon states of two spatial or temporal modes of light. However, it
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is experimentally challenging to produce a high-quality and high-performance heralded
single-photon source. Thus, in practice, attenuated laser sources are used in most QKD
experiments. The output of these sources can be regarded as a coherent state |α〉, where
α is a complex number and µ = |α|2 is the intensity of the pulse. This coherent state







and the phase of the complex number α determines the relative phases between different







∣∣∣√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ∣∣∣ dθ = ∞∑
n=0
Pn|µ |n〉〈n| , (1.14)
where Pn|µ = e
−µµn/n! follows a Poisson distribution of mean µ. That is, a phase-
randomised coherent state (PRCS) is a classical mixture, rather than a superposition,
of photon-number states.
Most QKD experiments rely on PRCS sources, rather than single-photon sources,
although these introduce security loopholes that need to be dealt with. For example,
in the BB84 protocol with a PRCS source, a powerful Eve could perfectly learn Alice’s
key bit in all multi-photon (n ≥ 2) emissions, using the photon-number-splitting attack
[29, 30]: (1) Eve performs a non-demolition measurement, learning the photon number
of each signal; (2) she splits multi-photon signals, storing one photon in a quantum
memory; and (3) she waits until the basis announcement step to measure it in the
correct basis, thus learning the encoded bit without introducing any errors. In principle,
Eve could also block single-photon signals, and ensure that all multi-photon signals
produce a click in Bob’s detectors, thus learning a significant fraction of the key.
Fortunately, Ref. [31] showed that, to prove the security of the protocol, it is suffi-
cient to obtain a lower bound on the fraction of bits in the sifted key that originated
from single-photon emissions, as well as an upper bound on the phase-error rate of
these bits. That is, it is not necessary to know which specific bits originated from
single photon emissions; by estimating these parameters, one can bound Eve’s total
sifted-key information, and then remove this information in the privacy amplification
step. The authors of Ref. [31] themselves proposed a method to obtain these bounds:
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take the pessimistic assumption that all errors are caused by single-photon emissions,
and that all multi-photon signals emitted by Alice have been detected by Bob. Unfor-
tunately, this assumption results in a poor performance in the presence of high loss: if
the rate of multi-photon emissions exceeds the rate of detections, all detections could
be caused by multi-photon signals, and no secret-key rate can be extracted at all. Thus,
in the presence of high losses, Alice must use a very weak laser intensity to ensure that
the rate of multi-photon emissions is very low. However, this also reduces the rate
of single-photon emissions, resulting in a key-rate drop. It can be shown that, for a
channel with transmissivity η, the optimal laser intensity is µopt ≈ η, and the resulting
protocol has O(η2) scaling [30], rather than O(η) as in the single-photon case.
Shortly after, a much more precise way to estimate the relevant parameters was
proposed: the decoy-state method [32–34]. Its key idea is to employ different laser
intensities to statistically characterise the effect of the channel on different photon
number states. Let QTµ be the detection rate (gain) of the PRCS ρµ when Alice and
Bob both choose basis T ∈ {Z,X} and let Y Tn be the detection probability (yield) of the
photon-number state |n〉 when Alice and Bob both choose basis T . In the asymptotic
regime, observed gains and yield probabilities converge to the same value, and from







for any intensity µ. Similarly, if we denote by EXµ the error rate observed when Alice
chooses intensity µ and both users choose the X basis, and by eXn the error probability











Therefore, by using different intensities µ, and observing their gains and error rates,
one obtains restrictions on the possible values of Y Zn and e
X
n . In fact, if one were to use
infinitely-many values of µ, one could precisely estimate Y Zn and e
X
n for all n. However,
to obtain a good lower bound on Y Z1 and a good upper bound on e
X
1 , it is enough to
use three different intensities [34, 35]. The net key rate obtainable is
Rnet ≥ Q1[1− h(eX1 )]− fQµh(Eµ), (1.17)
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where Q1 = Y1µe
−µ is the gain due to single-photon signals. Decoy-state BB84 has
O(η) scaling, and offers a performance comparable to the single-photon version of the
protocol.
Continuous vs discrete phase randomisation The results above assume that
Alice can generate pulses with a uniformly random phase in the continuous range
[0, 2π), see Eq. (1.14). However, this is difficult to achieve experimentally. A naive
attempt to produce continuous-phase-randomised pulses would be turning the laser on
and off for each emission. However, experiments have shown that this approach results
in residue correlations between consecutive pulses [36], especially in high-speed systems
[37, 38], which breaks the uniform randomness assumption. Moreover, continuous phase
randomisation has a fundamental problem: it is extremely challenging to verify that a
continuous phase is indeed fully random.
An alternative approach is to randomise the phase actively, using a random number
generator to choose a phase, and a phase modulator to modulate it into the pulse. How-
ever, using this method, the set of possible random phases is necessarily discrete, and
while discrete randomness is much easier to certify, it breaks the continuous assumption
of the decoy-state method. Thus, the standard decoy-state security proofs cannot be
applied to a discretely-randomised QKD implementation. This problem was considered
by Cao et al. [39], who proved the security of a discrete-phase-randomised decoy-state
BB84 protocol using computational methods. Their numerical results showed that,
while discretely-randomised decoy-state BB84 offers strictly worse secret-key rates than
the equivalent continuously-randomised protocol, the performance of the former is close
to the latter with as few as ten random phases. Recently, in Ref. [40], we have used sim-
ilar ideas to prove the security of a discrete-phase-randomised twin-field QKD protocol.
We expand on this work in Section 1.2.2.2.
1.2.1.2 Countermeasures against source flaws
Security proofs often assume that Alice’s source can produce perfectly encoded single-
photon states, or if they consider decoy-state sources, that Alice’s single-photon com-
ponents are perfectly encoded. For example, in the ideal BB84 protocol, it is assumed
that Alice prepares the perfect qubit states |0Z〉, |1Z〉, |0X〉 and |1X〉, which belong to
two mutually unbiased encoding bases. As we have seen in Section 1.1.3.2, when we
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have such a source, we can estimate the phase-error rate in one basis directly using the
observed bit-error rate in the other basis. More precisely, in the asymptotic regime,
the phase-error rate in one basis is exactly equal to the bit-error rate in the other basis,
while in the finite-key regime, the two quantities can be easily related using a trivial
random sampling analysis. As we have seen in Section 1.1.3.2, if one can guarantee
that Bob’s measurement is ideal, the condition to apply this trivial phase-error rate
estimation is relaxed to ensuring that Alice’s source is basis independent, i.e. ρZ = ρX .
However, due to flaws in the encoded states, even the basis independence condition
may not be met in practical implementations, allowing Eve to gain information on
which basis Alice has chosen in a specific round. In fact, by performing an unambigu-
ous state discrimination (USD) attack, Eve can in principle unambiguously determine
Alice’s basis choice, although she will sometimes obtain an indeterminate result, which
she can try to mask as channel loss. However, if the source is such that ρZ ≈ ρX ,
this USD attack would result in very high losses that may not be compatible with the
actual measurement results obtained in the protocol, suggesting that security may still
be possible. In fact, Lo and Preskill [41] proposed an analysis that can prove security
even if the source is basis dependent. The performance of their protocol depends on a
parameter that quantifies the basis dependency: if the source is close to basis indepen-
dent, the performance is good, but the secret-key rate deteriorates very quickly as the
basis dependency increases. Their framework was later extended to prove security in
the presence of information leakage from the phase modulator [42] and the decoy-state
intensity modulator [43, 44].
State preparation flaws and the loss-tolerant protocol Because the analysis
of Lo and Preskill [41] is general, it results in very pessimistic key rates for a certain
type of source imperfection, the so-called state preparation flaws (SPFs). These arise
from the finite precision of modulation devices, and are very common in experimental
implementations. For example, Alice’s source may produce states of the form
|ψi〉 = cos(θi/2) |0Z〉+ sin(θi/2) |1Z〉 , (1.18)
where |0Z〉 and |1Z〉 form an orthonormal qubit basis, and i ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X , 1X} rep-
resents Alice’s choice of state. With ideal encoding, Alice’s states would be such that
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θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = π, θ0X = π/2, and θ1X = 3π/2; however, due to SPFs, the real an-
gles may differ from these ideal values. The crucial difference between the states in
Eq. (1.18) and those produced by an arbitrary basis-dependent flaw is that, in the lat-
ter, the encoding flaws may be in an arbitrary dimension, while in the former, all the
encoded states are in the same qubit space, spanned by the basis vectors {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉}.
Because of this, Eve will not be able to exploit channel loss to perform an undetected
USD attack. The idea is the following: let us assume that |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 and |ψ3〉 are any
states in the same qubit space. These states form a plane in the Bloch sphere, and any
other state |ψ4〉 that is also in this plane may be expressed as,
|ψ4〉〈ψ4| = c1|4 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ c2|4 |ψ2〉〈ψ2|+ c3|4 |ψ3〉〈ψ3| , (1.19)
where c1|4, c2|4 and c3|4 are real coefficients. Let us assume that Alice and Bob run a
protocol in which Alice emits |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 and |ψ3〉, and let Yi be the yield of the state
|ψi〉, i.e. the probability that Bob obtains a successful detection given that Alice emits
|ψi〉. Then, from Eq. (1.19), it follows that
Y4 = c1|4Y1 + c2|4Y2 + c3|4Y3. (1.20)
That is, Alice and Bob can estimate the yield of the state |ψ4〉 without actually emitting
this state.
Based on this idea, Tamaki et al. [45] proposed the loss-tolerant protocol, which can
provide an almost identical performance to a perfect BB84 protocol in the presence of
large SPFs. In this protocol, Alice emits three different states, and the only assumption
is that they are characterised and in the same qubit space. For simplicity, let us assume
that the three states are in the form of Eq. (1.18), i.e. in the XZ plane of the Bloch
sphere, and denote them as |ψ0Z 〉, |ψ1Z 〉 and |ψ0X 〉. Let us also assume that Alice and
Bob generate their sifted keys from the detected events in which Alice selects |ψ0Z 〉
or |ψ1Z 〉 and Bob chooses the Z basis. As in Section 1.1.3.2, to prove the security, we
consider the phase-error rate eph that Alice and Bob would have obtained in the virtual





(|0Z〉A |ψ0Z 〉B + |1Z〉A |ψ1Z 〉B), (1.21)
and Alice and Bob respectively measure systems A and B in the X basis. This is
equivalent to Alice preparing the state |ψvirj〉 ∝ A〈jX |ΨZ〉 with probability pvirj =
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‖A〈jX |ΨZ〉‖2, where j ∈ {0, 1}. The phase-error rate formula can then be expressed




vir1)/YZ , where Y
kX
virj is the probability that Bob’s X-basis
measurement results in an outcome k when Alice emits |ψvirj〉, and YZ is the rate at
which Bob obtains a successful detection when Alice chooses the Z basis. To know eph,
we need to estimate Y 1Xvir0 and Y
0X
vir1, since YZ is directly observable. For this, since the
virtual states are in the same Bloch sphere plane as the real states, one can use the
idea in Eqs. (1.19) and (1.20) to find the following expressions,




















where the yields on the RHS are directly observable from the protocol, and the coef-
ficients ci|virj are real and known. Thus, using this method, the phase-error rate can
be estimated precisely, and the protocol is loss tolerant to SPFs, i.e. Eve cannot hide
behind channel loss to perform an undetected USD attack.
The finite-key security of the loss-tolerant protocol was first demonstrated in
Ref. [46], and more recently in Ref. [47], where we derived significantly tighter finite-
key security bounds, see Section 1.2.1.4. Moreover, recent works have shown that the
protocol is also secure in the presence of additional source imperfections, such as in-
formation leakage or pulse correlations, as long as their magnitude is sufficiently small
[48, 49].
1.2.1.3 Countermeasures against measurement flaws
In general, detectors are much more difficult to secure against side-channel attacks than
sources. Using optical isolation devices, Alice can typically prepare her signals in a pro-
tected environment outside the reach of the eavesdropper, and by verifying a random
sample of these signals, she can in principle characterise her source. Neither of these
hold for Bob’s measurement device: he cannot be isolated from the outside world, as he
must receive and measure the incoming pulses; and it is extremely difficult to charac-
terise his measurement, since Eve may send any kind of signal to him, including strong
optical pulses and even x-rays or neutrinos. Thus, the majority of hacking attacks that
have been theoretically proposed and/or experimentally demonstrated against QKD
systems exploit flaws in its detectors [50, 51], and while suitable countermeasures have
been found to close some of these, the fact remains that they are typically the weakest
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spot in the security of a QKD system. Fortunately, as we will see next, there is a class
of protocols in which neither Alice nor Bob perform any measurement on quantum
states, and are thus not vulnerable to any detector side-channel attack.
Measurement-device-independent QKD The first protocol of this kind was
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [52], see also Ref. [53], and the class of
protocols is sometimes referred to as MDI-type. In MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob both send
BB84-encoded states to an untrusted middle node Charlie, who (if honest) performs
a Bell state measurement (BSM) on the incoming pulses, see Fig. 1.3, and announces
the result. If Charlie truly performs a BSM, he will learn whether the users’ bits are
correlated or anti-correlated, but will not gain any information about their specific bit
values. The users can then use the announced correlation information to correct errors
in their keys. If Charlie is dishonest, and tries to learn some information about the
encoded bit values, he will inevitably introduce some errors in at least one of the two
bases. The security proof of MDI-QKD does not make any assumption on Charlie’s
measurement, treating him as a black box, and thus the protocol is not vulnerable to











Figure 1.3: Schematic diagram of MDI-QKD [52]. Alice and Bob send polarisation-
encoded BB84 pulses to a middle node Charlie, who performs a BSM based solely on
linear optics components, which is able to project the incoming pulses onto two out of
the four Bell states. A click in D1H and D1V, or in D2H and D2V, indicates a projection
onto the Bell state |Ψ+〉 = 12(|HV 〉+ |V H〉); thus, the users’ bits should be correlated
(anti-correlated) if they both selected the X (Z) basis. A click in D1H and D2V, or in
D2H and D1V, indicates a projection onto the Bell state |Ψ−〉 = 12(|HV 〉 − |V H〉); the
users’ bits should be anti-correlated if they both selected the same basis.
The main experimental challenge of MDI-QKD is performing high-visibility two-
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photon interference between photons arising from independent and far-away laser
sources. One must ensure that both photons are close to identical, which requires
the use of feedback mechanisms to compensate for the different time-dependent po-
larisation rotations and propagation delays in the two independent optical fibres [51].
Moreover, since MDI-QKD requires two detectors to click, its key rate is more vulner-
able to low detector efficiencies [54] than that of BB84, although this can be mitigated
by the use of SNSPD detectors, whose efficiency can be as high as 93% [55]. Also, the
need for two-fold coincidence detector events makes the protocol more resilient to dark
counts, allowing it to reach longer distances. In fact, Ref. [56] implemented MDI-QKD
over a 404 km total distance, a record at the time.
The original MDI-QKD scheme used polarisation encoding, but alternative phase-
encoding schemes have been proposed [57, 58]. Moreover, some recently introduced
MDI-type protocols can improve key-rate scaling with distance, the best known of which
are memory-assisted QKD and twin-field QKD; we introduce these in Section 1.2.2.1
and Section 1.2.2.2. Note that, when implementing MDI-QKD, one still needs to deal
with all the flaws associated with the user sources. In fact, these can have an even
bigger impact in MDI-type protocols, since each flaw may now be present in both users,
rather than just Alice. Fortunately, MDI-QKD can be combined with essentially all
the source countermeasures introduced in Section 1.2.1.1 and Section 1.2.1.2, including
the decoy-state method and the loss-tolerant protocol [45].
1.2.1.4 Asymptotic assumption and finite-key security
As we have seen in Section 1.1.3, to prove the security of a QKD protocol, one typically
needs to estimate the phase-error rate, which can be used to bound the amount of
information that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. This parameter is defined as the
error rate that Alice and Bob would have obtained if they had run the virtual protocol
instead of the actual protocol, and must be statistically bounded using data obtained
in the actual protocol. For simplicity, many security proofs assume the asymptotic
limit of Ntot →∞, in which case one can often obtain a perfect estimate of the phase-
error rate, since all statistical deviation terms vanish. However, real QKD experiments
must run for a finite number of rounds, and the more-complex finite-key security proofs
consider the statistical fluctuations that inevitably arise in its estimation. How these
are accounted for can have an important impact in the secret-key rate obtainable.
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As pointed out in Section 1.1.2.1, when one considers security against coherent
attacks, the detection statistics of a given round may depend on the choices made
and outcomes obtained in other rounds, i.e. Eve’s attack is not necessarily IID between
different rounds of the protocol. However, as seen in Section 1.1.3.2, for simple protocols
that rely on two mutually unbiased encoding bases, the statistical fluctuation task
can be trivially reduced to a random sampling problem. This problem can then be
solved using concentration bounds for sums of independent random variables, such as
Chernoff bounds [59], even if Eve performs a coherent attack. This is because, when
the encoding bases are mutually unbiased, Eve does not have any information about
Alice’s basis choice; one can even think of an equivalent fictitious scenario in which the
choice is made after Eve’s attack. However, many protocols do not rely on mutually
unbiased encoding bases, either because they take into account source imperfections,
see Section 1.2.1.2, or because of the inherent design of the protocol. In these cases,
finite-key regime proofs become more complex, and often employ Azuma’s inequality
[60] to deal with the dependency between different rounds of the protocol that may
exist due to a coherent attack. However, Azuma’s inequality is typically less tight than
Chernoff bounds, which results in lower secret-key rates.
The issue of statistical fluctuations is especially important for decoy-state protocols.
In the asymptotic regime, one can in principle obtain perfect estimates of the single-
photon yield Y Z1 and phase-error rate e
X
1 , but in the finite-key regime, one must apply a
complex statistical fluctuation analysis to obtain bounds on these parameters. Several
works have considered the finite-key security of decoy-state BB84 [61, 62] and MDI-
QKD [63, 64].
Our contribution [47]: Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant QKD based on
random sampling theory In the asymptotic regime, the loss-tolerant protocol pre-
sented in Section 1.2.1.2 can obtain a perfect estimation of the phase-error rate, and
consequently provides an almost identical performance to an ideal BB84 protocol in
the presence of SPFs. However, since the loss-tolerant protocol does not rely on mutu-
ally unbiased encoding bases, its finite-key phase-error rate estimation task cannot be
trivially reduced to a random sampling problem, as in the case of the BB84 protocol.
The previous finite-key analysis of the protocol in Ref. [46] relied on the application of
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Azuma’s inequality to estimate the phase-error rate, which results in a worse perfor-
mance than random sampling inequalities.
In Ref. [47], presented in Chapter 2, we show that, if Alice probabilistically assigns
tags to her detected emissions, the phase-error rate estimation of the loss-tolerant
protocol can be non-trivially reduced to a random sampling problem, which can be
tightly solved using Chernoff bounds. In doing so, we obtain significantly better secret-
key rates than the previous analysis based on Azuma’s inequality. This has important
implications for existing and future implementations of loss-tolerant QKD, and also
for the security of QKD in general, since it shows that one may use random sampling
techniques to prove the security of protocols for which it was not thought possible.
1.2.2 Challenge II: Improving key-rate scaling with loss
The first and best-known QKD protocol, BB84, is a prepare-and-measure point-to-
point protocol: Alice sends encoded single photons to Bob through a direct quantum
channel, such as an optical fibre, and then Bob performs a measurement on these
photons. While theoretically simple and relatively easy to implement, these protocols
have a fundamental practical problem: they cannot be performed over long distances,
at least over standard optical fibre. The reason is that, in optical fibres, the channel
transmittance η decreases exponentially with its length. With a moderate channel
length of 100 km, around one in every hundred photons emitted by Alice reach Bob’s
lab. Over a 300-km channel, achievable by today’s BB84 implementations [65], the rate
of photon arrivals drops to around one in a million. If one increases the channel length
to 1000 km, which falls short of covering the Earth’s circumference, only around one
in 1020 photons survives: even with a very ambitious source repetition rate of 10 GHz,
it would take Bob hundreds of years to receive just one single photon from Alice.
Fundamental bounds show that the secret-key rate of point-to-point QKD protocols
cannot exceed − log2(1− η) [66], which is approximately equal to ηln 2 for low values of
η. In other words, point-to-point protocols have at best O(η) secret-key rate scaling.
The theoretical solution to this problem has been known for many years, in what
is known as quantum repeaters [67], see Fig. 1.4. Conventionally, they are based on
entanglement swapping: given an entangled state between A and C1 and another en-
tangled state between B and C2, one can entangle systems A and B by performing
a BSM on C1 and C2. Thus, if one wants to create an entangled state over a long
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distance L, one can generate two entangled states over half the distance, L/2, and then
perform entanglement swapping. Similarly, the entanglement over a distance L/2 can
be created by swapping two entangled states generated over a distance L/4, and so on.
In a quantum repeater setup, the long channel separating Alice and Bob is divided into
many smaller segments, and a node is placed between each of them. The nodes must
be equipped with two quantum memories (QMs), one connected to each link, while the
end users, Alice and Bob, must have one QM each. The idea is that, if one manages
to generate entanglement over all the elementary links, then one can perform succes-
sive entanglement swapping rounds until Alice and Bob themselves end up becoming
entangled.
To generate the elementary entanglement, each node can simply generate an en-
tangled pair locally, store half of the pair in one of their QMs, and send the other half
over its respective segment. Of course, it is possible that, in any of these emissions,
the photon does not arrive to the destination. If so, the emitter generates another
entangled state locally, replaces the state in his QM by half of the new pair, and emits
the other half, repeating this step until the receiver confirms that a photon has arrived
and their associated QM has been loaded. If the original channel had a transmissivity
of η, then each of the n segments has now a transmissivity of n
√
η, and the probability
that all of the photons survive path loss in the first trial is ( n
√
η)n = η, exactly the
same as the probability that a single photon will survive path loss through the entire
Alice-Bob channel. However, the key is that it is not necessary for all the photons to
survive path loss in the same round: the QMs can store the surviving photons while
the unsuccessful emissions are retried.
Thanks to this, a quantum repeater scheme with ideal QMs can provide exponen-
tially better quantum communication rates than direct transmission. Unfortunately,
state-of-the-art QMs are far from ideal, and their coherence times are not good enough
to implement a quantum repeater setup. However, the fact remains that point-to-point
protocols have at best O(η) scaling, and to overcome this limitation a protocol needs
to have at least one middle node. Interestingly, this is not a sufficient condition: the
MDI-QKD protocol introduced in Section 1.2.1.3 is a well-known counterexample. In
MDI-QKD, both of Alice’s and Bob’s photons need to survive path loss in the same
round, which happens with probability (
√
η)2 = η. Thus, while offering other advan-
tages, standard MDI-QKD cannot improve key-rate scaling with respect to a BB84
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ALICE BOBNODE 1 NODE 2 NODE n-1
QM QMQM QM QM QM QM QM. . .
Figure 1.4: Example of a quantum repeater. The first step is to attempt to generate
entanglement between each QM pair linked by a double-headed arrow, using a heralded
entanglement distribution scheme [67–69]. Each QM pair repeats this step until the
entanglement has been successfully generated. The repetition rate is limited by the
transmission delay over the corresponding elementary link. When all QM pairs have
become entangled, there will be successive rounds of entanglement swapping, in which
the nodes in the middle perform a BSM, and announce the result. At the end of the
process, Alice and Bob’s QMs will be entangled.
protocol. However, as we will see next, some recently-proposed MDI-type protocols
can achieve O(
√
η) scaling, and can thus potentially reach longer distances.
1.2.2.1 Memory-assisted QKD
The reason why MDI-QKD has O(η) scaling is that, to obtain a successful BSM, both
Alice’s and Bob’s photons need to survive path loss in the same round. If Charlie could
interfere photons that have survived on different rounds, the scaling would be improved
to O(
√
η). Memory-assisted (MA) QKD [70, 71] achieves this by placing two QMs on
Charlie’s setup, see Fig. 1.5. This way, a surviving photon on, say, Alice’s side can









(when both QMs are loaded)Heralded loading
Figure 1.5: Schematics of MA-QKD [70, 71]. The setup is similar to that of MDI-QKD,
see Fig. 1.3, with the addition of two quantum memories on Charlie’s setup.
MA-QKD is similar to a quantum repeater with a single node, but there are impor-
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tant differences between the two setups. In the latter, Alice and Bob would generate an
entangled state locally, store half of the pair in their own QM, and send the other pair
to Charlie, repeating this procedure until Charlie’s associated QM has been loaded.
Then, once both of Charlie’s QMs are loaded, he would retrieve the states, perform a
BSM, and communicate the result to Alice and Bob, after which the state on Alice’s
and Bob’s QMs should be entangled. At that point, if their goal is to perform QKD,
Alice and Bob can measure their QM randomly in either the Z or X basis. Note that, in
this single-node repeater setup, the performance of Alice’s and Bob’s QMs is clearly the
bottleneck, since they have to store their quantum states since the beginning. On the
other hand, Charlie’s early-loaded QM needs to store the quantum state until his late
QM is loaded, while the late QM is read immediately after loading. The idea behind
MA-QKD is that, if Alice’s and Bob’s goal is to perform QKD, they do not actually
need to wait until the end of the protocol to perform the measurement on their local
state; they can measure in the very beginning, eliminating the need for a QM. In fact,
Alice and Bob do not actually need to generate an entangled pair and measure half
of it. They can simply encode BB84 states, which is equivalent; see discussion around
Eq. (1.11). Another related difference is the protocol repetition rate. In a single-node
quantum repeater, Alice (Bob) needs to wait for Charlie to announce whether his QM
has been loaded to initiate another attempt, since to do so she (he) must store half of
a newly generated entangled pair in their QM, destroying the previous state. However,
in MA-QKD, Alice and Bob can emit photons as fast as they can be stored in Charlie’s
QM. The potentially faster repetition rate can significantly reduce the average storage
time of Charlie’s early QM, making MA-QKD an attractive alternative to a single-node
quantum repeater.
Because of these differences, MA-QKD places far less stringent demands on QMs
than even a single-node quantum repeater. However, despite these reduced require-
ments, it is not clear if state-of-the-art QMs are sufficiently advanced for MA-QKD
to provide an advantage over a memory-less MDI-QKD setup in realistic conditions.
Reference [72] has recently reported an MA-QKD experiment over a total loss of 70 dB,
equivalent to around 350 km of real optical fibre, although Alice and Bob were located
in the same lab. This proof-of-principle demonstration obtained a higher secret-key rate
than that of an ideal memory-less MDI-QKD setup. However, the comparison may not
be entirely fair, since the MA-QKD setup had to be run at a relatively low repetition
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rate of 1 MHz, while standard MDI-QKD has achieved clock rates of 1 GHz [73]. In
terms of secret-key bits per second, the improved scaling with loss cannot offset the
103 times lower repetition rate. Still, given that its main limitation is the performance
of QMs, which are rapidly improving, MA-QKD is a promising protocol to perform
QKD at longer distances. In fact, it could potentially offer higher key rates at longer
distances than its main alternative, twin-field QKD, which we will shortly discuss in
Section 1.2.2.2. Moreover, theoretical and experimental work on MA-QKD brings us
closer to the ultimate goal of worldwide trust-free quantum communications, since it is
the stepping stone between point-to-point QKD and a full quantum repeater.
All-photonic alternative MA-QKD improves the key-rate scaling of MDI-QKD
because it allows Charlie to interfere pulses that have survived in different rounds.
The same O(η) scaling could be achieved if each of Alice and Bob were connected to
Charlie through multiple channels, and Charlie could combine pulses that have survived
in different channels, rather than in different rounds. Based on this idea, Ref. [74]
proposed an all-photonic protocol in which Charlie performs QND measurements to
check on which channels the signals have arrived, and then passes them through optical
switches to interfere the surviving pulses. While certainly interesting, this protocol is
far from being implementable with current technology [75].
Our contribution [76]: Finite-key analysis of decoy-state MA-QKD Previ-
ous theoretical work [70, 71, 77, 78] on MA-QKD had compared its performance with
that of memory-less MDI-QKD under idealistic experimental conditions. Namely, they
assumed that the users employed single-photon sources and considered only the asymp-
totic regime in which the protocol is run for an infinite number of rounds. Their results
suggested that, using state-of-the-art QMs, MA-QKD can only provide a modest secret-
key rate advantage for a small window of distances, around 350 km to 450 km, which is
still difficult to implement experimentally.
In Ref. [76], presented in Chapter 3, we have analysed the performance of MA-QKD
under more realistic conditions: (1) assuming that the users employ weak coherent
pulse (WCP) sources, in combination with the decoy-state method; and (2) taking into
account the statistical fluctuations that arise from running the protocol for a finite
number of rounds. Our results suggest that MA-QKD is significantly more resilient
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to decoy-state finite-key effects than an equivalent MDI-QKD system, and can thus
outperform the latter at much shorter distance regimes when these effects are taken
into account. This has important implications for MA-QKD experiments that aim to
demonstrate a key-rate advantage with respect to memory-less setups.
1.2.2.2 Twin-field QKD
Recently, Lucamarini et al. [79] devised a more practical approach to obtain O(
√
η)
scaling, known as twin-field (TF) QKD. The idea is to substitute the two-photon in-
terference of MDI-QKD by single-photon interference, which requires only one photon
to survive path loss, hence the O(
√
η) scaling. In TF-QKD, Charlie’s measurement
setup may be regarded as an imperfect BSM in the qubit space spanned by vacuum
(|0〉) and single-photon (|1〉) states, and requires only standard optical elements, see
Fig. 1.6. The original proposal only proved the security of TF-QKD against restricted
eavesdropping attacks, but a later work proved its security against general attacks
[80]. Moreover, since then, several variants of the scheme have been proposed and also
proven to be secure against general attacks [81–84]. The main experimental challenge
of TF-QKD is the precise phase stability needed to perform single-photon interference
with pulses originating from two remote independent lasers. Thus, in the first proof-of-
principle TF-QKD experiments [85–88], Alice and Bob were located in the same lab,
which facilitated the implementation of the feedback mechanisms needed to phase-lock
their respective lasers. Nevertheless, later experiments [89, 90] implemented TF-QKD
with independent lasers over 502 km and 509 km of ultra-low-loss fibre, obtaining higher
secret-key rates than the fundamental bounds on point-to-point QKD. A recent exper-
iment has performed TF-QKD over a record-breaking 605 km of optical fibre [91].
TF-QKD with single-photon sources Practical variants of TF-QKD rely on WCP
sources, typically in combination with the decoy-state method. However, the idea
behind TF-QKD is perhaps best understood by looking at a single-photon version of
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Figure 1.6: Schematic view of Charlie’s measurement in TF-QKD. A click on detector
Dc (Dd) is associated with constructive (destructive) interference at the 50:50 beam-
splitter (BS). The states emitted by Alice and Bob depend on the specific TF-QKD
variant.
it [83], in which Alice and Bob prepare the states
|Z0〉 = |0〉 with prob. q










1− q |1〉 with prob. 1/2.
(1.24)
Note that these states do not define two mutually unbiased bases; for starters, the
X-basis states are not even orthogonal to one another. However, the two bases can still
be regarded as complementary, since the state preparation could have been replaced by
the generation of the entangled state
|Ψ〉 = √q |0〉F |Z0〉+
√
1− q |1〉F |Z1〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉F |X0〉+ |−〉F |X1〉) (1.25)
followed by either a Z-basis or a X-basis measurement on the fictitious qubit ancilla
F . Thus, if one extracts the key from the detected Z-basis emissions, one can directly
estimate the phase-error rate using the bit-error rate of the detected X-basis emissions,
and vice-versa, with a similar argument as for the BB84 protocol in Section 1.1.3.2.
In the Z basis, events in which Alice and Bob send the same state and Charlie
reports a success are considered an error. In order to keep the error rate low, it is
important that 12  q . 1. Emissions of |0〉 |0〉 are very common, but they should
produce very few clicks on Charlie’s detectors, while emissions of |1〉 |1〉 are unlikely to
happen, since (1 − q)2 is very low; thus, the bulk of the detections should be due to
emissions of |1〉 |0〉 and |0〉 |1〉, the error-free terms. An emission of |1〉 |0〉 (|0〉 |1〉) results
in a detection if the photon survives path loss over the Alice-Charlie (Bob-Charlie)
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channel, which happens with probability
√
η. This implies that the protocol has O(
√
η)
scaling. In the X basis, the definition of an error depends on the specific detector that
has clicked. When Charlie reports a click on detector Dc (Dd), an emission of |X0〉 |X1〉
or |X1〉 |X0〉 (|X0〉 |X0〉 or |X1〉 |X1〉) is considered to be an error, since these should
result in destructive (constructive) interference. Note that both bases have errors that
are inherent to the protocol, i.e. they occur even if the devices and channel are ideal.
This stands in contrast with MDI-QKD, where, in the absence of Eve, all errors occur
due to imperfections in the channel, sources or measurement. Despite this, TF-QKD




The version of the protocol presented here uses the Z and X basis to encode.
However, the users could have substituted either of these by the Y basis,
|Y0〉 =
√
q |0〉 − i
√





1− q |1〉 with prob. 1/2,
(1.26)
equivalent to measuring the ancilla F of Eq. (1.25) in the Y basis.
Curty-Azuma-Lo variant The single-photon TF-QKD protocol presented above
has a simple theoretical description, and it is useful to understand the idea behind TF-
QKD. However, |X0〉 and |X1〉 are superpositions of vacuum and single-photon states,
which are very difficult to generate in practice. Thus, most proposals, including the
original proposal in Ref. [79], approximate the above single-photon idea using WCP
sources. Here, we focus on the variant proposed in Ref. [83], which approximates the








(−1)ncn |n〉 = c0 |0〉 − c1 |1〉+ c2 |2〉 − c3 |3〉+ . . . ,
(1.27)
which differ from |X0〉 and |X1〉 only in the presence of multi-photon components n > 1.
To prove the security of a key generated by emitting these states, one needs to consider




(|0X〉F |α〉+ |1X〉F |−α〉). (1.28)
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In particular, one needs to estimate the phase-error rate that the users would obtain if
they had measured the ancillas in Eq. (1.28) in the Z basis, rather than in the X basis.




|0Z〉F (|α〉+ |−α〉) +
1
2
|1Z〉F (|α〉 − |−α〉). (1.29)
This imples that the virtual protocol is equivalent to a scenario in which the users emit
the even and odd cat states









with probabilities pC0 = ‖F 〈0Z |ΨX〉‖2 and pC1 = ‖F 〈1Z |ΨX〉‖2, respectively. As in the
single-photon version, a phase-error occurs when the users send the same Z-basis state,
i.e. |C0〉 |C0〉 or |C1〉 |C1〉, and the round is detected.
Ideally, Alice and Bob would estimate the phase-error rate directly by emitting
these cat states. However, they are very difficult to generate experimentally. Instead,
Ref. [83] proposed to bound the detection rates of the cat states indirectly. Assum-
ing the asymptotic regime and collective attacks, and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz










where j ∈ {0, 1}, N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd) numbers, YCjCj is the
yield probability of |Cj〉 |Cj〉, and Ynm is the yield probability of |n〉 |m〉. The only step
missing is to estimate Ynm, which can be done by emitting PRCS and applying the
decoy-state method.
A similar protocol with a slightly different security proof was independently pro-
posed by Ref. [84]. In the literature, these two closely-related variants are sometimes
referred to as no-phase-postselection TF-QKD.
Our work [92]: Finite-key security analysis of TF-QKD The protocol proposed
by Ref. [83] has a simple experimental setup, and also a relatively-simple asymptotic
security proof. However, its extension to the finite-key regime is not trivial. For
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starters, their analysis assumes collective attacks. As mentioned in Section 1.1.2.1,
in the asymptotic regime, security against collective attacks implies security against
general attacks, but in the finite-key regime, it does not. Moreover, the protocol clearly
does not rely on two complementary encoding bases, since the detection statistics of
the cat states are estimated indirectly, and thus does not admit the simple statistical
fluctuation analysis based on random sampling introduced in Section 1.1.3.2. Also, the
asymptotic formula in Eq. (1.31) is a function of infinitely many yield probabilities Ynm.
In practice, one can only obtain good bounds for the lower order terms, and the authors
proposed to trivially upper bound the rest by one. In the finite-key regime, however,
one does not deal with yield probabilities, but rather with actual measurement results,
and it is not possible to apply this trivial upper bound.
In Ref. [92], presented in Chapter 4, after carefully accounting for all the difficulties
above, we prove the finite-key security of the protocol against general attacks. In doing
so, we show that the protocol can overcome the fundamental bounds on point-to-point
QKD with around 1010 transmitted signals, corresponding to around 10 s, assuming a
repetition rate of 1 GHz.
Our work [40]: Security of TF-QKD with discrete phase randomisation As
mentioned above, many variants of TF-QKD have been proposed to implement the basic
single-photon interference idea with WCP sources. Essentially, all of them rely on the
decoy-state method in one way or another. For example, the protocol explained above
relies on it to estimate the detection statistics of photon-number states, an important
step in estimating the phase-error rate. The decoy-state method assumes that the
users can emit WCPs with a fully-random continuous phase. However, as explained in
Section 1.2.1.1, these states are very difficult to generate in practice, and essentially
impossible to certify. It is much easier to randomise the phase of a pulse discretely, using
a random number generator and a phase modulator, and this approach is commonly
used in practice. However, by doing so, one breaks the assumptions of the existing
security proofs, and the implementation may not be secure.
In Ref. [40], presented in Chapter 5, we introduce and prove the security of a TF-
QKD variant that relies exclusively on discrete-phase randomisation. The quantum
phase of our variant is similar to that of Ref. [83], but uses discrete, rather than contin-
uous, phase randomisation in the test mode. Surprisingly, our discretely-randomised
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protocol can actually provide higher secret-key rates than the proposal by Ref. [83].
The reason is that discrete randomisation allows the users to post-select the events in
which they chose exactly the same phase, and the post-selected data provides a tighter
estimation of the phase-error rate. This shows that, although it is typically treated
as a source flaw, discrete phase randomisation can actually offer advantages in some
scenarios.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we provide an alternative finite-key analysis for the loss-tolerant protocol.
In Chapter 3, we present our analysis of the performance of decoy-state MA-QKD in
the finite-key regime. In Chapter 4, we prove the finite-key security of the TF-QKD
variant introduced in Ref. [83]. In Chapter 5, we present a TF-QKD variant that relies
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distribution based on random
sampling theory
2.1 Abstract
The core of security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the estimation of a
parameter that determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need to
apply in order to distill a secret key. To estimate this parameter using the observed
data, one needs to apply concentration inequalities, such as random sampling theory
or Azuma’s inequality. The latter can be straightforwardly employed in a wider class
of QKD protocols, including those that do not rely on basis independent sources, such
as the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol. However, when applied to real-life finite-length
QKD experiments, Azuma’s inequality typically results in substantially lower secret-
key rates. Here, we propose an alternative security analysis of the LT protocol against
general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent
versions, that is based on random sampling theory. Consequently, our security proof
provides considerably higher secret-key rates than the previous finite-key analysis based
on Azuma’s inequality. This work opens up the possibility of using random sampling




Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant users, Alice and Bob, to generate
a shared secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, with unbounded compu-
tational power [1, 2]. To prove the security of QKD, we often consider the error rate
that Alice and Bob would have obtained in a fictitious scenario, known as the phase-
error rate, which directly bounds the amount of sifted-key information that could have
leaked to Eve, and determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need
to apply to distill a secret key [3–6]. Since Alice and Bob cannot directly observe the
phase-error rate, they must estimate it using the data collected in the test rounds, i.e.
the detected rounds which are not used to generate the sifted key. For this estima-
tion, it is indispensable to employ statistical techniques. For example, in the case of
the BB84 protocol [7] without source flaws, one can use the fact that Alice’s source is
basis independent to estimate the Z-basis phase-error rate from the X-basis bit-error
rate, and vice-versa, using random sampling theory [8, 9]. In protocols where the user
sources are basis dependent, the detection statistics of a particular round may depend
on the basis choices made in previous rounds, and Azuma’s inequality [10] has been
typically applied to deal with this dependency [11–14]. However, recently, Maeda et al.
[15] have successfully applied a non-trivial security analysis based on random sampling
theory to a twin-field QKD variant in which the users do not employ a basis indepen-
dent source. This work raises the obvious question of whether random sampling theory
could also be applied to other protocols that do not use a basis independent source,
and whose security proofs currently rely on Azuma’s inequality. Since the estimation of
Eve’s side information is the core of QKD security proofs, investigating the possibility
of using different estimation techniques deepens our understanding of QKD protocols
and their security. Moreover, it has important experimental implications, in terms
of the secret-key rate obtainable, since concentration bounds for independent random
variables, such as the Chernoff bound, are typically tighter than those for dependent
random variables, such as Azuma’s inequality.
One obvious candidate to investigate is the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol [12], a three
state protocol that is resistant to state preparation flaws (SPFs), which arise from the
finite precision of modulation devices. Earlier attempts to address SPFs [16] resulted
in a performance that degraded very quickly with moderate-to-high channel losses.
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Conversely, even in the presence of large SPFs and high losses, the performance of the
LT protocol is close to that of a perfect four-state BB84 protocol, at least in the limit
of infinitely-long keys [12]. Recent works [17–19] have shown that one can prove the
security of the LT protocol in the presence of additional source imperfections, such
as mode dependencies, Trojan horse attacks or pulse correlations, as long as one can
ensure that their magnitude is sufficiently small. Also, the LT protocol can be combined
with measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [20] to guarantee the security in the
presence of arbitrarily flawed detectors. Moreover, the LT protocol is highly practical
and can be implemented with off-the-shelf devices. In fact, several experiments have
implemented the LT protocol [21, 22], and a variation of it [23] set a fibre QKD distance
record. For these reasons, a deep understanding of its security is of theoretical and
practical interest.
Clearly, in the LT protocol, Alice’s source is not basis independent. For starters,
in its standard three-state formulation, Alice only emits one of the two X-basis states.
However, even if one were to apply the LT idea to a four-state protocol, the source
would still be basis dependent, due to the SPFs. Thus, Azuma’s inequality has been
used in both the asymptotic [12] and finite-key [13] security proofs of the LT protocol.
In the asymptotic regime, the specific statistical technique employed does not affect
the performance, since the deviation terms vanish in the limit of infinitely-long keys.
However, choosing the tightest statistical technique available does have an impact on
the key rate obtainable in (existing and future) real-life finite-length implementations
of the LT protocol.
In this paper, we show how the finite-key security of the LT protocol against general
attacks can be reduced to a random sampling problem, for both its original prepare-
and-measure (P&M) version and its MDI version. This random sampling problem can
be solved using concentration inequalities for sums of independent random variables,
which results in tighter bounds than those of a previous analysis [13] based on Azuma’s
inequality. Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.3, we present our general
statistical analysis, inspired by that of Ref. [15], and apply it to a generic scenario. In
Section 2.4, we show how this analysis can be used to estimate the phase-error rate of
the P&M LT protocol, and in Section 2.5, we do the same for the MDI LT protocol. In
Section 2.6, we give an expression for the secret-key rate obtainable in both protocols.
In Section 2.7, we simulate the secret-key rate obtainable for different values of the
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block size, and compare it with that of alternative analyses. Finally, in Section 2.8, we
conclude our paper.
2.3 General statistical analysis
In this section, we present our general estimation procedure and apply it to a generic
scenario, which we denote as the Tagged Virtual Protocol (TVP). Its name refers to the
fact that, as we will see in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, one can draw an equivalence between
the TVP and the virtual protocols of both LT P&M QKD and LT MDI QKD, once
the users probabilistically assign tags to their emissions.
In the TVP, the users emit, amongst others, the states ρvir, ρpos and ρneg, with
probabilities pvir, ppos and pneg. These may be states sent by Alice, in the P&M
protocol, or joint states sent by Alice and Bob, in the MDI protocol. Also, ρvir is one of
the virtual states, emitted only in the virtual protocol, while ρpos and ρneg are actual
states, emitted also in the actual protocol. These states satisfy
ρvir = cposρpos − cnegρneg (2.1)
where cpos and cneg are some non-negative coefficients such that cpos − cneg = 1. For
reasons that will become clear later on, we assume that the users assign a tag of
t ∈ {vir,pos, neg} to each emission of ρt. That is, each emission of ρvir is trivially
assigned a tag t = vir, and so on. In the quantum communication phase of the protocol,
some of these emissions will be detected. Here, a “detection” refers to any process that
depends on Eve’s attack and distinguishes some emissions from others. For the P&M
protocol, we will define a detection as an event in which Bob obtained a particular
measurement result, and for the MDI protocol, as an event in which Charlie reports a
projection to a particular Bell state. We denote by Nt the number of detected emissions
with a tag of t, i.e., the number of detected emissions of ρt. In the actual protocol,
the outcome of the random variables Npos and Nneg can be directly observed by the
users, but the outcome of Nvir cannot, and must be estimated. Thus, the objective
of the analysis is to find a statistical relationship between Nvir, Npos and Nneg; more
specifically, we want to find a function f such that Pr[Nvir > f(Npos, Nneg; ε)] ≤ ε,
where ε can be made arbitrarily small.
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The starting point of the analysis is Eq. (2.1), which we now rewrite as
ρpos = pρvir|posρvir + pρneg|posρneg, (2.2)
where pρvir|pos = 1/cpos and pρneg|pos = cneg/cpos. Equation (2.2) implies that sending
ρpos is equivalent to sending ρvir with probability pρvir|pos and ρneg with probability
pρneg|pos. That is, the TVP is indistinguishable from the following scenario:
– The users select tag t ∈ {vir,pos, neg} with probability pt.
– If t = pos, the users emit ρvir with probability pρvir|pos, or ρneg with probability
pρneg|pos.
– If t ∈ {vir,neg}, the users emit ρt.
In the above scenario, some emissions of ρvir will have a tag of “vir”, and some will
have a tag of “pos”, but they are otherwise identical. The same is true for emissions of
ρneg with tags of “neg” and “pos”. Thus, one can go even further, and think of another
equivalent scenario in which the users first decide the quantum state that they emit,
and then probabilistically assign a tag to it. Namely:
Modified scenario
 The users select and emit the state ρx ∈ {ρvir, ρneg} with probability p̃ρx :=
px + ppospρx|pos.
 Next, they assign their emission the tag t = x with probability p̃x|ρx :=
px/p̃ρx , or the tag t = pos with probability p̃pos|ρx := 1− p̃x|ρx .
This modified scenario is equivalent to the TVP in terms of tags, because:
1. The overall probability to assign a particular tag t ∈ {vir,pos, neg} is the same
in both scenarios, i.e. pt.
2. The quantum state emitted given a particular tag t is the same in both scenarios,
i.e. ρt.
In the modified scenario, let Ñρxt be the number of detected emissions of ρx with




t be the total number of detected emissions of ρx, and Ñt =∑
x Ñ
ρx









pos , and Ñneg = Ñ
ρneg
neg . The equivalence above implies that, for any
attack by Eve, the set of random variables {Nvir, Npos, Nneg} in the TVP has an identical
distribution as the set {Ñvir, Ñpos, Ñneg} in the modified scenario. Hence, if we find a
function f such that Pr
[
Ñvir > f(Ñpos, Ñneg; ε)
]
≤ ε in an execution of the modified
scenario, then it must also be the case that Pr
[
Nvir > f(Npos, Nneg; ε)
]
≤ ε in an
execution of the TVP. The equivalence between the two scenarios is shown in Fig. 2.1.
. . . . . . 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the Tagged Virtual Protocol (TVP) and the modified
scenario. In the modified scenario, each emission of ρvir (ρneg) is assigned a tag of
either “vir” (“neg”) or “pos” with a fixed probability, in such a way that emissions
with a tag of t ∈ {vir,neg, pos} are equivalent to emissions of ρt in the TVP. In the
modified scenario, the detection statistics of each emission must be independent of the
tag assigned to it, since Eve does not have any tag information. Hence, each of the
Ñρvir (Ñρneg) detected emissions of ρvir (ρneg) is assigned a tag of either “vir” (“neg”) or
“pos” with the a priori fixed probability. This allows us to find a statistical relationship
between the random variables Ñvir := Ñ
ρvir




pos and Ñneg := Ñ
ρneg
neg
using a random sampling analysis, see Eq. (2.5). Since the TVP is equivalent to the
modified scenario, the same relationship must hold for the random variables Nvir, Npos
and Nneg in the TVP, see Eq. (2.6).
The random tag assignments in the modified scenario allow us to find a bound
on Ñvir by using a random sampling analysis. The key idea is that the probability
to assign a particular tag to a particular emission must be independent of whether
the emission is detected or not, since the tag assignment does not change the emitted
quantum state, and Eve does not have any tag information. Thus, each of the Ñρvir
detected emissions of ρvir is assigned a random tag of “vir” or “pos” with probabilities
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p̃vir|ρvir and p̃pos|ρvir = 1 − p̃vir|ρvir , respectively. This implies that Ñ
ρvir
vir is a random
sample of a population of Ñρvir = Ñρvirvir + Ñ
ρvir
pos elements, where each item is sampled




Ñρvirpos , p̃vir|ρvir , ε/2
)
, (2.3)
where gU is defined in Eq. (2.38). Similarly Ñ
ρneg
pos is the size of a random sample of




neg elements, where each item is sampled with





Ñneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)
, (2.4)
where gL is defined in Eq. (2.38).
Using the relations Ñvir = Ñ
ρvir




pos , and Ñneg = Ñ
ρneg
neg , in
combination with Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), we have that
Ñvir ≤ gU
(






Ñneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)




except with probability ε, where in the first inequality we have used Eq. (2.3), and
in the second inequality we have used Eq. (2.4) and the fact that gU is an increasing
function with respect to its first argument.
As explained above, the random variables {Nvir, Npos, Nneg} in the TVP are iden-
tically distributed as the random variables {Ñvir, Ñpos, Ñneg} in the modified scenario.





Nneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)
, p̃vir|ρvir , ε/2
)
:= f(Npos, Nneg; ε), (2.6)
except with probability ε, as required. Since Npos and Nneg are observables of the
actual protocol, Alice and Bob can use their observed values to obtain an upper bound
on Nvir.
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we explain how to apply this statistical analysis to the LT
protocol, for both its P&M and MDI versions. In this protocol, the virtual states and
the actual states are all in the same qubit space. Because of this, each virtual state can
be expressed as an operator-form linear function of the actual states. However, this
linear function does not necessarily have one positive term and one negative term, as in
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Eq. (2.1). To apply the analysis above, the users will first probabilistically assign tags
of “pos” and “neg” to some of their emissions, in such a way that the average state
with a tag of t ∈ {pos,neg} is ρt. After these tag assignments, the resulting tagged
virtual protocol will be equivalent to the TVP, shown on the left side of Fig. 2.1.
2.4 Prepare-and-measure protocol
In this section, we apply our analysis to the P&M LT protocol [12]. For each round,
Alice sends Bob a pure state |ψj〉a with probability pj , j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, where emissions
of |ψ0X 〉a (|ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a) are considered to belong to the X (Z) basis. The only
assumption needed to apply our analysis is that Alice’s states are characterised and
linearly dependent, i.e. they are all in the same qubit space. For simplicity, in this
discussion we assume that the states are in the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere; in
Section 2.B, we show how to apply our results in the general case. Bob measures the
incoming signals in the Z or in theX basis, with probabilities pZB and pXB , respectively.
We do not need to assume that Bob’s measurement bases are mutually unbiased, but
we do assume that his choice of basis is fully random, and that the detection efficiency
is the same for both bases. Afterwards, Bob reveals which rounds were detected, and
both users reveal their basis choice in those rounds. The sifted key is generated from
the detected events in which Alice and Bob both chose the Z basis. The detected
rounds in which Bob chose the X basis are considered to be test rounds. In these, Bob
will reveal his measurement result. The full protocol description is given in Section 2.C.
The objective of the security analysis is to estimate the number of phase errors in
the sifted key, using the test data. To define this quantity, we consider an equivalent
entanglement-based virtual protocol, in which Alice replaces the key emissions by the





|0Z〉A |ψ0Z 〉a + |1Z〉A |ψ1Z 〉a
)
, (2.7)
where a is the photonic system sent to Bob and A is Alice’s fictitious qubit ancilla, which
she keeps in her lab. For simplicity, in Eq. (2.7), we have assumed that p0Z = p1Z . The
key generated in the actual protocol is equivalent to the key that Alice and Bob would
obtain by performing a Z-basis measurement on the systems A and a of the detected
rounds in which Alice generated |ΨZ〉Aa. The number of phase errors is defined as the
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number of errors that Alice and Bob would have observed if they had measured these
systems A and a in the X basis instead. This is equivalent to a scenario in which, in
the key rounds, Alice sends Bob the virtual states
|ψvirα〉a =
|ψ0Z 〉a + (−1)α |ψ1z〉a√






pZA(1− (−1)α 〈ψ0Z |ψ1Z 〉a), (2.9)
and Bob measures these states in the X basis. Here, pZA is the probability that Alice
selects the Z basis, and α ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, Alice’s choice of state in the virtual protocol




pvir0pZB |0〉S |ψvir0〉a +
√
pvir1pZB |1〉S |ψvir1〉a +
√
p0ZpXB |2〉S |ψ0Z 〉a
+
√
p1ZpXB |3〉S |ψ1Z 〉a +
√
p0XpXB |4〉S |ψ0X 〉a +
√
p0XpZB |5〉S |ψ0X 〉a ,
(2.10)
and then performs a measurement on system S. Note that S holds information about
Alice’s and Bob’s setting choices. For instance, |2〉S represents the events in which Alice
selects the virtual state |ψ0Z 〉a and Bob chooses the X basis. In the right-hand side of
Eq. (2.10), the first two terms are associated with virtual events. That is, the events
in which Alice and Bob select the Z basis in the actual protocol, but their basis choice
is replaced by the X basis in the virtual protocol. All the other terms in Eq. (2.10)
correspond to actual events that occur in the actual protocol.
In the virtual protocol that we have just defined, the occurrence of a phase error is
defined as an event in which Alice measures system S, obtains the outcome 0 (1), and
Bob’s X-basis measurement outputs the bit value 1 (0). The measurement statistics
associated with these events cannot be directly observed, since the virtual states are
never sent in the actual protocol. However, as we show in Section 2.B, one can exploit
the fact that the virtual states and the actual states live in the same qubit space to find
an operator-form linear relationship between the virtual states and the actual states.
Namely,
ρvir0 = c0Z |vir0ρ0Z + c1Z |vir0ρ1Z + c0X |vir0ρ0X ,
ρvir1 = c0Z |vir1ρ0Z + c1Z |vir1ρ1Z + c0X |vir1ρ0X , (2.11)
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where ρvirα ≡ |ψvirα〉〈ψvirα |a, ρj ≡ |ψj〉〈ψj |a, and the coefficients cj|virα can be positive,
negative or zero depending on the form of the actual states {|ψj〉a}. For example,
when there are no SPFs, the emitted states are |ψ0Z 〉a = |0Z〉a, |ψ1Z 〉a = |1Z〉a and
|ψ0X 〉a = |0X〉a; and Eq. (2.11) becomes ρvir0 = ρ0X and ρvir1 = ρ0Z +ρ1Z −ρ0X . Next,
in order to employ the analysis in Section 2.3, we rewrite Eq. (2.11) as
ρvir0 = cpos0ρpos0 − cneg0ρneg0 , (2.12)
ρvir1 = cpos1ρpos1 − cneg1ρneg1 , (2.13)








pj|tα |ψj〉〈ψj |a . (2.15)






Now, each of Eqs. (2.12) and (2.13) is identical to Eq. (2.1), the starting point of the
statistical fluctuation analysis introduced in Section 2.3. We will apply this analysis
to estimate the detection statistics of each virtual state, separately. Recall that, in the
TVP defined in Section 2.3, the states sent are ρvir, ρpos and ρneg (see Fig. 2.1). How-
ever, in the virtual protocol defined above, Alice does not emit the states ρpos0 , ρpos1 ,
ρneg0 and ρneg1 . Instead, Alice will probabilistically assign tags of t0 ∈ {pos0, neg0} and
t1 ∈ {pos1,neg1} to some of her emissions, in such a way that the average state with
a tag of t0 (t1) is ρt0 (ρt1). After doing so, we can draw an equivalence between the
virtual protocol and the TVP.
More concretely, let us consider the events in which Alice emits |ψj〉a, j ∈
{0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and Bob chooses the X basis, corresponding to measuring system S of
Eq. (2.10) in 2, 3 or 4. Each of these events occurs with probability pj,XB = pjpXB ,







or a tag of tα = junkα otherwise; where α ∈ {0, 1}, pj|tα is given by Eq. (2.16), and
ptα is the total probability of assigning tag tα. Note that the assignment of tag t0
and of tag t1 is done independently: each of these emissions will have both a tag of
t0 and a tag of t1. This is allowed because our key idea relies only on a probabilistic
assignment of a tag, and even if multiple assignments are made for a single pulse, the
argument still holds. In Eq. (2.17), the conditional probabilities ptα|j,XB become fixed
once one chooses the value of ptα , which must be such that ptα ≤ pjpXB/pj|tα for all
j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, since ptα|j,XB ≤ 1. In order to waste as few test rounds as possible,
and thus obtain a tight estimate of the number of phase errors, we assume that Alice






Moreover, in the virtual protocol, Alice assigns a deterministic tag of t0 = vir0 (t1 =
vir1) to each emission of |ψvir0〉a (|ψvir1〉a), corresponding to S = 0 (S = 1).
After these tag assignments, an emission with a tag of tα is equivalent to an emission
of ρtα . Thus, if Alice disregards the outcome of her measurement of system S, and
considers only the tags of tα that she assigns, the virtual protocol becomes equivalent
to a scenario in which Alice actually emits ρtα with probability ptα , and then trivially
assigns her emission a tag of tα. This scenario, which we denote as the the Tagged
Virtual Protocol α and depict on the right side of Fig. 2.2, is identical to the TVP




) be the number of detected events with a tag of t0 (t1) in which Bob
obtained measurement result 1X (0X). Equation (2.6) of Section 2.3 implies that, in





N1Xneg0, p̃pos0|ρneg0 , ε/4
)
, p̃vir0|ρvir0 , ε/4
)
, (2.19)





N0Xneg1, p̃pos1|ρneg1 , ε/4
)
, p̃vir1|ρvir1 , ε/4
)
, (2.20)
where, for α ∈ {0, 1}, p̃virα|ρvirα = pvirα/(pvirα + pposα/cposα) and p̃posα|ρnegα = 1 −
pnegα/(pnegα + pposαcnegα/cposα). Moreover, since the virtual protocol is equivalent to
the Tagged Virtual Protocol 0 (1), in terms of the assigned tags of t0 (t1), Eq. (2.19)
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S = 1 . . . . . . 
Figure 2.2: Relation between the virtual protocol and the Tagged Virtual Protocol
α, where α ∈ {0, 1}, for the P&M scheme. In the virtual protocol, events for which
S ∈ {2, 3, 4} are probabilistically assigned a tag of tα ∈ {posα,negα, junkα} (dashed
arrows), in such a way that the average state with a tag of tα is ρtα . Events for which
S = α are deterministically assigned a tag of tα = virα (solid arrow). If one considers
only the tags of tα that Alice has assigned, the virtual protocol becomes equivalent to
the Tagged Virtual Protocol α. The ellipses at the top of the diagram represent events
which are identical in both scenarios, but which are not relevant for the analysis.
(Eq. (2.20)) must also hold for the virtual protocol. Thus, combining Eqs. (2.19)
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except with probability ε.




α ∈ {0, 1} and tα ∈ {posα,negα}, must be observables in an actual implementation
of the protocol. Thus, the probabilistic tag assignments defined in Eq. (2.17) must
happen in the actual protocol too. However, note the following: (1) the tag assigned to
a particular emission must be independent of Bob’s measurement result, since the tag
assignment does not change the emitted quantum state; and (2) the assignment of tag
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tα is only relevant for the analysis if Bob happens to obtain a measurement outcome of
(α⊕1)X in that round. This implies that it is only necessary for Alice to probabilistically
assign a tag of t0 (t1) to the events in which she sent |ψj〉a, j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and Bob
obtained measurement result 1X (0X). For a full description of the protocol, including
the tagging step, see Section 2.C.
2.5 Measurement-device-independent protocol
In this section, we apply our analysis to the LT MDI QKD protocol. For each round, Al-
ice (Bob) selects the state |ψj〉a (|ψ′s〉b) with probability pj (p′s), where j (s) ∈ {0, 1, τ},
and sends it to an untrusted middle node Charlie. As in the P&M case, the only as-
sumption required to apply our analysis is that all states emitted by Alice (Bob) are
in the same qubit space. For simplicity, in this discussion we assume that all states lie
in the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere; in Appendix D, we show how to treat the case
in which they do not. Emissions for which j ∈ {0, 1} (s ∈ {0, 1}) are considered to
belong to the Z basis, and for simplicity their selection probability is assumed to be






Z/2). We denote Alice and Bob’s joint state by
|ψj,s〉ab ≡ |ψj〉a ⊗ |ψ′s〉b, and its associated probability by pj,s ≡ pjp′s.
Alice and Bob expect Charlie to perform a Bell state measurement on each incoming
joint pulse, and announce the result. In most MDI protocols, including the original
MDI QKD proposal [20], Charlie may obtain a projection to one of two Bell states.
However, for simplicity, for now we assume that Charlie attempts to obtain a projection
to only one of the four Bell states, and that if he is successful (unsuccessful), he reports
the round as “detected” (“undetected”). At the end of the section, we show how to
generalise the analysis to the case in which Charlie may report a projection to two
or more different Bell states. Also, note that Charlie is untrusted, and may even be
fully controlled by Eve. Thus, in what follows, we directly assume that it is Eve who
performs the measurements and announces the results. Importantly, Eve is not limited
to measuring each round independently: if she performs a coherent attack, her full set
of announcements may depend on an arbitrary general measurement acting jointly on
the photonic systems of all the rounds in the protocol.
After Eve’s announcements, Alice and Bob reveal, for each round, whether
or not they used the Z basis, thus learning whether or not (j, s) ∈ Z :=
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{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. The rounds for which (j, s) /∈ Z are automatically con-
sidered to belong to the set of test emissions, which we denote as T . The rounds for
which (j, s) ∈ Z receive a special treatment: with probability pK|Z they are considered
key emissions, and with probability pT |Z they are considered test emissions, where K
is the set of key emissions, and pK|Z + pT |Z = 1. This is needed because we want to
use data from some Z-rounds to estimate the phase-error rate. The resulting scenario
is shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 2.3. For all rounds in T , Alice and Bob reveal
their choice of (j, s).
Figure 2.3: Relationship between the actual protocol and the Tagged Virtual Protocol
in the MDI scenario. In the actual protocol, shown on the left, emissions such that
(j, s) ∈ Z are probabilistically assigned to either K or T , while emissions such that
(j, s) /∈ Z are always assigned to T . In both the actual and virtual protocols, events
in T are probabilistically assigned a tag of t ∈ {pos,neg, junk}, in such a way that the
average state with a tag of t is ρt. The dashed arrows represent this tagging process. In
the virtual protocol, K-emissions are substituted by emissions of ρph and ρph, and are
assigned tags of “ph” and “ph”, respectively. If Alice and Bob consider only the tags
that they have assigned, the virtual protocol becomes equivalent to the tagged virtual
protocol, shown on the right.
Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as her (his) choices of j (s) in the detected
rounds in K. The objective of the analysis is to use the detection statistics of the
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T -rounds to estimate the number of phase errors in their sifted keys. This quantity is
defined as the number of errors that Alice and Bob would have obtained if they had
run a virtual scenario in which they replaced the K-emissions by the generation of the
virtual state |ΨK〉 = 12
∑
j,s=0,1 |jZ , sZ〉AB |ψj,s〉ab, followed by an X-basis measurement
on their local ancillas A and B. Let ΠphAB be the projector onto the phase-error subspace
in AB. Note that the definition of a phase error depends on the particular Bell state
onto which Charlie is supposed to project the incoming pulses. The average state of a






|ψj,s〉〈ψj,s|ab = pph|Kρph + pph|Kρph, (2.22)
where ρph and ρph are quantum states such that pph|Kρph = TrAB[Π
ph
AB |ΨK〉〈ΨK|] and
pph|Kρph = TrAB[(I − Π
ph
AB) |ΨK〉〈ΨK|]. Thus, the virtual protocol may be regarded as
the following scenario: the users jointly select K or T with probabilities pK = pZpK|Z
and pT = 1− pK, respectively, and
 If they select K, they emit ρph and ρph with probabilities pph|K and pph|K, respec-
tively.
 If they select T , they emit |ψj,s〉ab with probability pj,s|T = pj,spT |j,s/pT , where
pT |j,s = pT |Z if (j, s) ∈ Z and pT |j,s = 1 if (j, s) /∈ Z.
The number of phase errors, Nph, is defined as the number of detected emissions of
ρph that Alice and Bob would have observed if they had run this virtual protocol. To
estimate this quantity, we use again the random sampling analysis of Section 2.3. To
apply this analysis, however, we need to first show that ρph can be written in the form
of Eq. (2.1), i.e.,
ρph = cposρpos − cnegρneg, (2.23)
and then add a tagging step to the protocol, so that it becomes equivalent to a scenario
in which the states ρpos and ρneg are actually emitted. In Section 2.B, we show that







where ρj,s ≡ |ψj,s〉〈ψj,s|ab and the coefficients cj,s are real and can be negative. Thus, if
we denote by Spos (Sneg) the set of pairs (j, s) such that cj,s is positive (negative), and,












|cj,s|/ct if (j, s) ∈ St,
0 otherwise,
(2.27)
we obtain Eq. (2.23).
In the tagging step, Alice and Bob need to probabilistically assign tags of “pos”
and “neg” to their emissions in T , in such a way that the average state with a tag of
t is ρt. To achieve this, in the actual protocol, Alice and Bob must assign a tag of





where pj,s|t is given by Eq. (2.27), and pt|T is the probability that a round in T is
assigned a tag of t. Note that the assignment probabilities pt|j,s,T become fixed once
one chooses pt|T . From Eq. (2.28), it follows that the value of pt|T must be such that






and we assume that Alice and Bob choose this value, in order to waste as few T -rounds
as possible and thus obtain a tight estimate of the phase-error rate. Finally, Alice and
Bob assign the tag “junk” to all the remaining rounds in T that have not been tagged
as “pos” or “neg”.
Since T -emissions are identical in the actual and virtual protocols, the previous tag
assignments can be regarded as taking place in both protocols. Besides, let us further
assume that, in the virtual protocol, Alice and Bob assign trivial tags of “ph” and “ph”
to each emission of ρph and ρph, respectively. Then, if Alice and Bob disregard their
choice of state, and consider only the tags that they have assigned, the resulting tagged
virtual protocol becomes equivalent to the scenario depicted in the right-hand side of
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Fig. 2.3, in which Alice and Bob emit ρt, t ∈ {ph,ph, pos, neg, junk}, with probability
pt; where pt = pKpt|K for t ∈ {ph,ph}, and pt = pT pt|T for t ∈ {pos,neg, junk}. This
scenario is identical to the starting point of the random sampling analysis in Section 2.3,
the TVP shown on the left side of Fig. 2.1. The only differences are that here we have
denoted the virtual state of interest as ρph, not ρvir; and that we have some extra
emissions of ρph and ρjunk, which we simply ignore in the analysis. Using Eq. (2.6), we





Nneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)
, p̃ph|ρph , ε/2
)
, (2.30)
where Nt is the number of detected events with a tag of t, p̃ph|ρph = pph/(pph+ppos/cpos)
and p̃pos|ρneg = 1− pneg/(pneg + pposcneg/cpos).
In the analysis above, we have assumed that Alice and Bob reveal their choice of
basis for all rounds, and then probabilistically assign all events such that (j, s) ∈ Z to
either T or K with probabilities pT |Z and pK|Z . However, note the following: (1) the
probability to assign a particular emission to T or K must be independent of whether or
not it is detected, since Eve has no information about this assignment when she makes
her announcements; and (2) the set assigned to the undetected rounds is irrelevant,
since their data is not used at any point in the analysis. This implies that it is only
necessary for Alice and Bob to reveal their choice of basis in the detected rounds, and
then assign each detected event such that (j, s) ∈ Z to either Td or Kd with probabilities
pT |Z and pK|Z , respectively, where Td (Kd) is the set of detected test (key) rounds. By
a similar argument, we conclude that Alice and Bob only need to reveal their choice of
(j, s) for the emissions in Td, and then assign each of them a tag of t ∈ {pos, neg} with
probability pt|j,s,T . For a full description of the protocol, including these assignments,
see Section 2.D.
Case in which Charlie reports several projections
The analysis above can be easily generalised to the case in which Charlie may report
a projection to two or more Bell states. Essentially, the procedure is simply repeated
separately for each successful projection announcement Ω. Note that, because the
definition of a phase error depends on Ω, so does the operator associated with a phase
error, which we now denote as ρphΩ . By repeating the procedure in Eqs. (2.23) to
(2.27), we define the operators ρposΩ and ρnegΩ , and the coefficients cposΩ and cnegΩ , for
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each Ω. Then, we imagine that, for all Ω, Alice and Bob assign a tag tΩ ∈ {posΩ,negΩ}
to each emission in T with probability ptΩ|j,s,T , defined similarly to Eq. (2.29), in such
a way that the average state with a tag of tΩ is ρtΩ . In the virtual protocol, we also
imagine that Alice and Bob assign a tag tΩ = phΩ to each emission of ρphΩ . Then, if
Alice and Bob look only at the assigned tag of tΩ, the scenario becomes equivalent to
the “Tagged Virtual Protocol Ω”, in which Alice and Bob emit ρtΩ with probability
ptΩ . Let NtΩ be the number of events with a tag of tΩ in which Charlie announced Ω.
Applying the results of Section 2.3 to the “Tagged Virtual Protocol Ω”, we have that,










:= NUphΩ , (2.31)
and because of the equivalence between the “Tagged Virtual Protocol Ω” and the virtual
protocol, Eq. (2.31) must also hold for the latter, for all Ω. Thus, the total number of





except with probability ε =
∑
Ω εΩ. By a similar argument as in the main analysis
above, we deduce that, in the actual protocol: (1) Alice and Bob only need to reveal
their choice of basis in the detected rounds, and then assign each detected event such
that (j, s) ∈ Z to either Td or Kd with probabilities pT |Z and pK|Z , respectively, where
Td (Kd) is the set of detected test (key) rounds; and (2) Alice and Bob only need to
reveal their choice of (j, s) for the emissions in Td, and then assign each of them a tag
of tΩ ∈ {posΩ,negΩ} with probability ptΩ|j,s,T , where Ω is Charlie’s announcement on
that round.
2.6 Secret-key rate and security parameter
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we have shown how to obtain an upper bound NUph on the








After calculating this bound, Alice and Bob perform error correction, error verification,
and privacy amplification. They obtain a secret key of length







where Ns is the length of the sifted key, λEC is the number of bits revealed in the error
correction step, and εc is the probability that Alice and Bob’s keys will not be identical
after the error verification step. It is known [5, 15] that, if the number of phase errors
is bounded as in Eq. (2.33) and the secret-key length is set as in Eq. (2.34), then the




ε+ ξ. Since the protocol is also εc-correct, then it
is εsec-secure, with εsec = εc + εs.
2.7 Numerical results
In this section, we simulate the secret key obtainable for both the P&M and MDI LT
protocols, using the analysis introduced in the previous sections. As usual, we assume
the nominal scenario in which no eavesdropper is present. Moreover, we assume that
the users’ sources emit three different imperfectly-encoded single-photon states in the
form
|ψj〉 = cos(θj) |0Z〉+ sin(θj) |1Z〉 , (2.35)
where {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉} forms a qubit basis, and θj ∈ [0, 2π) is the encoded phase. For
the P&M scheme, we assume that Alice’s states satisfy θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = κπ/2, and
θ0X = κπ/4, where κ = 1 + δ/π and δ quantifies the magnitude of the SPFs. For the
MDI setup, we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s states satisfy θ0 = θ
′
0 = 0, θ1 = θ
′
1 = κπ/2,
θτ = κπ/4 and θ
′
τ = −κπ/4, where θj (θ′s) denotes the angle of Alice’s (Bob’s) state
when she (he) emits state j (s).
To simulate the data that would be obtained in an experiment, we use the channel
model in Ref. [17] for the P&M protocol, and the channel model in Section 2.E for the
MDI protocol. For simplicity, in the latter we assume that Charlie only announces a
detection if he obtains a projection to the Bell state Ψ−. The experimental parameters
considered are: SPF’s parameter δ = 0.126, error correction inefficiency f = 1.16,
dark count probability of the detectors pd = 10
−8 and fiber loss coefficient α = 0.2




and εs = 10
−8, respectively, and for simplicity we set ξ = ε in Eq. (2.34), which means
that ε = ε2s/4. In our simulations, we optimise over Alice and Bob’s basis selection
probabilities, and in the MDI protocol, we also optimise over the value of pT |Z . Also,
we consider different values of the block size Ntot, which represents the total number of
rounds in the protocol. Finally, we assume an error-correction leakage of λEC = fh(eZ)
bits, where eZ is the bit-error rate of the sifted key. The results for the P&M and the
MDI LT protocols are shown in Fig. 2.4(a) and Fig. 2.4(b), respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Secret-key rate obtainable using our analysis based on random sampling
theory (solid lines), for the P&M (a) and MDI (b) LT protocols, as a function of the
overall channel loss and for different values of the block size Ntot. For comparison, we
include the secret-key rate obtainable using an alternative analysis based on Azuma’s
inequality (dashed lines), similar to that of Ref. [13]. For both LT protocols, our
analysis clearly outperforms the alternative analysis based on Azuma’s inequality.
For completeness, we compare our results with those of an alternative analysis
based on the application of Azuma’s inequality. This alternative analysis, presented
in Section 2.F, is essentially a simplified version of the security proof in Ref. [13],
which considers the emission of weak coherent pulses rather than single photons. The
results in Fig. 2.4 show that our analysis based on random sampling offers significantly
higher performances for both the P&M and MDI LT protocols. The difference in
performance is larger for lower values of Ntot, while as Ntot increases, the two analyses
slowly converge. In the case Ntot → ∞, both analyses provide a perfect estimation of
the phase-error rate, and thus offer the same secret-key rate.
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We note that a novel concentration inequality for sums of dependent random vari-
ables has been recently uploaded to a preprint server by Kato [24]. This result can be
regarded as an improved version of Azuma’s inequality that is much tighter when the
success probability of the random variables is low. In Section 2.F, we give a statement
of the result, and use it to substitute Azuma’s inequality in the alternative finite-key
analysis of the LT protocol. However, it must be said that, when applied to QKD
protocols, Kato’s inequality requires an extra condition that is not needed in either our
analysis based on random sampling or analyses based on Azuma’s inequality. Namely,
it requires users to attempt to predict the results that they expect to obtain in the
experiment, before they actually run the experiment. This is an important step, since
the inequality is only tight when the actual experimental data was reasonable close to
their predictions [25].
In Fig. 2.5, we compare the performance of our analysis based on random sampling
theory with that of our alternative analysis based on Kato’s inequality. For simplicity,
in the alternative analysis, we assume that the users could perfectly predict the exper-
imental data that they obtain in the experiment, which maximises the secret-key rate
obtainable. Fig. 2.5(a) shows that, in the case of the P&M protocol, the difference be-
tween the two analyses vanishes almost completely. Conversely, Fig. 2.5(b) shows that,
in the case of the MDI protocol, our analysis based on random sampling still retains
an advantage, although significantly smaller than that observed in Fig. 2.4(b). We
emphasise that, unlike the alternative analysis based on Kato’s inequality, our analysis
based on random sampling does not require the users to make any prediction before
running the experiment.
2.8 Discussion
In this work, we have proved the finite-key security of the loss-tolerant (LT) QKD proto-
col against general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-
independent versions. Our security analysis reduces the parameter estimation task
to a classical random sampling problem, which can be solved using Chernoff bounds,
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Figure 2.5: Comparison between the secret-key rate obtainable using our random sam-
pling analysis (solid lines) and our alternative analysis based on the application of a
novel concentration inequality for dependent random variables (dashed lines), for both
the P&M (a) and MDI (b) versions of the LT protocol and different values of the block
size Ntot. For the P&M protocol, the performance of the two security proofs is almost
identical, while for the MDI protocol, our analysis based on random sampling provides
slightly better secret-key rates.
Although we have assumed single-photon sources, we believe that our analysis can
be extended to the case in which the users employ weak coherent sources, as long as
the single-photon components of the three encoded pulses satisfy the requirements of
our proof, i.e. they are characterised and belong to the same qubit space. In that
case, the users should assign tags to their emissions in such a way that Eq. (2.1) holds




pos − cnegρ(1)neg, where ρ(1)t is the
average quantum state of a single-photon pulse with a tag of t. If so, Eq. (2.6) holds,






neg; ε), where N
(1)
t denotes the number





directly observable, since the users do not know the photon number of their emissions.
However, by using different laser intensities µ, they are able to observe the values {Nµpos}
and {Nµneg} for all µ, where Nµt is the number of detected emissions with a tag of t
that originated from intensity µ. Thus, they can apply the decoy-state method [26–29]




neg), using for example the numerical
techniques introduced in Ref. [30].
Also, in our random sampling analysis, we have assumed that the three encoded
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states live in the same qubit space. In a future work, it would be interesting to consider
if our security proof can be extended to the case in which the qubit assumption is not
satisfied, due to additional imperfections such as mode dependencies [17] or correlations
between different rounds of the protocol [18, 19]. In that case, one can no longer derive
an operator equality between the virtual and the actual states, such as e.g. Eq. (2.11).
Instead, one needs to find an operator dominance condition [15] between them, which is
non-trivial if the side-channel states are not characterised, as assumed by Refs. [17–19].
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2.A Random sampling analysis
Here, we prove the statements in Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), and give an expression for the
functions gL and gU . Let us assume that we have a population of n items, where
n is unknown. Each item is assigned to either K1 with probability p or to K2 with
probability 1− p. We know the value of K2 = |K2| and we would like to obtain bounds
on K1 = |K1|.
Let ξi = 1 if the i-th trial is assigned to K2 and ξi = 0 otherwise. We have that
n∑
i=1
ξi = K2. (2.36)
Clearly, E[K2] = (1 − p)n, and therefore n = E[K2]/(1 − p). Using the inverse multi-













where W0 and W−1 are branches of the Lambert W function, and each of the bounds
fails with probability at most ε. From this and the fact that n = K1 + K2, we have
that
K1 = n−K2 =
E[K2]







1− p −K2, 0
 =: gL(K2, p, ε),
K1 = n−K2 =
E[K2]







1− p −K2 =: gU (K2, p, ε),
(2.38)
where each of the bounds fails with probability ε. It can be shown that gU is an
increasing function of K2. Note that Eq. (2.38) is only valid for K2 > 0. In the special
case K2 = 0, we have that [31]
gL(0, p, ε) := 0




We note that this random sampling problem can also be solved using the method
introduced in Ref. [15].
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2.B Operator-form linear relationship between the virtual
and actual states
In this Appendix, we show how to find an operator-form linear relationship between the
virtual states and the actual states, see Eq. (2.11) and Eq. (2.24). For simplicity, we
provide first the procedure for the P&M protocol; then, at the end of this Appendix, we
show how to extend it to the MDI case. The only assumption on Alice’s emitted states,
|ψj〉a for j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, is that they are linearly dependent, i.e. all three states live
in the same qubit space. However, the analysis simplifies significantly if they are all in
the same standard basis plane of the Bloch sphere, such as the XZ, XY or ZY plane.
First, we consider this simpler case, and then provide the analysis for the general case.
2.B.1 Case in which all states are in a standard basis plane
Without loss of generality, we assume that the three states are in the XZ plane of the
Bloch sphere, i.e. they can be expressed as
|ψj〉a = cos(θj) |0Z〉a + sin(θj) |1Z〉a , (2.40)
where θj = (−π, π]. Alice generates her sifted key from the detected emissions of |ψ0Z 〉a
and |ψ1Z 〉a. To prove the security of the sifted key, we consider an entanglement-based





|0Z〉A |ψ0Z 〉a + |1Z〉A |ψ1Z 〉a
)
. (2.41)
In this virtual protocol, Alice measures her local ancilla A in the complementary basis
{|0X〉A , |1X〉A}, where |αX〉A = 1/
√
2 [|0Z〉A + (−1)α |1Z〉A] for α ∈ {0, 1}. If Alice










∥∥|ψ0Z 〉a + (−1)α |ψ1Z 〉a∥∥2/4 = (1+(−1)α cos(θ0Z − θ1Z ))/2 is the prob-
ability that Alice obtains |αX〉A. Since |ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a are in the XZ plane, |ψvirα〉a
is also in the XZ plane.




j ] be the Bloch vector of the state |ψj〉a. We have that SZj =
cos(2θj), S
X
j = sin(2θj) and S
Y
j = 0. Thus, in operator form, the state |ψj〉a can be
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expressed as











where σI is the identity operator and σK , for K ∈ {Z,X, Y }, is a Pauli operator. It
is useful to see Eq. (2.43) as a system of linear equations, with three unknowns (σI ,
σZ , σX) and three equations (one for each |ψj〉a). We can write this system in matrix
form:
ρ = Sσ, (2.44)
where ρ = [ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X ]










and express its solution as
σ = S−1ρ. (2.46)
Equation (2.46) essentially says that the operators σI , σZ , σX can be expressed as a
linear combination of the actual states ρj . This implies that every state that can be
expressed as a linear combination of σI , σZ , σX (i.e., every state in the XZ plane) can
also be expressed as a linear combination of ρj . In particular, the virtual states |ψvirα〉a
are in the XZ plane, and in operator form they can be expressed as











where SZvir0 = −SZvir1 = cos(θ0Z + θ1Z ) and SXvir0 = −SXvir1 = sin(θ0Z + θ1Z ). Or equiva-
lently,









. Combining Eqs. (2.46) and (2.48), we have that
ρvirα = SvirαS
−1ρ = fαρ, (2.49)
where fα := SvirαS
−1 is a row vector. If we express fα as fα = [c0Z |α, c1Z |α, c0X |α],
we obtain Eq. (2.11), i.e.
ρvirα = c0Z |virαρ0Z + c1Z |virαρ1Z + c0X |virαρ0Z , (2.50)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, as required.
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In our numerical simulations, we assume that the three states emitted by Alice are
in the XZ plane, and that when written as in Eq. (2.40), their phases satisfy θ0Z = 0,
θ1Z = κπ/2 and κπ/4, for some κ. For this particular case, an analytical expression for
the coefficients is given by
c0Z |vir0 = c1Z |vir0 = 0,
c0X |vir0 = 1,
c0Z |vir1 = c1Z |vir1 = csc
2(κπ/4))/2,
c0X |vir1 = − cot2(κπ/4)).
2.B.2 General case
Here, we consider the case in which the three states are not all in the same standard
basis plane. Formally, we assume that for all K ∈ {Z,X, Y }, there is at least one j
such that SKj 6= 0. Therefore Eq. (2.43) becomes






j σZ + S
X





and now we have a system of three equations with four unknowns. We have to find a
way to modify Eq. (2.51) such that it becomes a system with three unknowns.




uj |0U 〉a + eiφj
√
1− uj |1U 〉a
)
. (2.52)
where 0 ≤ uj ≤ 1, γj ∈ [0, 2π), φj ∈ [0, 2π). Since the end points of the three Bloch
vectors associated to Alice’s emitted states form a plane, there must be a basis U such





∣∣0Ỹ 〉a + eiφj√1− ỹ ∣∣1Ỹ 〉a) , (2.53)
for some 0 ≤ ỹ ≤ 1. Let V be a unitary operator such that V |0Y 〉a =
∣∣0Ỹ 〉a and
V |1Y 〉a =
∣∣1Ỹ 〉a. V can be regarded as a transformation from the set of mutually
unbiased bases Z, X, Y to the set of mutually unbiased bases Z̃, X̃, Ỹ . Let us define
the modified Pauli operators σ̃K = V σKV
†, for K ∈ {Z,X, Y }, and express the actual







Z σ̃Z + S̃
j






2.B Operator-form linear relationship between the virtual and actual states
Note that the three states have the same Ỹ component, i.e. S̃jY = S̃Y := 2ỹ − 1, ∀j.












which has a similar form as Eq. (2.43), i.e. it can be regarded as a linear system of three
equations and three unknowns. If we define ρ = [ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X ]











we have that ρ = Sσ, and therefore,
σ = S−1ρ. (2.57)
The previous equation implies that the modified Pauli operators σ̃O, σ̃Z , σ̃X can be
expressed as a linear combination of the actual states ρj . Therefore, any state that can
be expressed as a linear combination of σ̃O, σ̃Z , σ̃X (i.e. any state whose Ỹ -component
is S̃Y ) can also be expressed as a linear combination of the ρj .
If we define the virtual states as in Eq. (2.42), it is likely that they will not satisfy
the condition that their Ỹ -component is S̃Y . However, note that to obtain Eq. (2.42),
we have assumed that Alice measures the ancilla A of the entangled state in Eq. (2.41)
in the X basis. In reality, Alice could have decided to measure it in any other basis
that is mutually unbiased with Z. Equivalently, we can express this degree of freedom





|0Z〉A |ψ0〉a + eiφ |1Z〉A |ψ1〉a
)
, (2.58)










∥∥|ψ0〉a + (−1)αeiφ |ψ1〉a∥∥2/4 is the probability that Alice obtains |αX〉A.
Substituting Eq. (2.53) in Eq. (2.59), one can easily show that if Alice chooses φ =




, S̃virαY ], satisfies S̃
virα













2.B Operator-form linear relationship between the virtual and actual states
or equivalently,









. Combining Eqs. (2.57) and (2.61), we have that
ρvirα = SvirαS
−1ρ := fαρ, (2.62)
where fα := SvirαS
−1 is a row vector. If we express fα as fα = [c0Z |α, c1Z |α, c0X |α],
we obtain Eq. (2.11), i.e.
|ψvirα〉〈ψvirα |a = c0Z |α |ψ0Z 〉〈ψ0Z |a + c1Z |α |ψ1Z 〉〈ψ1Z |a + c0X |α |ψ0X 〉〈ψ0X |a , (2.63)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, as required.
2.B.3 MDI protocol
In the MDI scenario, we essentially perform the above procedure separately for Alice’s
and Bob’s states. Let |ψj〉a (|ψ′s〉b), with j (s) ∈ {0, 1, τ}, denote Alice’s (Bob’s) states,
and let ρj ≡ |ψj〉〈ψj | (ρ′s ≡ |ψ′s〉〈ψ′s|) denote their operator form. Using the analysis in
the previous sections, we have that















where α, β ∈ {0, 1}, and ρvirα (ρ′virβ ) denotes one of Alice’s (Bob’s) virtual states,
emitted with probability pvirα|K (p
′
virβ |K). We can define Alice and Bob’s joint virtual
states as




emitted with probability pvirα,β |K = pvirα|Kp
′
virα|K; where cj,s|virα,β = cj|virαc
′
s|virβ . De-
pending on Charlie’s Bell state report, the definition of a phase error will change. If
Charlie reports a projection to either Ψ− or Φ−, the phase-error operator is defined as
ρph = (pvir0,0ρvir0,0 + pvir1,1ρvir1,1)/pph, (2.66)
where pph = pvir0,0 + pvir1,1 . Conversely, if he reports a projection to either Ψ
+ or Φ+,
the phase-error operator is defined as
ρph = (pvir0,1ρvir0,1 + pvir1,0ρvir1,0)/pph, (2.67)
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where the coefficients cj,s are a linear function of the coefficients cj,s|α,β, and can be
obtained by substituting Eq. (2.65) in either Eq. (2.66) or Eq. (2.67).
In our numerical simulations we assume that Alice and Bob’s states are in the





1 = κπ/2, θτ = −θ′τ = κπ/4. For this particular case, we have that Alice’s
virtual states satisfy
c0|vir0 = c1|vir0 = 0,
c0|vir0 = 1,
c0|vir1 = c1|vir1 = csc
2(κπ/4))/2,
cτ |vir1 = − cot2(κπ/4);
(2.69)


















1 + 2 cos(κπ/2)
.
(2.70)
2.C Description of the P&M protocol
(1) Preparation
For each round, Alice chooses a pure state |ψj〉a with probability pj , where j ∈
{0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and sends it to Bob through the quantum channel. Emissions of
|ψ0X 〉a (|ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a) are considered to belong to the X (Z) basis.
(2) Detection
Bob measures the incoming signals in either the Z or the X basis, which he
chooses with probabilities pZ and pX = 1− pZ , respectively.
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(3) Sifting
Bob announces which rounds were detected, and Alice and Bob reveal their basis
choices in those rounds. Let KZ be the set of detected rounds in which both users
employed the Z basis, and let TX be the set of detected rounds in which Bob
employed the X basis. Then,
(3.1) Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as the bit values associated with her
emissions (his measurement results) in the rounds in KZ .
(3.2) For all rounds in TX , Bob announces his measurement result.
(4) Tag assignment
Alice probabilistically assigns a tag to all rounds in TX , depending on her choice
of state and Bob’s measurement result. Namely, if she chose the state |ψj〉a and
Bob obtained measurement result (α ⊕ 1)X , for α ∈ {0, 1}, she assigns a tag
of tα ∈ {posα, negα} with probability ptα|j,XB , given by Eq. (2.17). Then, she
calculates N
(α⊕1)X
tα , the number of detected events with a tag of tα in which Bob
obtained measurement result (α⊕ 1)X .
(5) Parameter estimation
Alice uses the values of {N (α⊕1)Xtα } to obtain an upper bound NUph on Nph, the
number of phase errors in her sifted key, using Eq. (2.21).
(6) Postprocessing
(6.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-fixed amount λEC of syndrome
information bits through an authenticated public channel, which Bob uses
to correct errors in his sifted key.
(6.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute a hash of their error-corrected
keys using a random universal hash function, and check whether they are
equal. If so, they continue to the next step; otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(6.3) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob extract a secret key pair (SA, SB)
of length |SA| = |SB| = ` from their error-corrected keys using a random
two-universal hash function.
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2.D Description of the MDI protocol
(1) Quantum communication
For each round, Alice (Bob) selects the state |ψj〉a (|ψ′s〉b) with probability pj
(p′s), where j (s) ∈ {0, 1, τ}, and sends it to an untrusted middle node Charlie,
who announces whether or not he obtained a successful projection to a Bell state.
Emissions for which j ∈ {0, 1} (s ∈ {0, 1}) are considered to belong to the Z
basis.
(2) Sifting
Alice and Bob announce their basis choices in the detected rounds. Then, they
assign all detected rounds in which at least one of them used the X basis to set
Td. Also, for each detected round in which both chose the Z basis, they assign it
to set Kd with probability pK|Z , or to set Td with probability pT |Z = 1 − pK|Z .
Then, they announce these assignments, and
(2.1) Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as her (his) choices of j (s) in the
rounds in Kd.
(2.2) For all rounds in Td, Alice and Bob announce their choice of j and s.
(3) Tag assignment
Alice and Bob assign a tag t ∈ {pos, neg} to each round in Td with probability
pt|j,s,T , give by Eq. (2.29). Then, they calculate Nt, the number of detected events
with a tag of t.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob substitute the values of Npos and Nneg in Eq. (2.30) to obtain an
upper bound NUph on Nph, the number of errors in the sifted key.
(5) Postprocessing
(5.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-fixed amount λEC of syndrome
information bits through an authenticated public channel, which Bob uses
to correct errors in his sifted key.
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(5.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute a hash of their error-corrected
keys using a random universal hash function, and check whether they are
equal. If so, they continue to the next step; otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(5.3) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob extract a secret key pair (SA, SB)
of length |SA| = |SB| = ` from their error-corrected keys using a random
two-universal hash function.
2.E Channel model for the MDI protocol
In this Appendix, we present the channel model used in our simulations of the MDI
LT protocol, which is based on the single-photon version of the original MDI QKD
scheme [20]. Specifically, we assume that Alice and Bob prepare polarised single-photon
states in the form of Eq. (2.35), where here |0Z〉 and |1Z〉 denote the horizontally
and vertically polarised single-photon states, respectively. After the preparation, Alice
(Bob) sends the transmitted states to the intermediate party Charlie through a lossy
quantum channel of transmittance ηA (ηB), who interferes the two incoming signals in
a 50:50 beamsplitter, which has on each output port a polarising beamsplitter (PBS)
that separates the horizontal and vertical modes. Now, let h1 and v1 (h2 and v2) be the
threshold detectors placed at horizontal and vertical output port of the first (second)
PBS, respectively, and let pd be the dark-count probability of each detector. After the
measurement, Charlie announces the Bell state Ψ+ (Ψ−) if he observes clicks in h1 and
v1, or h2 and v2 (h1 and v2, or h1 and v2). Then, it is easy to prove that the conditional
probability that Charles announces the Bell state Ψ± given that Alice and Bob selected
the states |ψj〉a and |ψs〉b, respectively, is
PΨ
±




sin2(κ(θj ± θ′s)) + pd
ηAηB
2










2.F Alternative analysis using concentration inequalities for dependent
random variables
2.F Alternative analysis using concentration inequalities
for dependent random variables
In this Appendix, we present an alternative analysis that requires the application of
a concentration inequality for sums of dependent Bernoulli random variables. This
alternative analysis is a simplified version of that of Ref. [13], which considers the
emission of weak coherent pulses rather than single photons. In Ref. [13], Azuma’s
inequality [10] is the concentration inequality applied. Here, we also present a new
security proof based on the application of the recently proposed Kato’s inequality [24].
First, we introduce the concentration inequalities that we consider, and then we provide
the analysis.
2.F.1 Concentration inequalities
Let ξ1, ..., ξN be a sequence of Bernoulli random variables, and let Λl =
∑l
u=1 ξu. Let
Fl be its natural filtration, i.e. the σ-algebra generated by {ξ1, ..., ξl}.
2.F.1.1 Azuma’s inequality

































Equating the right hand sides to to εA and solving for b, we have that
N∑
u=1




Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) + ∆A,
(2.73)
except with probability at most εA for each of the bounds, where ∆A =
√
2N ln ε−1A .
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2.F.1.2 Kato’s inequality










































































which holds when a ≤
√
N/2.
In the following, we will use Eq. (2.74) to obtain an upper bound on∑N
u=1 Pr(ξu = 1|Fu−1), Eq. (2.75) to obtain a lower bound on
∑N
u=1 Pr(ξu = 1|Fu−1),
and Eq. (2.76) to obtain an upper bound on ΛN .
Upper bound on the sum of probabilities
Before running the protocol, one should use previous knowledge of the channel to come
up with a prediction Λ̃N of the value of ΛN that one expects to obtain. Then, one
calculates the values of a and b that would minimise the deviation term in Eq. (2.74)
if the realisation of ΛN equalled Λ̃N , for a fixed failure probability εK. These are the






























nΛ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) ln εK − 16N3/2 ln2 εK + 9
√
2(N − 2Λ̃N )
√
−N2 ln εK(9Λ̃N (n− Λ̃N )− 2N ln εK)
)

















2.F Alternative analysis using concentration inequalities for dependent
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Then, we have that
N∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) ≤ ΛN + ∆UK , (2.79)










Lower bound on the sum of probabilities
Similarly to the previous case, one should use previous knowledge of the channel to
come up with a prediction Λ̃N of the value of ΛN that one expects to obtain after
running the protocol. Then, one calculates the values of a and b that would minimise
the deviation term in Eq. (2.75) if the realisation of ΛN equalled Λ̃N , for a fixed failure






























NΛ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) ln εK + 16N3/2 ln2 εK + 9
√
2(N − 2Λ̃N )
√
−N2 ln εK(9Λ̃N (n− Λ̃N )− 2N ln εK)
)
















Then, we have that
N∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) ≥ ΛN −∆LK , (2.83)











2.F Alternative analysis using concentration inequalities for dependent
random variables
Upper bound on the actual value
In this case, we assume that we have an upper bound SN on the sum of probabilities∑N
u=1 Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1), and we want to obtain an upper bound on ΛN . Before running
the protocol one should use previous knowledge to come up with a prediction S̃N of
the value of the upper bound SN that one expects to obtain. Then, one calculates the
values of a and b that would minimise the deviation term in Eq. (2.76) if the prediction






























3N2 − 8NS̃N + 8S̃2N
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+ 9(N − 2S̃N )
√






N2 − 2NS̃N + 2S̃2N
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SN + b− a
)
, (2.87)
except with probability εK.
2.F.2 Analysis
We assume a virtual protocol in which Alice prepares Ntot copies of the entangled
state in Eq. (2.10), and sends all subsystems B to Bob through the untrusted quantum
channel. Then, Bob performs a quantum non-demolition measurement on each system
B, learning which rounds produce a click on his detectors, and saving the system B of
these detected rounds in a quantum memory. Let N be the number of detected rounds.
For each detected round u = {1, 2, . . . , N}, Alice measures her ancilla S, and Bob
measures B in the X basis; except if Alice obtained S = 5, in which case Bob measures
B in the Z basis. Let ξu = (i, j) represent the event “Alice learns that she emitted i and
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Bob obtains measurement result j”. More specifically, Alice learns that she emitted
i = {vir0, vir1, 0Z , 1Z , 0X} if she obtained S = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} in her measurement of
system S, respectively. Events in which she obtained S = 5 are ignored in the analysis.
Then, using the fact that the virtual states can be written as an operator-form linear
function of the actual states as in Eq. (2.11), one can show that
N∑
u=1








Pr[ξu = (i, α⊕ 1)|Fu−1],
(2.88)
where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by {ξ1, ..., ξu−1}. Now one needs to apply a
concentration bound for sums of dependent random variables to substitute the sums of
probabilities in Eq. (2.88) by the actual values.
2.F.2.1 Using Azuma’s inequality






(Nα⊕1i + δi) + ∆A := N
α⊕1
virα , (2.89)
except with probability 4εA, where εA is the failure probability of each aplication of
Azuma’s inequality, which has been applied four times; and δi = ∆A (δi = −∆A) if
ci|virα is positive (negative). Then, the number of phase errors is upper bounded by
Nph ≤ N1vir0 +N
0
vir1 , (2.90)
except with probability ε = 8εA.






(Nj,s,T + δj,s) + ∆A (2.91)
except with probability ε = 9εA, where Nj,s,T is the number of detected test rounds in
which the user emitted |ψj,s〉a,b, and δj,s = ∆A (δj,s = −∆A) if cj,s is positive (negative).
87
2.F Alternative analysis using concentration inequalities for dependent
random variables
2.F.2.2 Using Kato’s inequality
Applying Eq. (2.79) and Eq. (2.83) to Eq. (2.88), we have that
N∑
u=1





(Nα⊕1i + δi) := Svirα ,
(2.92)
except with probability 3εK, where δi = ∆
U
K (δi = −∆LK) if ci|virα is positive (negative).
Substituting Sn → Svirα and Λn → Nα⊕1virα in Eq. (2.87), we obtain an upper bound
N
α⊕1
virα which fails with probability 4εK. Then, the number of phase errors is upper
bounded by
Nph ≤ N1vir0 +N
0
vir1 , (2.93)
except with probability ε = 8εK.
Similarly, for the MDI protocol, we have that
N∑
u=1





(Nj,s,T + δj,s) := Sph (2.94)
except with probability ε = 8εA, where δj,s = ∆
U
K (δj,s = −∆LK) if cj,s is positive
(negative). Then, substituting Sn → Sph and Λn → Nph in Eq. (2.87), we obtain an
upper bound on Nph which fails with probability 9εK.
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Memory-assisted quantum key distribution (MA-QKD) systems are among novel
promising solutions that can improve the key-rate scaling with channel loss. By using
a middle node with quantum storage and measurement functionalities, they offer the
same key-rate scaling with distance as a single-node quantum repeater. However, the
distance at which they can surpass the nominal key rate of repeaterless systems, in
terms of bits per second, is typically long, owing to the efficiency and/or interaction
time issues when one deals with quantum memories. This crossover distance can be
a few hundred kilometres, for instance, when one relies on the exchange of infinitely
many key bits for the key-rate analysis. In a realistic setup, however, we should ac-
count for the finite-key effects in our analysis. Here, we show that accounting for such
effects would actually favour MA-QKD setups, by reducing the crossover distance to
the regime where realistic implementations can take place. We demonstrate this by
rigorously analysing a decoy-state version of MA-QKD, in the finite-key regime, us-
ing memory parameters already achievable experimentally. This provides us with a





Quantum key distribution (QKD) has made a lot of progress as part of the solution
package for secure communications in the quantum era [1]. But, when it comes to long
distances, quantum technologies still have a long way to go before they can replicate
the same functionalities that public-key cryptography offers. In terrestrial networks,
such as the infrastructure that today’s Internet is based on, the biggest challenge to
overcome is perhaps the exponential growth of loss in optical fibres [2]. This makes it
extremely difficult to perform QKD at long distances without trusted middle nodes.
Quantum repeaters are potential solutions, but none of their theoretical architectures
can currently be implemented experimentally to the full effect [3]. For instance, prob-
abilistic quantum repeaters [4–6] would require quantum memory (QM) modules with
high coupling efficiencies to light and with coherence times exceeding the transmission
delays, which are hard to achieve together [7]. That said, even if the current QMs are
not sufficiently advanced for quantum repeaters, they may still be used to offer key-rate
improvements in some of the existing QKD systems. Working on such memory-assisted
QKD (MA-QKD) systems paves the way for future scalable quantum repeaters. This
work studies the secret key rate for decoy-state MA-QKD systems in the practical
regime where only a finite block of data is exchanged among QKD users.
MA-QKD setups [7, 8] are based on the measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) protocol [9], in which Alice and Bob send BB84-encoded pulses to a middle
node, Charlie, who performs a Bell-state measurement (BSM). In MDI-QKD, a raw
key bit can be generated if both pulses survive the channel loss in the same round and
the BSM is successful. In MA-QKD, however, Charlie employs two QMs to store the
quantum state of the users’ pulses, and only performs the BSM when both memories
have been loaded. This will allow the pulses that arrive in different rounds to be
combined to produce a key bit. Thus, the key-rate scaling is improved from η2 in
MDI-QKD to η in MA-QKD [7], where η is the transmittance of the channel between
Alice/Bob and Charlie. Together with the recently introduced twin-field QKD (TF-
QKD) [10], MA-QKD is a strong contender to beat the current rate versus distance
records in QKD. Such an advantage has recently been demonstrated experimentally
using silicon vacancy centres [11].
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Offering advantage in a realistic setup that relies on imperfect QMs is not without
its own challenges. For instance, photon-memory coupling can introduce additional
loss in the setup. Some memories have also a long photon-memory interaction time
that requires users to employ a low source repetition rate. The better scaling with
channel loss can only offset these effects after a certain distance, which we refer to as
the crossover distance. If this distance happens to be long, it would then be difficult
to experimentally implement a stable system that benefits from such an advantage.
Other effects, such as decoherence in the QMs, also need to be taken into account
when evaluating system performance [7] and they typically exacerbate the situation.
Additionally, in realistic setups, we should consider the effect of using weak laser pulses
by the users in conjunction with finite-key effects. In this work, we develop a security
analysis that accounts for all the above, and, in particular, quantify the interplay
between the crossover distance and other parameters of the system.
Several analyses of MA-QKD have already been carried out, under varying assump-
tions and for different implementations of QMs. However, most of them [8, 12, 13]
assume single-photon sources, which are difficult to attain in practice. In many QKD
experiments, attenuated laser sources are used, instead. The multi-photon compo-
nents in the signals generated by these sources introduce security loopholes, and they
need to be dealt with [14]. The decoy-state method [15] is often used to bound the
leaked information from these multi-photon signals, thus closing the loophole. This
method involves the statistical estimation of channel probabilities, based on data col-
lected from the use of different laser intensities. This statistical characterisation of the
channel would only be perfect if one could collect an infinite amount of data by using
the channel infinitely many times. In practice, a QKD experiment will run for a fixed
amount of time, and a finite-size dataset will be generated [16]. By using statistical
analyses based on concentration inequalities, it has been shown that a bound on the
leaked information can be computed [16, 17], thus a secret key can still be distilled,
with a failure probability that can be made arbitrarily small. However, as the total
number of signals exchanged (the block size) gets smaller, the obtainable secret key rate
is reduced. In fact, if the block size is too small, no secret key rate may be obtained at
all.
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of a decoy-state MA-QKD setup that
accounts for the statistical fluctuations that arise from generating a finite-size key.
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Previous work [7] on MA-QKD has only considered the asymptotic limit in which
the users exchange an infinite number of signals, and under simplified assumptions
on the loading of QMs with attenuated laser sources. In our finite-key analysis, we
compare MA-QKD performance with that of a no-memory MDI-QKD system, by using
parameters from state-of-the-art experiments on quantum memories [12]. We find that
MA-QKD is inherently more resistant to finite-key effects, and it experiences a lower
reduction in secret key rate than MDI-QKD. In particular, we see that once these effects
are considered, the distance from which MA-QKD offers an advantage is reduced. This
would make it easier for experimentalists to implement a decoy-state MA-QKD setup
that outperforms, in terms of secret key rate versus distance, the equivalent decoy-state
BB84 or MDI-QKD setups.
In terms of key rate, MA-QKD may not outperform the recently introduced TF-
QKD, at least with state-of-the-art quantum memories. However, one should be careful
when comparing systems that have different requirements. For instance, the single-
photon interference of TF-QKD demands phase stability over long channels, which is
experimentally difficult, and which MA-QKD does not need. We believe that comparing
MA-QKD with MDI-QKD is the fairest when it comes to the requirements of each
system. We note that there exists some recent work on memory assisted TF-QKD
[18], which specifies under what circumstances adding quantum memories to TF-QKD
setups can be advantageous. Moreover, we believe that MA-QKD is of special interest
as is the very first step toward building memory-based quantum repeaters. Unlike TF-
QKD, or other no-memory systems, these offer a scalable solution for long distance
quantum communications. Any practical progress with quantum repeaters would be
based on fully understanding and implementing MA-QKD as the simplest memory-
based repeater system. Our findings for MA-QKD systems suggest that memory-based
quantum repeaters may also be resilient to finite-key effects, at least when users access
them with decoy-state sources.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.3, we describe the analysed
setup, placing an emphasis on the QM modules, and the different parameters that are
used for modelling them. In Section 3.4, we explain how different system parameters
affect the secret-key rate. In Section 3.5, we compare the secret key rate achievable
in decoy-state MA-QKD and decoy-state MDI-QKD with examples from warm vapour
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and cold atomic ensembles. Section 3.6 concludes the paper with our interpretation of
the results.
3.3 System description
In this section, we describe our MA-QKD setup and the assumptions we make on
different devices and components of the system.
Figure 3.1 shows the schematic of the MA-QKD setup considered in this work.
Here, in each round, Alice and Bob each send decoy-state BB84 states in their chosen
basis. Charlie verifies the receipt of the transmitted signal by generating an entangled
photon pair (EPP) on each side to effectively teleport the state of the users to a local
photon on his site. The side BSMs in Fig. 3.1 would herald the success of such an
event, in which case the remaining photon of the EPP source will be written to the
corresponding QM. That is, its photonic state is transferred to the memory, and will be
kept there until the state of the other user is also successfully received and teleported
to its respective QM. At this point, the two QMs will be read, i.e., their states will
be transferred to photons on which the middle BSM is performed. At the end of the
protocol, Charlie announces his measurement results, and Alice and Bob would follow
with conventional steps for sifting and post-processing of their key bits.
Figure 3.1: The schematic of an MA-QKD system. The two users Alice and Bob use
decoy-state BB84 encoders to generate polarisation/phase encoded signals. Charlie, in
the middle, uses entangled photon pair (EPP) sources to teleport the state sent by the
users to the corresponding memories. When both memories are loaded, their states are
converted back to photons and combined in the middle BSM. For an example of the
BSM module, see Fig. 3.4 of Appendix 3.A.
Note that the teleportation scheme used here to herald and transfer the state of
photons is not an ideal one. In an ideal teleportation setting, the users have to send
ideal single photons, whereas here they are using weak laser pulses. The effect of the
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multi-photon components has then to be taken into account. We analyse the memory-
loading procedure for weak laser pulses in Appendix 3.A. In this scheme, we are also
delaying the writing of the second photon of the EPP until we learn about the success of
teleportation. While there is a chance that the transfer of this photonic state to the QM
may fail, this delayed writing process has the advantage that the QM initialisation is not
necessary in each round [12], but only when a writing procedure has been attempted.
This helps with maximising the repetition rate of the protocol especially when the
initialisation phase is time consuming. We account for the failure in transferring a
local single photon to the memory by the memory writing efficiency parameter.
Finally, while, in practice, an ideal EPP source as assumed here may not be real-
istic, it would help us obtain the key features of our finite-key analysis without overly
complicating the calculations. The former issue can be managed by techniques intro-
duced in Ref. [12], where they propose a quasi-EPP scheme based on single-photon
sources, instead. It is also possible to create a photon-QM entangled pair in certain
QMs [13, 19]. In all cases, we should be careful with the possible multiple excitations
we may locally create at Charlie’s node to not violate the conditions for the proper op-
eration of MA-QKD systems [12, 20]. Under above considerations, we believe that the
main result from our paper, i.e., the resilience of the decoy-state MA-QKD to finite-key
effects, should still hold.
In the following, we describe the key components of our system in more detail.
3.3.1 Quantum memories
We model QMs using a few relevant parameters to our setup, while keeping our model
as general as possible:
 The writing efficiency, denoted as ηw, is the probability of successfully transferring
a single-photon state to the quantum memory. We refer to this process by the
term “loading”.
 The reading efficiency, denoted as ηr, is the probability to transfer the qubit state
stored in the QM back to a single photon. We assume that, at time t after loading,
ηr(t) = ηr0 exp[−t/T1], where ηr0 denotes the reading efficiency at time t = 0 and
T1 is the decay time constant of the QM.
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 The QM decoherence time constant is denoted by T2. We consider two decoher-
ence processes: dephasing and depolarisation. In the case of dephasing, for an
initial state ρ(0) of the QM, the state at a time t after loading will be
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0) + [1− p(t)]σzρ(0)σz, (3.1)
where p(t) = [1 + exp(−t/T2)]/2. Dephasing will only affect X-basis states. For
a depolarisation process, we assume
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0) +
1− p(t)
3
[σzρ(0)σz + σxρ(0)σx + σyρ(0)σy]. (3.2)
In both cases, we treat the QM state as a qubit for which σx, σy, and σz are its
corresponding Pauli operators.
 We denote the interaction time with single photons as τint, for both reading and
writing procedures. We denote the initialisation time of the QM as τinit. Because
of our delayed-writing assumption, a writing procedure will always be followed
by a reading procedure, and the QM only needs to be initialised after reading.
 The writing time is denoted as τw, and the reading time is denoted as τr. For
our delayed writing procedure, we assume τw = τint and τr = τint + τinit. We
effectively neglect the required time for measurement in both cases.
 We denote as τp the pulse duration of both the user sources and the EPP sources,
which are assumed to have matching pulse shapes. We assume τp = τw to maxi-
mize the writing efficiency into the memory. The MA-QKD system is to be run
at a repetition rate of Rs = 1/τp.
3.3.2 Channel and source model
Similarly, we present our assumptions on the channel and the users sources:
 We assume that the user sources produce phase-randomised coherent states, and
that the intensity of the pulse can be perfectly tuned in each round. The users
select a random intensity, in terms of mean number of photons, from the set
{z, w1, w2, v} with probability {pz, pw1 , pw2 , pv}. Emissions with the z intensity
will be encoded in the Z basis, and they will be used to generate the raw key.
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Emissions with any other intensity will be encoded in the X basis, and they will
be used to estimate the single-photon counts and their corresponding phase-error
rate. We will refer to z as the signal intensity, and to {w1, w2, v} as the decoy
intensities. Our model can work with either polarisation or phase encoding. We
denote the source repetition rate as Rs.
 We assume non-resolving detectors with efficiency ηd and a dark count rate γdc.
The latter includes intrinsic effects as well as background photons in the channel.
The dark count probability per detector per round of the protocol is pdc = γdcτp.
 We denote the total length of the channel separating Alice and Bob by L. We
assume that the central node is located exactly halfway between the users. We
denote the attenuation length of the channel by Latt. The transmission coefficient






 We consider the effect of setup misalignment between the user sources and the
measurement devices in the central node. The standard way to model misalign-
ment in QKD is by a misalignment probability emis, and previous analyses of
MA-QKD have also modelled it that way [7]. However, as explained in Appendix
3.A, such a model is not directly applicable when considering the indirect loading
of QMs with weak laser pulses. Here, we model misalignment by assuming that
the encoding modes, e.g., horizontal and vertical polarisations, have been rotated
from their ideal settings by a random angle θ. We then average over θ to find
parameters of interest.
 In our setup, we allow for the usage of frequency converters to match the fre-
quency of the telecom signals sent by the users with that of the EPP source.
The EPP source, in one leg, should generate a beam that interacts with the QM.
For a degenerate EPP source, this would typically require us to downconvert the
frequency of the other beam to the telecom band. One can, in principle, design
a non-degenerate EPP source, but we should then be careful with the extent of
multiple excitations in the source [20]. We account for the efficiency of frequency




In this section, we find the secret key generation rate for our decoy-state MA-QKD
setup, in both the asymptotic and finite-key regimes. We assume the nominal mode
of operation in which no eavesdropper is present, and the system is only affected by
device imperfections. Also, for simplicity, we assume that the sources used by Alice
and Bob, and the channels connecting them to the middle node are identical.
3.4.1 Asymptotic case
In this subsection, we calculate the key rate obtainable in the limit that the users
exchange an infinite number of signals. In this regime, we can assume that the signal
intensity is used with probability pz ' 1, and that the decoy-state analysis provides a
perfect estimate of the single-photon channel probabilities. Under these assumptions,
the secret key rate is lower bounded by [7]
R ≥ Rs
[
QZ11 (1− h(eph))− fQZh(eZ)
]
, (3.3)
where QZ is the probability of generating a sifted key bit per round of the protocol,
and eZ is the error rate of the sifted key. Also, Q
Z
11 is the single-photon contribution
to QZ , and eph is the phase-error rate of these single-photon components.
Our objective here is to calculate what Alice and Bob would observe in a nominal
experiment for directly measurable parameters QZ and eZ , and their corresponding
estimation for QZ11 and eph after using the decoy state method. For this, we mainly
use the method introduced in [7], but we adjust it as needed to account for the specific
components of our model. In particular, in the case of weak laser pulses at the source,
we need to pay special attention to the modelling of misalignment in the channel. We
also extend the results of [7] to depolarising channels.
Appendix 3.A provides a detailed and self-contained description of our analysis.
In short, we first obtain the exact expression for loading probability pµload and loading
error rate eµload when Alice/Bob sends a phase-randomised coherent state with intensity
µ under a generic model for channel misalignment. This parameter would then allow
us to calculate the average number of rounds needed to load both memories, and the
corresponding state of the memories after a heralded loading. We will then account
for memory decoherence and decay processes and calculate the rate of success, and
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the corresponding error rate, for the middle BSM. Section 3.A.2.1, in Appendix 3.A,
provides the analytical form for all parameters needed in Eq. (3.3).
3.4.2 Finite-key regime
Now, we calculate the secret key rate in the more realistic scenario where the number
of signals exchanged by the users is finite. In this regime, we still derive the secret key
from the data points for which both users have used the Z basis, but we also need to
take into account the rounds in which the users employ decoy intensities. In this case,
we can no longer assume that the decoy-state analysis provides a perfect estimate of
the single-photon statistics QZ11 and eph. Instead, we use a statistical analysis to bound
them. Under our new assumptions, the total secret key length K satisfies
K ≥MZ11[1−H(eph)]−MZH(eZ), (3.4)
where MZ is the length of the sifted key, generated from the events in which both users
selected the Z basis (i.e., the z intensity), and eZ is its bit error rate; M
Z
11 is the number
of bits in this sifted key that originated from single-photon emissions, and eph is their
phase-error rate.
In an experimental implementation of the protocol, the measurable observables
available to us are the sets {Mab} and {Eab}, where Mab is the total number of mea-
surement counts when Alice has used intensity a and Bob has used intensity b, while
Eab is the number of such events that result in error. The objective of Alice and Bob
is to use this data to obtain statistical bounds on MZ11 and eph.
The full description of our statistical analysis appears in Appendix 3.B. We use
the idea in [21] to perform our statistical fluctuation analysis using X-basis data only.
This would make our statistical estimation procedure more efficient. By applying tight
multiplicative Chernoff bounds [16], we are then able to use the measured counts Mab
and Eab to set linear constraints on the possible values that MZ11 and eph could take.
These constraints enable us to express the desired bounds on these quantities as the
solution to two linear programs. We use the analytical estimation procedure introduced
in [17] to solve these programs.
For our numerical simulations, we still need to make some assumptions on the
obtained measurement results in a nominal experiment. For this purpose, we use the
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expected values for relevant parameters using the corresponding probability in the
asymptotic regime, derived in the previous subsection. That is, we assume
Mab = NQab and Eab = eabM
ab, (3.5)
where N is the total number of rounds, i.e., the number of transmitted pulses by
Alice/Bob, in the protocol, Qab is the probability of having a successful measurement
originating from intensities a, for Alice, and b, for Bob, and eab is the probability that
this measurement results in an error. Section 3.A.2.2, in Appendix 3.A, provides the
derivation and the analytical form for all these parameters.
In our finite-key analysis, we have only considered the effect of statistical fluctu-
ations on parameter estimation. Thus, in our key rate formula in Eq. (3.4), we have
neglected some of the less significant terms that usually appear in a rigorous finite-key
analysis. The latter is to adhere to the universal composable framework [22, 23]; e.g.,
we direct the reader to Eq. (1) of [17]. We have neglected these terms for simplicity,
as they are, in practice, only on the order of tens of bits, and because their effect is
identical for the memory-assisted and no-memory systems, which the present work aims
to compare.
3.5 Numerical results
In this section, we use the results of Section 3.4 to simulate the secret key rate that can
be achieved with the decoy-state MA-QKD scheme in Fig. 3.1, in both the asymptotic
and finite-key regimes. We use two types of memories for our analysis: Warm vapour
atomic ensembles, which often offer high bandwidth, hence high repetition rates, but a
rather low coherence time; and cold atomic ensembles, which are often slower but benefit
from longer coherence times. Table 3.1 summarises the relevant memory parameters
used in our simulation based on the experimentally reported values in [24], for warm
vapours, and [25], for cold atomic ensembles. In our simulations, we have assumed
T1 = T2.
We compare the MA-QKD system with a no-memory MDI-QKD setup, run at a
repetition rate of 1 GHz, as a reference point, and study how finite-key effects change the
crossover distance under different circumstances. Section 3.A.3 in Appendix 3.A pro-
vides the analytical expressions used for simulating the MDI-QKD system. MDI-QKD
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WV [24] CA [25] SV [11]
Writing-reading efficiency, ηwηr0 0.05 0.76 0.423
Decay time, T1 120 µs 220 ms 200 µs
Interaction time, τint 1.43 ns 240 ns 142 ns
Repetition rate, Rs 518 MHz 4.2 MHz 7.04 MHz
Table 3.1: Parameter values of recently demonstrated warm vapour (WV) and cold
atom (CA) ensembles [12], as well as silicon vacancy (SV) centres, used in the simula-
tions in this work. For simplicity, in our simulations, we assume T2 = T1.
is the closest no-QM system to MA-QKD, which enables us to make this comparison
as fair as possible. They both offer measurement-device-independent features and they
can both be run with minimal requirements on the source or channel phase stabili-
sation. The latter property is needed for advanced twin-field QKD systems, whose
rate-versus-distance scaling is similar to MA-QKD, but are expected to offer higher
rates if properly implemented [26–28].
In all cases, we use the system parameters listed in Table 3.2, which are attainable
by today’s technologies [29]. In all graphs, we optimise over the values of the intensities
{z, w1, w2}, and assume a vacuum intensity of v = 0.5 · 10−3, since the optimal value
v = 0 may be difficult to achieve in practice. We also optimise over their selection
probabilities {pz, pw1 , pw2 , pv}. In our finite-key analysis, we assume a failure probabil-
ity of ε = 0.5 ·10−11 for each of the concentration bounds used in Section 3.B; the total
failure probability of the estimation process is 20ε = 10−10.
In Fig. 3.2, we show the performance of the warm vapour memory in Ref. [24], for
different values of the block size N , which represents the total number of signals sent
by Alice (or Bob) in that run of the protocol. We can see that, at low distances, the
key rate of MA-QKD is lower than that of MDI-QKD. This is partly due to the lower
repetition rate for MA-QKD, but also due to the additional loss effects introduced by
the QM’s less-than-one writing and reading efficiencies. At longer distances, however,
the improved key-rate scaling of MA-QKD with channel loss may overcome these effects.
In Fig. 3.2(a), we can see that in the asymptotic regime (black curves), the MA-
QKD protocol can only offer a small advantage over MDI-QKD from around 340 km
to 430 km. However, once we use a finite block size N (colour curves), the crossover
distance moves to the left to shorter channel lengths, and even approaches 100 km at
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Attenuation length of the channel, Latt 22 km
Detector efficiency, ηd 93%
Detector dark count rate, γdc 1 count/s
Misalignment error probability, emis 0.5%
Conversion efficiency, ηc 0.5, 1
Table 3.2: System parameter values used for the simulations in this work. For no-
memory MDI-QKD, we assume that the channel misalignment, in their respective leg
of the channel, flips the state sent by each user with probability emis. For MA-QKD, we
assume that channel misalignment rotates the states sent by the users by an angle θ that
follows a uniform distribution of width 2
√
3emis; see Eq. (3.28), and the explanation
preceding it.
N = 1010. This suggests that in order to see the advantages of MA-QKD over no-QM
MDI-QKD we only need to demonstrate such systems over much shorter distances than
one may require in the asymptotic regime. With record distances for entanglement
distribution between two QMs being around 50 km [30], one can hope that such a
demonstration can take place in near future.
While a slight shift to the left, due to finite-key effects, might be expected in Fig. 3.2,
the considerable change in the crossover distance may come as a surprise. A naive
thinking may suggest that in order to see the benefits in the finite-key setting, we
need to have larger count numbers in MA-QKD, as compared to MDI-QKD, to reduce
statistical errors in our parameter estimation. But, so long as, in the asymptotic
case, the key rate for MDI-QKD is higher than that of MA-QKD, we may expect
that the corresponding counts will also remain larger in the finite-key setting, hence
no considerable change may be expected in the crossover distance. This argument,
however, fails to give us an accurate picture of what is happening in the MA-QKD
case. Below, we explain two key reasons for why the finite-key setting may benefit the
MA-QKD setup, hence shifting the crossover distance to much shorter channel lengths.
 Self-purification of multi-photon terms: The MA-QKD system can by de-
sign get rid of some of the erroneous terms that would otherwise be present in the
no-QM setup. Let us compare the two setups when Alice selects a non-vacuum
intensity s, in the X basis, and Bob selects the vacuum intensity v. In no-QM
MDI-QKD, there is a single BSM module, in which Alice’s and Bob’s emissions
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Figure 3.2: Secret key generation rate, in b/s, for a MA-QKD setup using warm vapour
quantum memories [24] (solid lines), in comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD (dashed
lines), for different values of the block size N . In (a) and (c) a dephasing channel is
used to model memory decoherence, whereas, in (b), a depolarisation channel is used.
The efficiency of the frequency converter is assumed ideal in (a) and (b), whereas, in
(c), it is 50%.
are directly combined. A successful BSM, in polarisation encoding, is declared
if two detectors corresponding to different polarisations click. In the event that
Bob sends a vacuum state, a successful BSM could happen because of the multi-
photon terms in Alice’s signal. This increases M sv and Esv counts, which add
to the uncertainty in estimating eph. In MA-QKD, such counts are much lower.
Charlie will declare that Bob’s QM has been loaded when his corresponding side
BSM is successful. For a vacuum input, such an event could only happen if one
of the detectors clicks because of the dark count, assuming that the EPP source
can only cause a click in one of the detectors. For low dark count rates, as we
assume here, the measurement counts M sv, as well as its corresponding terms in
error will be close to zero in MA-QKD. Around the crossover distance, this makes
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the upper bound on eph lower for MA-QKD even if its corresponding value in the
asymptotic case is higher than that of MDI-QKD. That is, MA-QKD enjoys less
noisy statistics that helps us obtain tighter bounds on our parameters of interest.
 Efficient use of decoy states: In both MDI-QKD and MA-QKD, the secret
key is extracted from events in which both users select the signal intensity z. The
rounds in which they both employ the decoy intensities are used for parameter
estimation only. The points that one user uses the Z basis and the other uses
the X basis, are then somehow “wasted” and will be sifted out. MA-QKD can
help with better sifting efficiency. This is partly because of the main advantage
of MA-QKD with respect to MDI-QKD in that the key rate scales with the
transmissivity of one leg of the channel, rather than the entire channel. To better
understand this point, let us consider the effect of employing the vacuum intensity,
v. Suppose that Alice and Bob are using either an MDI-QKD or an MA-QKD
setup with a channel transmittance per leg of η, and that they use intensity z
with probability pz ' 1, as they do in the infinite key regime. Charlie will report
a successful detection with probability Qz. Now suppose that they use the same
scheme as above, except that they now employ a (fictitious) finite-key scheme,
in which they employ the vacuum intensity v with probability pv = pz = 1/2.
The effect of this is equivalent to using a channel with transmittance per leg of
η/2, since the effective transmittance of each user’s link has been reduced by
one half. Since MDI-QKD scales with η2, Qz will be reduced by a factor of 4.
However, since MA-QKD scales with η, Qz will only be reduced by a factor of
2. In reality, Alice and Bob will use additional decoy intensities other than the
vacuum intensity. But since the decoy states will typically have larger vacuum
components than the signal intensity z, they will have a similar effect as adding
loss to the system, which MA-QKD tolerates better.
Another important factor in our finite-key comparison is the amount of time needed
to collect data for a block size N . In the case of MDI-QKD, we can typically run the
system at a high repetition rate on the order of GHz for very long periods of time.
The stability of the memory-based system may, however, require us to stop collecting
data after a certain period of time. It would be interesting to see how the two systems
compare if, instead of the block size, one fixes the total data collection time Tcol,
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instead. This corresponds to a block size of N = RsTcol, for each system, and gives
a considerable advantage to the faster system in collecting more data at an identical
time. This would not make much a difference in the case of warm vapours as we can
already run the system at sub-GHz rates. But, in the case of cold atomic ensembles or
silicon vacancy centres, which represent slower memories, this would be interesting to
study.
Figure 3.3 (a)-(c) show the performance of MA-QKD using the cold atom QM
reported in Ref. [25], with a repetition rate of 4.2 MHz, at different collection times.
This means that, at an identical collection time, the MDI-QKD system can collect
almost 250 times more data than the MA-QKD setup. It is interesting to see that,
even under these harsher conditions, the MA-QKD system can offer a similar advantage
as we saw in Fig. 3.2 over the no-QM MDI-QKD setup. As shown in Fig. 3.3(a), for
a dephasing channel, in the asymptotic regime (black curves), the MA-QKD system
can only offer a small advantage in the range from 300 km to 430 km. However, if the
experiment is run for an hour (orange curves), MA-QKD can generate more key after
230 km, and, while MDI-QKD dies off at about 250 km, MA-QKD can generate a key
up to 350 km. If the experiment is run for just a minute (blue curves), MA-QKD can
offer an advantage after a distance of just 170 km. In Fig. 3.3(d), we show a similar
graph for the silicon vacancy centres used in the recent MA-QKD experiment reported
in [11]. This system has a slightly higher repetition rate, but a lower coherence time.
The latter is the main reason why the cut-off distance is shorter in Fig. 3.3(d) compared
with Fig. 3.3(a).
Note that it may not be possible to use a memory-based system continuously for a
long period of time without applying certain calibrations or cooling techniques. This
could reduce the time available for data collection, reducing the effective block size for
an MA-QKD system. One key technique that may mitigate this problem in the setup
considered in this work is the delayed writing procedure, in which we only attempt
to interact with the memory if the corresponding side-BSM is successful. This means
that the memory is kept in a ready-to-go initial state until we know a photon has
survived the path loss, in which case its state is teleported to the memory. Given that
at long distances the chance of the latter event is low, this suggests that the external
interaction with the memory is not that frequent, and the time between any two such
events can be used to bring the memory back to a solid initial state. In the case of
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Figure 3.3: Secret key generation rate, in b/s, for a MA-QKD setup (solid lines) using
(a)–(c) cold atom quantum memories, reported in [25], and (d) silicon vacancy centres,
reported in [11], in comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD (dashed lines), if we collect
data for one minute (blue), one hour (orange), or with no time limit (black). In (a), (c),
and (d) a dephasing channel is used to model memory decoherence, whereas, in (b),
a depolarisation channel is used. The efficiency of the frequency converter is assumed
ideal in (a), (b), and (d), whereas, in (c), it is 50%.
memories reported in [24] and [25], we also have the additional advantage that after
reading the memory, it automatically goes back to its initial state. Nevertheless, it is
easy in our analysis to consider the effect of possible interruptions in data collection
by modifying the block size. For instance, for CA ensembles, we have verified that the
advantage shown in Fig. 3.3(a) will remain even if we can only collect data a quarter
of the experiment time.
Finally, we have looked at how different system parameters can affect the conclusion
we draw above. In Fig. 3.2(b) and Fig. 3.3(b), we have used a depolarising channel
to model the decoherence effect. In comparison to Fig. 3.2(a) and Fig. 3.3(a), where
a dephasing model is used, we see that the warm vapour system, which has lower T2
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values, is more adversely affected than the cold atom system. We observe the same
behaviour when we change the frequency converter efficiency from one to to 0.5 as
can be seen in Fig. 3.2(c) and Fig. 3.3(c). This can simply be a ramification of having
noisier data in the case of warm vapours as compared to the cold atom case. This would
result in less tight bounds on system parameters at the same block size or collection
time, hence sharper drop in key rates. The overall effect would nevertheless suggest
that MA-QKD systems can offer competitive performances in the finite-key regime
irrespective of the memory or other relevant system parameters. This would be an
essential observation in the early demonstrations of memory-based systems and how
we benchmark them against their rival counterparts.
3.6 Conclusions
By borrowing ideas from quantum repeaters, MA-QKD can improve the scaling of
repeaterless QKD systems. However, the common imperfections in memory-based sys-
tems such as their coupling efficiency to photonic systems, or their finite coherence
times, may make it difficult for them to offer any practical advantage as compared to
their no-memory counterparts. In particular, previous analyses suggest that any ad-
vantage in the total key rate would often come only after a crossover distance that is
still challenging to implement experimentally. In this work, we showed that once we
considered the finite-key effects in the key rate analysis, the crossover distance in such
systems was reduced to a point that an experimental implementation could be foreseen
in the near future. This effect was attributed to two features of decoy-state MA-QKD
systems. First is their ability to purify some of the errors that result from multi-photon
terms in weak laser pulses, and the other relates to a more efficient sifting of signal and
decoy states. It is essential, however, for MA-QKD systems to keep all sources of noise
near the memory units low, as they otherwise would translate into erroneous measure-
ments in the middle site. As such are the multiple excitation terms in the memories,
or sources that drive them, or additional background noise that may enter the setup.
All these issues are manageable with careful design and they are all precursors to im-
plementing longer quantum communications links relying on quantum memory units.
In particular, we believe that the results of this work would be applicable to possible
architectures for future quantum networks, in which end users are only equipped with
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simple equipment, such as decoy-state BB84 encoders, but the core of the network has
advanced memory-based repeater chains [31].
We should note that there are no-memory QKD systems, such as twin-field (TF)
QKD [10], that offer a similar rate-vs-distance scaling as MA-QKD, and they have
already been implemented at record distances [28]. An MA-QKD system may not be
currently able to offer higher key rates or reach longer distances than those achieved by
TF-QKD systems. But, it is important to recognise that the expertise and skills in both
MA-QKD and TF-QKD would be required to implement scalable quantum repeater
systems that go beyond the current rate-versus-distance records. In this respect, this
work makes us one step closer to the final goal of implementing long-distance quantum
communications systems.
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In this appendix, we describe our simulation model, starting with our analysis of the
indirect-loading of QMs with attenuated laser sources. Here, we assume that Charlie
is honest, there is no eavesdropper, and we are only interested in finding the relevant














Figure 3.4: Loading of a QM with a Z-encoded weak coherent pulse, in a round with a
misalignment angle of θ. The module in the dotted box represents a partial Bell-state
measurement (BSM) on polarisation-encoded photons. We refer to the module in the
dashed box as the butterfly module, in which ηa models the channel transmissivity and
the quantum efficiency of a single-photon detector, whereas ηb captures the coupling
and frequency conversion efficiencies as well as the quantum efficiency of a single-photon
detector. The quantum efficiency of photodetectors in the BSM module is then assumed
to be one.
Figure 3.4 shows a schematic view of our memory loading model for a single user,
say Alice, in the polarisation encoding case. We model the loss in the channel, the
measurement devices, and possible frequency converters as two beam splitters of trans-
missivity ηa = ηchηd and ηb = ηcηd located at each input port of the 50:50 beam splitter
of the BSM module. Here, ηch models the transmissivity of the Alice-Charlie channel,
ηc models the frequency conversion and/or coupling efficiency, and ηd represents the
efficiency of the single-photon detectors. Note that by assuming the same efficiency
ηd for all detectors, we are able to analyse its effects at the input ports of the BSM,
simplifying our model. We do not need to consider the effect of the QM’s writing effi-
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ciency, ηw, at the loading stage. Instead, we modify the reading efficiency ηr by an ηw
factor, allowing us to analyse its effect at the reading stage. In Fig. 3.4, the EPP source
is assumed to generate an ideal entangled state in the form 1√
2
(|HH〉b̂m̂ + |V V 〉b̂m̂),
where b̂ and m̂, respectively, represent the two output modes of the EPP source heading
toward the BSM module and the QM.
We also consider setup misalignment between the user sources and the central node,
which, in polarisation encoding, we model as a random rotation of the horizontal and
vertical modes. For simplicity, we assume that the rotation angle θ is independent and
identically distributed between different rounds of the protocol, and for the two legs
of the system. Also, we assume that polarisation maintenance schemes are in place,
so that the reference frames at the user sources and the central node are the same on
average. It is reasonable then to assume, as we do in this work, that the probability
density function (PDF) f(θ) is an even function of θ. One can use a similar formulation
when other types of encoding, e.g. time-bin, are used.
In the following, in Sec. 3.A.1, we first find the post-measurement state of the
loaded memory, the loading probability, and the its corresponding error rate under
above considerations. The particular issue of misalignment turns out to complicate the
analysis when we use weak laser pulses (WCPs) as compared to single-photon sources.
Previous analyses of MA-QKD either assume no channel misalignment [8, 12] or model




In our case, while the analysis is more cumbersome, the end result, in terms of the form
of the post-measurement state of the QM, is similar to the single-photon case. This
allows us to replicate most of the analysis in [7] in Sec. 3.A.2, and extend it to the case
of depolarisation channels. In the last section of this Appendix, we have summarised
the key rate relationships used for the no-QM MDI-QKD as a reference point.
3.A.1 Memory loading
Here, we calculate the post-measurement state of the QM, its loading probability and
error rate, in the two cases of Z and X bases.
3.A.1.1 Analysis for Z basis
Without loss of generality, let us consider the case that the user generates a horizontally





µ and âh and âv represent, respectively, the horizontal and vertical modes
of the transmitted light in Fig. 3.4. In a particular round with a misalignment angle of
θ, the misaligned state, at the input of the butterfly module, is given by
|ψ〉θâ = |αh〉âh |αv〉âv , (3.6)
where αh = α cos θ and αv = α sin θ. Meanwhile, the joint state of the two output




(|HH〉b̂m̂ + |V V 〉b̂m̂) = 1√2(|10H〉b̂hb̂vm̂ + |01V 〉b̂hb̂vm̂), (3.7)
where in the last equality, we have divided b̂ into, respectively, horizontal and vertical
modes b̂h and b̂v. After reordering modes, and averaging over θ, the joint input state

























|αh〉〈αh|âh |0〉〈1|b̂h |αv〉〈αv|âv |1〉〈0|b̂v |V 〉〈H|m̂ ,
(3.9)
and |ψ〉 〈ψ|â is our shorthand notation for |ψ〉ââ〈ψ|.
We are interested in the state projected to the QM after a successful loading, i.e.,
when exactly an H detector and a V detector click in the BSM module. To model this
measurement process, we should find the output state of the butterfly module, with
an input state as in Eq. (3.8), and then find the post-measurement state for the de-
sired measurement outcome. The key to calculate this is to realise that the horizontal
and vertical modes will interact separately at the 50:50 beam splitter of the butterfly
module, and will cause clicks in the horizontal and vertically polarised detectors, re-
spectively. Thus, we can split the overall transformation B̂ for the butterfly module




B̂ = B̂h ⊗ B̂v (3.10)
M̂ = M̂h ⊗ M̂v. (3.11)
Here, the butterfly operators B̂h and B̂v in Fig. 3.4 only differ in their input and output
modes: B̂h will take modes âh and b̂h to modes l̂h and r̂h, while B̂v will take modes âv
and b̂v to modes l̂v and r̂v. The measurement operators (POVMs) are also identical for
both the horizontal and vertical modes, and are given by
M̂x = (1− pdc)
[(












for x ∈ {h, v}, where Î is the identity operator for the corresponding mode. M̂x
represents the event of getting a click in the x-polarised left detector and no click on
the x-polarised right detector, or vice-versa.
Using the above notation, the post-measurement state of the QM, after a successful



































B̂†v |αv〉〈αv|âv |0〉〈0|b̂v B̂vM̂v
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f(θ)[cHH(θ) + cV V (θ)]dθ (3.16)
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is the probability of a successful loading for a WCP with intensity µ.
Every individual trace term in Eq. (3.15) involves either horizontal or vertical modes,
and is equivalent to the probability of having exactly one detector click in the corre-
sponding polarisation. Such terms have already been calculated in Table III of [31],
which here we reuse, after making necessary adjustments, to obtain
cHH(θ) = (1− pdc)2
(







µ ηa − 2 ηb + 4
)
e1/2 ηa (cos
2 θ)µ − 4 (1− ηb) (1− pdc)
)
e−1/2 ηa µ ((cos
2 θ)+1),





2 θµ ηa − ηb ηa µ+ 2 ηb − 4
)
e−1/2 ηa µ (cos
2 θ+1)




2 θµ ηa − ηb ηa µ+ 2 ηb − 4
)
e−1/2 ηa µ





cHV (θ) = cV H(θ) =
1
4
cos θ sin θ(1− pdc)2(ηaηbµe−ηaµ). (3.18)
It is interesting that, in the above, the diagonal terms cHV and cV H are odd functions





f(θ)cV H(θ)dθ = 0, (3.19)
implying that these terms vanish when considering the average post-measurement state
ρ̂m̂ in Eq. (3.13). Thus, ρ̂m̂ can be expressed as
ρm̂ = e
µ
load |H〉〈H|+ (1− e
µ








is the probability of loading the memory with the wrong state. In our case, when
we send H-polarised light, a successful BSM in Fig. 3.4 suggests that the b̂ mode is
V-polarised. The state stored in the memory, for an EPP source with |Φ+〉b̂m̂ as its
initial state, is then also expected to be V-polarised. That is why the coefficient for
|H〉〈H|, in Eq. (3.20), represents the loading error probability, in Z basis, for a WCP
with intensity µ.
Due to the symmetry of the setup, if the user sends vertically polarised light, the
loading probability pµload would be the same, but the post-measurement state is given
by ρm̂ = (1− eµload) |H〉〈H|+ e
µ
load |V 〉〈V |.
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3.A.1.2 Analysis for X basis







In a particular round with a misalignment angle θ, the butterfly module will receive
the state
|ψ〉θâ =
∣∣∣∣ α√2(sin θ + cos θ)
〉
âh








(|DD〉b̂m̂ + |AA〉b̂m̂) = 1√2 ((|10〉+ |01〉) |D〉+ (|10〉 − |01〉) |A〉))b̂hb̂vm̂ ,
(3.24)
where |D〉 = (|H〉+ |V 〉)/
√
2 and |A〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/
√
2.
The analysis is similar to the one for the Z basis. After going through similar steps,









(1− pdc) (cos θ sin (θ)µηa ηb − 1/2 ηb µηa + 6 ηb − 8)
e−1/2 ηa µ(cos θ sin(θ)+3/2) − (1− pdc) (cos θ sin (θ)µηa ηb + 1/2 ηb µηa − 6 ηb + 8)




and, under our assumption that f(θ) is even, the post-measurement state of the mem-
ory can be written as
ρm̂ = e
µ
load |D〉〈D|+ (1− e
µ












(1− pdc) (cos (θ) sin (θ)µηa ηb − ηb µηa/2 + 6 ηb − 8)
e−1/2 ηa µ(cos(θ) sin(θ)+3/2) − (1− pdc) (cos (θ) sin (θ)µηa ηb + 1/2 ηb µηa − 6 ηb + 8)
e1/4 ηa µ(2 cos(θ) sin(θ)−3) +
(




µηa ηb − 4 ηb + 8
)
e−1/2 ηa µ




Finally, note that we calculate the integrals in Eqs. (3.16), (3.21), (3.25) and (3.27)
numerically as a closed form expression for them could not be found. In our simulations,
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to compute pµload and e
µ
load, we assume that f(θ) follows a uniform distribution over
[−Θ,Θ]. To have a fair comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD, we choose Θ = √3emis,
where emis is the misalignment error probability in one leg of a symmetric MDI-QKD

















θ2dθ = emis, (3.28)
which implies that the chosen f(θ) would cause a misalignment error of approximately
emis in the MDI-QKD setup.
3.A.2 Key rate simulation
In Sec. 3.A.1, we showed that the post-measurement QM state after a successful load-
ing is a mixture of the desired and undesired states for the QM; see Eq. (3.20) and
Eq. (3.26). In effect, it is as if the state of QM has flipped with a probability eµload.
This is similar to how misalignment acts on a single photon state, because of which we
can think of the whole loading process as a channel with an effective misalignment of
eµload. This would also make it possible to use the methodology in Ref. [7] to calculate
the required parameters of the key rate formula. In particular, the photonic states re-
trieved from the two QMs turn out to also have a similar form to a misaligned photon,
although at a higher error rate to account for the dephasing/depolarisation process.
In the following, we explain how to simulate all terms in the key-rate formula,
in both the asymptotic and finite-key regimes. Given that in MA-QKD, one of the
memories will be read immediately after loading, only one of the QMs would undergo
the decay process. That implies that the middle BSM in Fig. 3.1 can be thought as
an asymmetric MDI-QKD setup, with possibly different transmissivities ηl and ηr for,
respectively, its left and right legs [7]. We can then use the yield and error rate formulas,
summarised below, of asymmetric single-photon MDI-QKD for our rate calculation:
Y MDI11 (ηl, ηr) = (1− pd)2
[ηlηr
2





11 (ηl, ηr) = e0Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr)− (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2ηlηr/2, (3.30)
eMDI11;Z(ηl, ηr, ed)Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr) = e0Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr)− (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2(1− 2pd)ηlηr/2,
(3.31)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed is the total misalignment probability in the asymmetric MDI-




In this case, the key-rate formula is given by Eq. (3.3). In this regime, we assume that
the signal intensity z, encoded in the Z-basis, is chosen with probability approaching
one, and the parameter estimation provides perfect estimates of the single-photon terms
QZ11 and eph. We only then need to simulate the values of QZ , eZ , Q
Z
11 and eph under
nominal mode of operation. The procedure we use to calculate these terms is very
similar to that of [7]. The main differences are our new model for the memory-loading
with WCPs, developed earlier in this Appendix, and the inclusion of the depolarising
channel for memory decoherence.
To compute QZ , we divide it into two parts: (1) the probability of having the two
memories loaded and available to read in a given round, denoted by Pside, and (2) the
probability that the middle BSM is successful, given that the QMs are ready, denoted
by Pmid. Then,
QZ = PsidePmid. (3.32)
To find Pside, we first estimate the probability to load the QM with a Z-encoded WCP,
given by pzload in Eq. (3.16). Then, we compute the average number of rounds NL that
it takes to load both memories, substituting ηA and ηB by p
z











where Nr is the number of rounds it takes to read the memory, which we assume to be
one.
The second term is given by
Pmid = Y
MDI
11 (ηm, ηm′), (3.35)
where ηm = ηwηr0ηd is the effective reading efficiency of the QM loaded later, and ηm′
is the average effective reading efficiency of the QM loaded earlier, given by [7]
ηm′ =
(1 + eT/T1 − pzload)pzload
(2− pzload)(eT/T1 + pzload − 1)
ηm, (3.36)
where T1 is the time constant for the decay process of the QM.
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where pSPload is the probability to load the QM when a single photon is sent, given by [7]
pSPload = Y
MDI
11 (ηchηd, ηcηd). (3.38)
To find eph, we first calculate the misalignment-error probability for loading the
QM with an X-basis single photon, which is given by [7]
eX,SPload = e
MDI



































[1− (1− pzload)e−T/T2 ][1− (1− pzload)2]
, (3.42)
















E {edeph} , (3.44)
in the case of depolarising memories.






where E {eQM} is the average total misalignment-error probability between the two
QMs, which depends on the specific model used for decoherence. In the dephasing
120
3.A Simulation model
model, the Z-basis QM states will not be affected by the decoherence, therefore, the
probability that exactly one state is misaligned is as follows
E {eQM} = eQM = 2ezload(1− ezload), (3.46)
where ezload is given by Eq. (3.21). For the depolarisation model, we have
E {eQM} = 2ezload + 2βE {edepol} − 2ezloadezload − 4βE {edepol} ezload, (3.47)
where β = 1− 2ezload.
To derive Eq. (3.47) and Eqs. (3.41) to (3.44), we have used a similar analysis as in
Appendix D of Ref. [7].
3.A.2.2 Finite-key regime
In this case, we need to calculate the sets {Mab} and {Eab}, where Mab is the total
number of measurement counts when Alice (Bob) has used intensity a (b), while Eab
is the number of such events that also result in an error. Note that intensity z is
encoded in the Z basis and intensities {w1, w2, v} are encoded in the X basis; we are
only interested in estimating {Mab} and {Eab} when a, b are encoded in the same basis.
For our numerical simulations, we still need to make some assumptions on the
obtained measurement results in a nominal experiment. For this purpose, we use the
expected values for relevant parameters using the corresponding probability in the
asymptotic regime. That is, we assume
Mab = NQab and Eab = eabM
ab, (3.48)
where N is the total number of rounds, i.e., the number of transmitted pulses by
Alice/Bob, in the protocol, Qab is the probability of having a successful measurement
originating from intensities a, for Alice, and b, for Bob, and eab is the probability that
this measurement results in an error.
To calculate Qab, we first compute the total gain Qtot, using the same procedure as
for QZ in the asymptotic case, with the difference that Qtot is now a function of the









where pa is the probability of selecting intensity a ∈ {z, w1, w2, v}; and paload is the
probability of a successful loading when the user selects intensity a, given by either
Eq. (3.21) or Eq. (3.27), depending on whether intensity a is encoded in the Z or X






(1 + eT/T1 − p̄load)p̄load








11 (ηm, ηm′), (3.53)
Qtot = PsidePmid, (3.54)
where Nr = 1 and ηm = ηwηr0ηd. Now, Q
ab is the fraction of Qtot that originated from
intensities a, b. Note that after a successful loading, the state projected to the QM
is always a misaligned qubit. The probability that the middle BSM is successful only
depends on the loss coefficients ηm and ηm′ , and it is independent of the intensities a, b
that caused the loading. Thus, Qab only depends on how likely intensities a, b are to
































is the total average misalignment error probability between the two
QMs, and depends on whether one considers a dephasing or depolarisation model. The





= eQMzz = 2e
z
load(1− ezload). (3.58)





= eaload + e
b
load + βaE {edeph}+ βbE {edeph} − 2ealoadebload




where βk = 1− 2ekload, and






[1− (1− p̄load)e−T/T2 ][1− (1− p̄load)2]
, (3.60)
using a similar analysis to the one that results in Eq. (D.8) of [7].





= eaload + e
b
load + βaE {edepol}+ βbE {edepol} − 2ealoadebload






E {edeph} . (3.62)
3.A.3 MDI-QKD without QMs
Here, we give the formulas that we have used to simulate the no-memory MDI-QKD
with WCP sources.
In general, if Alice and Bob encode in the Z basis and choose intensities a and b,
respectively, the gain and error-rate formulas are given by [32]
Qab = Qc +Qe, (3.63)
eab = edQc + (1− ed)Qe, (3.64)
where ed represents the total misalignment error probability given by ed =
2emis(1− emis), and
Qc = 2(1− pd)2e−ζ/2(1− (1− pd)e−ηa/2)(1− (1− pd)e−ηb/2)




ζ = η(a+ b),
(3.65)
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and η = ηchηd is the total
attenuation between each user and the middle node. If they encode in the X basis,
they are given by [32]




− (1− 2ed)y2[I0(2x)− 1], (3.67)
where




In the asymptotic regime, the key rate formula is given by
R ≤ Rs
[
QZ11 (1− h(eph))− fQZh(eZ)
]
. (3.69)
QZ and eZ are given by Eqs. (3.63) and (3.64), respectively, by substituting a = b = z.
In the asymptotic regime, we assume that the users are able to obtain perfect estimates

























We need to simulate the sets {Mab} and {Eab}. In our simulations, we assume that all
measurement counts equal their expected values, that is,
Mab = NpabQ
ab and Eab = eabM
ab, (3.73)
where Qab and eab are given by Eq. (3.63) and Eq. (3.64) for Z-encoded intensities, and
by Eq. (3.66) and Eq. (3.67) for X-encoded intensities, and pab is the probability that
Alice and Bob choose intensities a and b, respectively.
3.B Finite-key analysis
In this Appendix, we explain the detailed procedure for finding a lower bound on MZ11
and an upper bound on eph in Eq. (3.4). For our finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD
and MA-QKD, we use the analytical estimation procedure introduced in [17], together
with the tighter multiplicative Chernoff bounds introduced in [16]. Also, as in [21],
we estimate the total single photon measurement counts M11 in both bases using data
in the X basis only. We then link it with M zz11 via random sampling analysis. This





In the protocol, Alice and Bob emit phase-randomised coherent states of a random
intensity a ∈ {z, w1, w2, v}, where the z intensity is encoded in the Z basis and the rest
of the intensities are encoded in the X basis. Without knowing the basis information,




pn|a |n〉〈n| , (3.74)
where pn|a is the probability that a pulse of intensity a contains n photons, and |n〉
is the n-photon Fock state. For weak laser pulses, we can typically assume a Poisson
distribution for the photon number, in which case, pn|a = a
ne−a/n!. While most of our
analysis does not depend on the choice of the probability distribution, we also use the
Poisson assumption for our numerical results. Based on the above diagonal form, for
a pulse encoded in a given basis, the only information available to Eve is its photon
number n. This implies that, instead of the actual protocol, Alice and Bob could have
run the equivalent virtual scenario in which
 Alice (Bob) sends a Z-encoded n-photon Fock state with probability pn,Z =
pzpn|z.
 Alice (Bob) sends an X-encoded n-photon Fock state with probability pn,X =∑
a∈{w1,w2,v} papn|a.
In this virtual scenario, Alice and Bob can wait until after Eve’s attack to assign






and then “reveal” their intensity choices in the appropriate step of the protocol, so that
Eve cannot tell which scenario (actual or virtual) is being performed.
Note that Fock states encoded in different bases are in general partially distinguish-
able to Eve, so Alice and Bob must decide their encoding basis before their emission,
even in the virtual scenario. There is one important exception, however: single-photon














This implies that the users could have replaced their single-photon emissions by the




(|0〉 |H〉+ |1〉 |V 〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉 |D〉+ |−〉 |A〉) , (3.77)
where the first qubit, in |0〉-|1〉 basis, is held by the users and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
This allows us to alter our virtual scenario in the following way: when Alice and Bob
both decide to send a single-photon state, they replace their respective emissions by
the generation of |ψ1〉, and then wait until after Eve’s attack to decide in which basis to
measure their ancilla. This delayed basis choice will allow us to estimate the statistics
of Z-encoded single-photon emissions using X-basis data.
3.B.2 Estimation of MZ11
The estimation is divided in two steps:
1. Estimation of M11, the total single-photon measurement counts in both basis,
using the decoy state analysis.
2. Estimation of MZ11 from M11, via a random sampling analysis.
3.B.2.1 Estimation of M11
In our virtual scenario, the users have replaced their decoy-state emissions by Fock
states, which are only assigned to a particular intensity after Eve’s attack. Let MXnm,
with (n,m) 6= (1, 1), be the set of rounds in which Alice (Bob) chooses the X basis,
sends n (m) photons, and Charlie reports a successful detection. Also, let MXnm =∣∣MXnm∣∣. After her reports, Alice and Bob will assign each event in MXnm to intensities
a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v} with probability








a∈{w1,w2,v} papn|a by the law of total probability. As explained above,
Alice and Bob have also delayed their choice of basis on those rounds in which both
sent a single photon. Let M11 be the set of rounds in which Alice and Bob sends a
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single photon and Charlie reports a successful detection, and let M11 = |M11|. The
probability that they assign each event in M11 to intensities a, b ∈ {z, w1, w2, v} is








a∈{z,w1,w2,v} papn|a by the law of total probability. Let M
ab denote the











where S = {(m,n)|m,n ∈ Z,m, n ≥ 0} − {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Each of these intensity
assignments is a Bernoulli random variable, and therefore E[Mab] is the average value
of the sum of some Bernoulli random variables. The values of Mab measured by Alice
and Bob correspond to an instance of this sum of Bernoulli random variables.
Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random
variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the observation of the outcome χ, its expectation value




























These solutions can be expressed in terms of the Lambert W function, the inverse of




which is useful for their quick numerical computation.
We use Eq. (3.81) to find bounds on E[Mab], which by Eq. (3.80) will set constraints
on the values of MXnm and M11. Since we are interested in M
L
11, our analysis can be
reformulated as the optimization problem: Find minM11 such that
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∀a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}. This problem can be solved using linear optimisation techniques
[17]. In this work, however, we use the computationally faster analytical estimation
method laid out in the Supplementary Note 1 of [17], for Poisson distributed input





where pab|11,X is given by Eq. (3.78), and substitute pab|11M11 by pab|11,XM̂
X
11 in
Eq. (3.84). Then, one can use the results of [17] to find a lower bound on M̂X11, and
reuse Eq. (3.85) to turn it into a lower bound ML11 on M11.
3.B.2.2 Estimation of MZ11 from M11
LetMZ11 be the subset ofM11 in which both users employ the Z basis, and let MZ11 =∣∣MZ11∣∣. By the delayed basis argument, Alice and Bob could decide which events in










i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the expectation value E[χ], the outcome χ can be lower-
bounded by [16]








except with probability ε.
The lower bound on MZ11 is then given by (M
Z
11)
L = (1− δ)χ̄, where χ̄ = pzz|11ML11
and δ is given by Eq. (3.87).
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3.B.3 Estimation of eph







where EZ11 is the number of phase errors inMZ11, that is, the number of bit errors that
Alice and Bob would have obtained if they had encoded their Z basis single-photon
emissions in the X basis. The estimation of this quantity is divided in two steps:
1. Estimation of E11, the total amount of phase-flip errors in all single-photon emis-
sions.
2. Estimation of EZ11 from E11, via a random sampling analysis.
3.B.3.1 Estimation of E11
Let us imagine that, in the virtual scenario, Alice and Bob measure all their pairs of
ancillas in M11 in the X basis, even those that they have assigned to MZ11. Let E11
be the subset of M11 in which they find a phase-flip error, and let E11 = |E11|. Each
event in E11 is assigned to intensity a, b ∈ {z, w1, w2, v} with probability pab|11 defined
in Eq. (3.79).
Also, let EXnm, with (n,m) 6= (1, 1), be the subset of MXnm in which Alice and Bob
obtain a phase-flip error. Each event in EXnm is assigned to intensity a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}
with probability pab|nm,X defined in Eq. (3.78). For a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}, the expected











From Eqs. (3.81)–(3.83), we obtain bounds EL[Eab],EU[Eab], and redefine our analysis
as the optimization problem: Find max E11 such that







∀a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}. Again, this problem can be solved using linear programming tech-
niques, but we use the analytical estimation method in the Supplementary Note 1 of
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where pab|11,X is given by Eq. (3.78), and substitute pab|11E11 by pab|11,XÊ
X
11 in
Eq. (3.90). Then, one can use the results of [17] to find an upper bound on ÊX11,
and reuse Eq. (3.91) to turn it into an upper bound EU11 on E11.
3.B.3.2 Estimation of EZ11 from E11
By the delayed basis argument, each event in E11 will be assigned to E
Z
11 with proba-
bility pzz|11, defined in Eq. (3.86).
Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random
variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the expectation value E[χ], the outcome χ can be upper-
bounded by [16]








except with probability ε.
Finally, an upper bound on EZ11 is given by (E
Z
11)
U = (1 + δ)χ̄, where χ̄ = pzz|11E
U
11
and δ is given by Eq. (3.92).
130
References
[1] S. Pirandola, U. Andersen, L. Banchi, M. Berta, D. Bunandar, R. Colbeck, D. En-
glund, T. Gehring, C. Lupo, C. Ottaviani, et al., “Advances in quantum cryptog-
raphy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.01645, 2019. 94
[2] N. Gisin, “How far can one send a photon?,” Frontiers of Physics, vol. 10, no. 6,
p. 100307, 2015. 94
[3] S. Muralidharan, L. Li, J. Kim, N. Lütkenhaus, M. D. Lukin, and L. Jiang, “Op-
timal architectures for long distance quantum communication,” Scientific reports,
vol. 6, p. 20463, 2016. 94
[4] L.-M. Duan, M. Lukin, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, “Long-distance quantum com-
munication with atomic ensembles and linear optics,” Nature, vol. 414, no. 6862,
p. 413, 2001. 94
[5] N. Sangouard, C. Simon, H. De Riedmatten, and N. Gisin, “Quantum repeaters
based on atomic ensembles and linear optics,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 83,
no. 1, p. 33, 2011.
[6] N. L. Piparo and M. Razavi, “Long-distance trust-free quantum key distribution,”
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, vol. 21, pp. 123–130,
May 2015. 94
[7] C. Panayi, M. Razavi, X. Ma, and N. Lütkenhaus, “Memory-assisted measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 16,
no. 4, p. 043005, 2014. 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 113, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123
131
REFERENCES
[8] S. Abruzzo, H. Kampermann, and D. Bruß, “Measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution with quantum memories,” Physical Review A, vol. 89,
no. 1, p. 012301, 2014. 94, 95, 113
[9] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution,” Physical review letters, vol. 108, no. 13, p. 130503, 2012. 94
[10] M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Overcoming the rate–
distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters,” Nature,
vol. 557, no. 7705, p. 400, 2018. 94, 111
[11] M. K. Bhaskar, R. Riedinger, B. Machielse, D. S. Levonian, C. T. Nguyen, E. N.
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Chapter 4




Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a reliable solution to communication problems
that require long-term data security. For its widespread use, however, the rate and
reach of QKD systems must be improved. Twin-field (TF) QKD is a step forward
toward this direction, with early demonstrations suggesting it can beat the current
rate-versus-distance records. A recently introduced variant of TF-QKD is particularly
suited for experimental implementation, and has been shown to offer a higher key rate
than other variants in the asymptotic regime where users exchange an infinite number
of signals. Here, we extend the security of this protocol to the finite-key regime, showing
that it can overcome the fundamental bounds on point-to-point QKD with around 1010
transmitted signals. In many practical regimes of interest, our analysis offers higher key
rates than those of alternative variants. Moreover, some of the techniques we develop
are applicable to the finite-key analysis of other QKD protocols.
4.2 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties, Alice and Bob, to gen-
erate a shared secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who may have
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unbounded computational power at her disposal [1–3]. While, ideally, the two parties
can be at any distance, in practice, due to the loss and noise in the channel, point-
to-point QKD is limited to a certain maximum distance at which secret key bits can
securely be exchanged. In fact, the longest distance achieved to date in a terrestrial
QKD experiment is about 400 km [4, 5]. The main limitation is the exponential de-
crease of the transmittance, η, with the channel length in optical fibres. Even with a
high repetition rate of 10 GHz, it would take an average of about two minutes to send
a single photon over a distance of 600 km of standard optical fibres, and about 300
years to send it over 1000 km [6]. Indeed, fundamental bounds [7–11] on the private
capacity of repeaterless point-to-point QKD protocols show that their secret-key rate
scales at best approximately linearly with η. A protocol that aims to overcome this
linear scaling must then include at least one middle node. Interestingly, this is not a
sufficient condition. A well-known counterexample is the so-called measurement-device
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [12], which uses the middle node for an untrusted Bell-
state measurement operation. There are, however, extensions of MDI-QKD that can
improve its rate scaling from η to
√
η by either using quantum memories [13, 14] or
quantum non-demolition measurements [15]. Such setups can, in fact, be considered to
be the simplest examples of quantum repeaters [6, 16], which are the ultimate solution
to trust-free long-distance quantum communications [17]. However, even these simple
versions may need more time to be efficiently implemented in practice [18, 19].
Remarkably, the recently proposed twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [20] can also over-
come this linear scaling while using a relatively simple setup. TF-QKD is related to
MDI-QKD, and it inherits its immunity to detector side-channels. However, it relies on
single-photon, rather than two-photon, interference for its entanglement swapping op-
eration. The secret-key rate of this protocol was first conjectured [20] and then proven
[21, 22] to scale with
√
η too, making this approach a strong candidate to beat the
current QKD records [23–26] with today’s technology. The main experimental chal-
lenge is that single-photon interference needs very precise phase stability, which makes
it more demanding than two-photon interference. Also, some of its current security
proofs [21, 22] need Alice and Bob to randomly choose a global phase, and then post-
select only those rounds in which their choices match, which causes a drop in the secret
key rate. Since the original proposal, several variants of TF-QKD have been developed





differing in their experimental setups and security proofs. Moreover, some of these vari-
ants have been shown to be robust against phase reference mismatch [28–30], which
simplifies their experimental implementation.
In this paper, we focus on the TF-QKD variant introduced in [28], which has two
key features: (i) it does not need phase post-selection, which results in a higher secret-
key rate; and (ii) it is a convenient option for experimental implementation. Indeed,
many of the current TF-QKD experiments use this variant [23, 24, 26]. One of its
defining characteristics is its unconventional security proof; specifically, its estimation
of the phase-error rate, a parameter needed to bound the amount of key information
that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. In many QKD protocols, the phase-error
rate of the single-photon emissions in one basis can be directly estimated by bounding
the bit-error rate of the single-photon emissions in the other basis. In the above TF-
QKD variant, however, the encoding bases are not mutually unbiased. To estimate the
phase-error rate, the authors in [28] use the complementarity [31] between the “phase”
and the “photon-number” of a bosonic mode. In this case, the security of a bit encoded
in the relative phase of two coherent pulses can be related to the detection statistics
of photon-number states. More specifically, in the asymptotic regime, the phase-error
rate can be bounded by a non-linear function of infinitely many yield probabilities for
even photon-number states [28], which can be estimated via the decoy-state method
[32–34].
While, in the asymptotic regime, the protocol in [28] can offer a higher key rate
than its counterparts, it is not obvious if this advantage will still hold in a practical
setting where only a finite number of pulses is sent. In the finite-key regime, one should
account for possible statistical fluctuations between the true phase-error rate and the
measurement data used to estimate it. There are, however, two challenges in doing
so. The first challenge is that the phase-error rate of the protocol is related to the
measurement statistics of infinitely many combinations of photon-number states; in
practice, one can only obtain bounds for a finite number of them, and dealing with
the unbounded components is not as straightforward as in the asymptotic regime. The
second challenge is that, unlike in many other QKD protocols, the encoding bases are
not mutually unbiased. This opens the possibility that, under a coherent attack by
Eve, the detection statistics of a particular round may depend on the basis choices
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made in previous rounds. Accounting for these correlations makes the analysis quite
cumbersome.
In this work, we provide a rigorous security proof for the protocol in [28] that
accounts for these two issues in the finite-key setting. Our security proof provides a
tight bound on the key rate against general coherent attacks. To overcome the two main
challenges mentioned above, we borrow ideas from the finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD
[35] and the loss-tolerant protocol [36, 37], as well as introduce several methods of our
own. To obtain a tighter result, we employ a recent technique to bound the deviation
between a sum of correlated random variables and its expected value [38], which can
be much tighter than the widely employed Azuma’s inequality [39] when the success
probability is low. Importantly, our numerical simulations show that the protocol can
overcome the repeaterless bounds [8–10] for a block size of around 1010 transmitted
signals in nominal working conditions.
During the preparation of this manuscript, an alternative finite-key security analy-
sis for an identical protocol setup has been reported in [40], using an interesting, but
different, approach. We would like to highlight that our analysis imposes fewer condi-
tions on the setup parameters than that of Ref. [40], and results in a higher key rate
in most practical regimes. In the Discussion section, we compare both approaches. We
also compare our results with those of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol
introduced in [30], whose security has recently been extended to the finite-key regime
[41]. We find that for reasonably large block sizes, and sufficiently low phase reference
mismatch errors, the asymptotic key rate advantage of the scheme in [28] is maintained
in the finite-key regime, for most practical ranges of distance.
Results
Protocol description
The setup of the TF-QKD protocol in [28] is illustrated in Fig. 4.1 and its step-by-
step description is given below. Alice and Bob generate quantum signals and send
them to a middle node, Charlie, who would ideally couple them at a balanced 50:50
beamsplitter and perform a photodetection measurement. For simplicity, we assume
the symmetric scenario in which the Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie quantum channels
are identical. We note, however, that our analysis can be straightforwardly extended
138
4.2 Introduction
Figure 4.1: Setup of the simple TF-QKD protocol [28] considered in this
work. Alice and Bob generate their sifted key from the rounds in which they both
select the X basis and Charlie declares that a single detector has clicked. The key
bit is encoded in the phase of their coherent state. When the users select the same (a
different) bit, the constructive (destructive) interference at Charlie’s 50:50 beamsplitter
should cause a click in detector Dc (Dd). The Z-basis PRCSs are only used to estimate
the phase-error rate of the X-basis emissions.
to the asymmetric scenario recently considered in Refs. [42, 43]. The emitted quantum
signals belong to two bases, selected at random. In the X basis, Alice and Bob send
phase-locked coherent states |±α〉 with a random phase of either 0 or π with respect
to a pre-agreed reference. In the Z basis, Alice and Bob generate phase-randomised
coherent states (PRCSs), which are diagonal in the Fock basis. The X-basis states
are used to generate the key, while the Z-basis data is used to estimate the detection
statistics of Fock states, in combination with the decoy-state method. This is a crucial
step in estimating the phase-error rate of the key, thus bounding the information that
could have been leaked to a potential eavesdropper. The detailed steps of the protocol
are:
(1) Preparation
Alice (Bob) chooses the key-generation basis X with probability pX or the
parameter-estimation basis Z with probability pZ = 1− pX , and
(1.1) If she (he) chooses the X basis, she (he) generates a random bit bA (bB),
prepares an optical pulse in the coherent state
∣∣(−1)bAα〉 (∣∣(−1)bBα〉), and
sends it to Charlie.
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(1.2) If she (he) chooses the Z basis, she (he) sends an optical pulse in a PRCS
of intensity µ, selected from the set µ = {µ0, µ1, . . . , µd−1} with probability
pµ, where d is the number of decoy intensities used.
They repeat step (1) for N rounds.
(2) Detection
An honest Charlie measures each round separately by interfering Alice and Bob’s
signals at a 50:50 beamsplitter, followed by threshold detectors Dc and Dd placed
at the output ports corresponding to constructive and destructive interference,
respectively. After the measurement, Charlie reports the pair (kc, kd), where
kc = 1 (kd = 1) if detector Dc (Dd) clicks and kc = 0 (kd = 0) otherwise. If he is
dishonest, Charlie can measure all rounds coherently using an arbitrary quantum
measurement, and report N pairs (kc, kd) depending on the result. A round is
considered successful (unsuccessful) if kc 6= kd (kc = kd).
(3) Sifting
For all successful rounds, Alice and Bob disclose their basis choices, keeping only
those in which they have used the same basis. Let MX (MZ) be the set of
successful rounds in which both users employed the X (Z) basis, and let MX =
|MX | (MZ = |MZ |) be the size of this set. Alice and Bob disclose their intensity
choices for the rounds in MZ and learn the number of rounds Mµν in MZ in
which they selected intensities µ ∈ µ and ν ∈ µ, respectively. Also, they generate
their sifted keys from the values of bA and bB corresponding to the rounds in
MX . For those rounds in which kc = 0 and kd = 1, Bob flips his sifted key bit.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob apply the decoy-state method to Mµν , for µ, ν ∈ µ, obtaining
upper-bounds MUnm on the number of rounds Mnm in MZ in which they sent n
and m photons, respectively. They do this for all n,m ≥ 0 such that n + m is
even and n+m ≤ Scut for a prefixed parameter Scut. Then, they use this data to





(5.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-fixed amount λEC of syndrome
information bits through an authenticated public channel, which Bob uses
to correct errors in his sifted key.
(5.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute a hash of their error-corrected
keys using a random universal hash function, and check whether they are
equal. If so, they continue to the next step; otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(5.3) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob extract a secret key pair (SA, SB)
of length |SA| = |SB| = ` from their error-corrected keys using a random
two-universal hash function.
4.2.1 Parameter estimation and Secret-key rate analysis
The main contribution of this work—see Methods for the details—is a procedure to
obtain a tight upper-bound NUph on the total number of phase errors Nph in the finite-
key regime for the protocol described above. Namely, we find that, except for an
arbitrarily small failure probability ε, it holds that

























where pnm|X (pnm|Z) is the probability that Alice and Bob’s joint X (Z) basis pulses
contain n and m photons, respectively, given by





with pn|µ = µ
n exp(−µ)/n! being the Poisson probability that a PRCS pulse of intensity
µ will contain n photons; N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd) integers; and ∆
and ∆nm are statistical fluctuation terms defined in step 4 of subsection “Instructions
for experimentalists”, where we provide a step-by-step instruction list to apply our
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results to the measurement data obtained in an experimental setup. The rest of the
parameters have been introduced in the protocol description.
When it comes to finite-key analysis, there is one key difference between the protocol
considered in this work and several other protocols, such as, for example, decoy-state
BB84 [44], decoy-state MDI-QKD [35], and sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD [41]. In
all the latter setups, when there are no state-preparation flaws, the single-photon com-
ponents of the two encoding bases are mutually unbiased; in other words, they look
identical to Eve once averaged by the bit selection probabilities. This implies that such
states could have been generated from a maximally entangled bipartite state, where
one of its components is measured in one of the two orthogonal bases, and the other
half represents an encoded key bit. In fact, the user(s) could even wait until they learn
which rounds have been successfully detected to decide their measurement basis, effec-
tively delaying their choice of encoding basis. This possibility allows the application of
a random sampling argument: since the choice of the encoding basis is independent of
Eve’s attack, the bit error rate of the successful X-basis emissions provides a random
sample of the phase-error rate of the successful Z-basis emissions, and vice-versa. Then,
one can apply tight statistical results such as the Serfling inequality [45] to bound the
phase-error rate in one basis using the measured bit-error rate in the other basis. This
approach, however, is not directly applicable to the protocol considered here, in which
the secret key is extracted from all successfully detected X-basis signals, not just from
their single-photon components. Moreover, the encoding bases are not mutually unbi-
ased: the Z-basis states are diagonal in the Fock basis, while the X-basis states are
not. This will require a different, perhaps more cumbersome, analysis as we highlight
below.
To estimate the X-basis phase-error rate from the Z-basis measurement data, we
construct a virtual protocol in which the users learn their basis choice by measuring
a quantum coin after Charlie/Eve reveals which rounds were successful. Note that,
because of the biased basis feature of the protocol, the statistics of the quantum coins
associated to the successful rounds could depend on Eve’s attack. This means that the
users cannot delay their choice of basis, which prevents us from applying the random
sampling argument. Still, it turns out that the quantum coin technique now allows
us to upper-bound the average number of successful rounds in which the users had
selected the X basis and obtained a phase error. This bound is a non-linear function
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of the average number of successful rounds in which they had selected the Z basis and
respectively sent n and m photons, with n+m even. More details can be found in the
Methods Section; see Eq. (4.19).
The main tool we use to relate each of the above average terms to their actual
occurrences, Nph and Mnm, is Azuma’s inequality [39], which is widely used in security
analyses of QKD to bound sums of observables over a set of rounds of the protocol (in
our case, the set of successful rounds after sifting), when the independence between
the observables corresponding to different rounds cannot be guaranteed. When using
Azuma’s inequality, the deviation term ∆ scales with the square root of the number of
terms in the sum. In our case, ∆ scales with
√
Ms, where Ms is the number of successful
rounds after sifting. For parameters of comparable magnitude to Ms, this provides us
with a reasonably tight bound. Whenever the parameter of interest is small, however,
the provided bound could instead be loose. This is the case for the crucial term MU00 in
Eq. (4.1), as vacuum states are unlikely to result in successful detection events, and thus
the bound obtained with Azuma’s inequality can be loose. This is important because,
in Eq. (4.1), the coefficient associated to the vacuum term is typically the largest. To
obtain a better bound for this term, we employ a remarkable recent technique to bound
the deviation between a sum of dependent random variables and its expected value [38].
This technique provides a much tighter bound than Azuma’s inequality when the value
of the sum is much lower than the number of terms in the sum. In particular, it
provides a tight upper-bound for the vacuum component M00. In Methods, we provide
a statement of the result and we explain how we apply it to our protocol.
Having obtained the upper-bound eUph := N
U
ph/MX on the phase-error rate, we show













the protocol is guaranteed to be εc-correct and εs-secret, with εs =
√
ε + εPA; where ε
is the failure probability associated to the estimation of the phase-error rate, h(x) =
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon binary entropy function, and λEC is
number of bits that are spent in the error-correction procedure. Here, our security
analysis follows the universal composable security framework [46, 47], according to
which a protocol is εsec-secure if it is both εc-correct and εs-secret, with εsec ≤ εc + εs.
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4.2.2 Instructions for experimentalists
Here, we provide a step-by-step instruction list to apply our security analysis to a
real-life experiment:
(1) Set the security parameters εc and εPA, as well as the failure probabilities εc and
εa for the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound and the concentration bound for
sums of dependent random variables, respectively. Set Scut. Calculate the overall
failure probability ε of the parameter estimation process, which depends on the





εa+εa, where d is the number of decoy intensities employed by
each user. For Scut = 4 and three decoy intensities, we have that ε = 9εc + 10εa.
(2) Use prior information about the channel to obtain a prediction M̃U00 on M
U
00, the
upper bound on the number of Z-basis vacuum events that will be obtained after
applying the decoy-state method.
(3) Run steps 1-3 of the protocol, obtaining a sifted key of length MX , and Z-basis
measurement counts Mµν for µ, ν ∈ µ. Let Ms = MX + MZ be the number of
successful rounds after sifting.
(4) Use the analytical decoy-state method included in the Supplementary Note B and
the measured values of Mµν to obtain upper bounds MUnm, for all n,m such that
n + m is even and n + m ≤ Scut. Alternatively, use the numerical estimation
method introduced in the Supplementary Notes of [35].





a and ∆nm = ∆ for all n,m except for m = n = 0. Substitute















(7) Use Eq. (4.4) to specify the required amount of privacy amplification and to
find the corresponding length of the secret key that can be extracted. The key






In this section, we analyse the behaviour of the secret-key rate as a function of the total
loss. We simulate the nominal scenario in which there is no Eve and Charlie is honest.
In this case, the total Alice-Bob loss includes the loss in the quantum channels as well
as the inefficiency of Charlie’s detectors. We compare the key rate for the protocol
in Fig. 4.1, using the finite-key security analysis introduced in the previous section,
with that of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol [30, 41], as well as with
the finite-key analysis presented in Ref. [40]. We also include the asymptotic secret
key capacity for repeaterless QKD systems over lossy channels, known as the PLOB
bound [9], for comparison. It is given by − log2(1 − η), where η is the transmittance
of the Alice-Bob quantum channel, which includes the efficiency of Charlie’s detectors.
While specific bounds for the finite-key setting have recently been studied [10, 48],
in the practical regimes of interest to this work, they numerically offer a negligible
difference to the PLOB bound. The latter has then been used in all relevant graphs for
consistency. To simulate the data that would be obtained in all protocols, we use the
simple channel model described in Supplementary Note C, which accounts for phase
reference mismatch and polarisation misalignment. Also, we assume that both users
employ three decoy-state intensities µ0 > µ1 > µ2. Since the optimal value µ2 = 0 is
typically difficult to achieve in practice, we set µ2 = 10
−4 and optimise the secret-key
rate over the value of µ0 and µ1. We also optimise it over the selection probabilities,
as well as over pX and α.
In our simulations, we model the phase reference mismatch between Alice and
Bob’s pulses by shifting Bob’s signals by an angle φ = δphπ, where δph = 9.1%. This
corresponds to a QBER of around 2% for most attenuations, matching the experimental
results in [23]. For brevity, we do not consider the effect of polarisation misalignment in
our numerical results, but one can use the provided analytical model to study different
scenarios of interest. In principle, even if the mechanism used for polarisation stability
is not perfect, one can use polarisation filters to ensure that the same polarisation modes
are being coupled at the 50:50 beamsplitter, at the cost of introducing additional loss.
We assume a per-pulse dark count probability pd = 10
−8 for each detector. We assume
an error correction leakage of λEC = fMXh(eX), where eX is the bit error rate of the
145
4.3 Discussion
sifted key, and f is the error correction inefficiency, which we assume to be f = 1.16. For
the security bounds, we set εc = εs = 10
−10, and for simplicity we set ε = εPA = εs/3.
In Fig. 4.2, we display the secret key rate per pulse achievable for different values
of the block size, N , of transmitted signals. It can be seen that the protocol could
outperform the repeaterless bound for a block size of around 1010 transmitted signals
per user, at an approximate total loss of 50 dB. For standard optical fibres, this cor-
responds to a total distance of 250 km, if we neglect the loss in the photodetectors.
At a 1 GHz clock rate, it takes only around ten seconds to collect the required data.
For a block size of 1011 transmitted signals, the protocol can already outperform the
repeaterless bound for a total loss ranging from 45 dB to over 80 dB. By increasing N ,
we approach the asymptotic performance of the protocol. We note that our choice of
dark count probability, pd = 10
−8, may be conservative, since a dark count rate of 1
c.p.s, corresponding to pd = 10
−9 with a repetition rate of 1 GHz, which may be achiev-
able with state-of-the-art SSPD [49]. In Supplementary Note D, we show an additional
graph for of pd = 10
−9. We find that, for sufficiently large block sizes, the maximum
distance increases when the dark count probability decreases. Interestingly, however,
this is not the case for N = 1010, for which the two curves are almost identical.
The dependence of the secret key rate on the block size N has been shown in Fig. 4.3,
at a fixed total loss of 50 dB and for several values of the phase reference mismatch δph.
In all cases, there is a minimum required block size to obtain a positive key rate. This
minimum block size can be even lower than 109 in the ideal case of no phase reference
mismatch, and it goes up to around 1010 at δph = 20%. There is a sharp increase in the
secret key rate once one goes over this minimum required block size, after which one
slowly approaches the key rate in the asymptotic limit. The latter behaviour is likely
due to the use of Azuma’s inequality. One can, nevertheless, overcome the repeaterless
bound at a reasonable block size in a practical regime where δph ≤ 15%. At higher
values of total loss this crossover happens at even larger values of δph.
In Fig. 4.4, we compare the performance of our protocol with that of the sending-
or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol presented in [30, 41]. To compute the results of the
sending-or-not-sending protocol, we have used the analysis in [41], after correcting a
mistake present in Appendix A of that work. Namely, according to Eqs. (S14) to (S19)
of Ref. [50], if the failure probability of the phase-error rate estimation is ε̄, then the
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Repeaterless bound [9]
Figure 4.2: Secret key rate obtainable as a function of the channel loss. We
consider different values of the block size N , which represents the total number of
rounds in the protocol. The overall Alice-Bob loss includes the loss in both quantum
channels and in Charlie’s detectors. The simulation parameters are stated in the main
text.
of H ε̄max. In the asymptotic regime, the protocol considered in this work outperforms
the sending-or-not-sending protocol at all values of total loss. For a block size of 1012
transmitted signals, this is still the case up to 80 dB of total loss, after which the key
rate is already lower than 10−6 bits per pulse for both protocols. For a block size of
1010 transmitted signals, however, the curves for the two protocols cross at around
55 dB, after which the sending-or-not-sending protocol offers a better performance.
This behaviour is due to the different statistical fluctuation analyses applied to the
two protocols. As explained in the Result section, the single-photon components in
the sending-or-not-sending protocol are mutually unbiased, allowing for a simpler and
tighter estimation of the phase-error rate. This is not the case for our TF-QKD protocol,
for which this estimation involves the application of somewhat looser bounds for several
terms in Eq. (4.1). We conclude that for sufficiently large block sizes, and a sufficiently
low phase reference mismatch, the protocol considered in this work maintains its better
key-rate performance over the sending-or-not sending variant. We note that for smaller
block sizes and higher values of phase reference mismatch, this comparative advantage
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Figure 4.3: Secret key rate obtainable as a function of the block size N . We
assume a total loss of 50 dB and consider several values of the phase reference mismatch
δph. All other simulation parameters are stated in the main text.
is reduced, or even inverted in some regimes. For completeness, in Supplementary Note
D, we provide additional simulation results for a broader range of parameter values.
Finally, in Fig. 4.5, we compare our results with those of the alternative analysis
in [40]. To compute the secret-key rate of the latter, we use the code provided by the
authors, except for the adjustments needed to match it to the channel model described
in Supplementary Note C. It can be seen that, in most regimes, the analysis introduced
in this paper provides a higher key rate than that of [40]. Moreover, we remark that
the security proof presented in [40], in its current form, is only applicable when the
state generated by the weakest decoy intensity µ2 is a perfect vacuum state of intensity
µ2 = 0. The security analysis presented in this work, however, can be applied to
any experimental value of µ2, and we assume a value of µ2 = 10
−4, which may be
easier to achieve in practice. That said, the security proof in [40] adopts an interesting
approach that results in a somehow simpler statistical analysis. In particular, unlike in
the analysis presented in this paper, the authors in [40] do not estimate the detection
statistics of photon-number states as an intermediate step to bounding the phase-
error rate. Instead, they show that the operator corresponding to a phase-error can be
bounded by a linear combination of the Z-basis decoy states. While this linear bound is
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between this work (solid) and sending-or-not-sending
TF-QKD [30, 41] (dashed). We consider different values for the block size N of
transmitted signals. All other simulation parameters are stated in the main text.
asymptotically looser than the non-linear formula in Eq. (4.1), it allows the application
of a simpler statistical analysis based on a double use of Bernoulli sampling. Given
that the finite-key analysis of a protocol could be part of the software package of a
product, we believe that the additional key rate achievable by our analysis in many
regimes justifies its slightly more complex approach.
In conclusion, we have proven the security of the protocol proposed in Ref. [28], in
the finite-key regime and against coherent attacks. Our results show that, under nom-
inal working conditions experimentally achievable by today’s technology, this scheme
could outperform the repeaterless secret-key rate bound in a key exchange run of around
ten seconds, assuming a 1 GHz clock rate. In terms of key rate, it would also outper-
form other TF-QKD variants, as well as alternative security proofs, in many practical
regimes of interest.
4.4 Methods
In this section, we introduce the procedure that we use to prove the security of the
protocol, referring to the Supplementary Notes when appropriate. For notation clarity,
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between this work (solid) and the alternative analysis
in [40] (dashed). We consider different values for the block size N of transmitted
signals. All other simulation parameters are stated in the main text.
we assume the symmetric scenario in which Alice and Bob employ the same X-basis
amplitude α and the same set of Z-basis intensities µ, which is optimal when the Alice-
Charlie and Bob-Charlie channels are identical. However, the analysis can be applied
as well to the asymmetric scenario [42, 43] by appropriately redefining the parameters
pnm|X and pnm|Z .
4.4.1 Virtual protocol
To bound the information leakage to Eve, we construct an entanglement-based virtual
protocol that is equivalent to the actual protocol. In this virtual protocol, Alice and
Bob measure their local ancilla systems in a basis that is conjugate to that used to
generate the key. We refer to the error rate of the virtual protocol as the phase-error









≤ ε. In Supplementary Note A, we show how this can be used to prove
the security of the key obtained in the actual protocol.





(|+〉A |α〉a + |−〉A |−α〉a), (4.6)
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where A is an ancilla system at Alice’s lab, a is the photonic system sent to Eve, and
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉); while Bob replaces his X basis emissions are by a similarly defined
|ψX〉Bb. After Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob measure systems A and B in the Z basis
{|0〉 , |1〉}, which is conjugate to the X basis {|+〉 , |−〉} that they would use to generate
the key. It is useful to write the state in Eq. (4.6) as
|ψX〉Aa = |0〉A |C0〉a + |1〉A |C1〉a , (4.7)




(|α〉+ |−α〉), |C1〉 =
1
2
(|α〉 − |−α〉). (4.8)
Alice’s Z-basis emissions are diagonal in the Fock basis, and the virtual protocol





pn|Z |n〉A |n〉a , (4.9)
where pn|Z =
∑
µ∈µ pµpn|µ is the probability that Alice’s Z basis pulse contains n
photons, averaged over the selection of µ. Unlike in the actual protocol, in the virtual
protocol Alice and Bob learn the photon number of their signals by measuring systems
A and B after Eve’s attack.
Lastly, Alice’s emission of |ψX〉Aa with probability pX and |ψZ〉Aa with probability
pZ is replaced by the generation of the state
|ψ〉AcAa =
√
pX |0〉Ac |ψX〉Aa +
√
pZ |1〉Ac |ψZ〉Aa , (4.10)
where Ac is a quantum coin ancilla at Alice’s lab; while Bob’s is replaced by an equally
defined |ψ〉BcBb. Alice and Bob measure systems Ac and Bc after Eve’s attack, delaying
the reveal of their basis choice. The full description of the virtual protocol is the
following:
(1) Preparation
Alice and Bob prepare N copies of the state |φ〉 = |ψ〉AcAa⊗|ψ〉BcBb and send all




Eve performs an arbitrary general measurement on all the subsystems a and b
of |φ〉⊗N and publicly announces N bit pairs (kc, kd). Without loss of generality,
we assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between her measurement
outcome and her set of announcements. A round is considered successful (un-
successful) if kc 6= kd (kc = kd). Let M (M̄) represent the set of successful
(unsuccessful) rounds.
(3) Virtual sifting
For all rounds, Alice and Bob jointly measure the systems Ac and Bc, learning
whether they used the same or different bases, but not the specific basis they
used. Let Ms (Md) denote the set of successful rounds in which they used the
same (different) bases.
(4) Ancilla measurement
(4.1) For all rounds in Ms, Alice (Bob) first measures the system Ac (Bc) in
{|0〉 , |1〉}, learning her (his) choice of basis. If the result is |0〉Ac (|0〉Bc), she
(he) measures system A (B) in {|0〉 , |1〉}; if the result is |1〉Ac (|1〉Bc), she
(he) measures system A (B) in the Fock basis.
(4.2) For all rounds inMd, Alice (Bob) measures the systems Ac (Bc) and A (B),
using the same strategy as in step 4.1.
(5) Intensity assignment
For all rounds inM in which Alice (Bob) obtained |1〉Ac (|1〉Bc), she (he) assigns
each n-photon state to intensity µ with probability pµ|n.
(6) Classical communication
For all rounds inM, Alice and Bob announce all their basis and intensity choices
over an authenticated public channel.
(7) Estimation of the number of phase errors




Two points from the virtual protocol above require further explanation. The first
is that, in the real protocol, Bob flips his key bit when Eve reports kc = 0 and kd = 1.
This step is omitted from the virtual protocol, since the X-basis bit flip gate σz has
no effect on Bob’s Z-basis measurement result. The second point concerns step 5,
which may appear to serve no purpose, but it is needed to ensure that the classical
information exchanged between Alice and Bob is equivalent to that of the real protocol.
The term pµ|n is the probability that Alice’s (Bob’s) Z-basis n-photon pulse originated





4.4.2 Phase-error rate estimation
We now turn our attention to Alice and Bob’s measurements in step (4.1) of the virtual
protocol. Let u ∈ {1, 2, ...,Ms} index the rounds inMs, and let ξu denote the measure-
ment outcome of the u-th round. The possible outcomes are ξu = Xij , corresponding to
|00〉AcBc |ij〉AB, where i, j ∈ {0, 1}; and ξu = Znm, corresponding to |11〉AcBc |n,m〉AB,
where n and m are any non-negative integers. Note that the outcomes |10〉AcBc and
|01〉AcBc are not possible due to the previous virtual sifting step. A phase error oc-
curs when ξu ∈ {X00, X11}. In Supplementary Note E, we prove that the probability
to obtain a phase error in the u-th round, conditioned on all previous measurement
outcomes in the protocol, is upper-bounded by














where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables ξ1, ..., ξu−1, N0 (N1) is
the set of non-negative even (odd) numbers, and the probability terms pnm|X and pnm|Z
have been defined in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3). In Eq. (4.12), for notation clarity, we have
omitted the dependence of all probability terms on the outcomes of the measurements
performed in steps (2) and (3) of the virtual protocol.





Pr (ξu ∈ {X00, X11}|Fu−1) + ∆, (4.13)
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Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ≤Mnm + ∆, (4.14)
where Mnm is the number of events of the form ξu = Znm in Ms. As we will explain
later, this bound is not tight when applied to the vacuum counts M00. For this term,




Pr (ξu = Z00|Fu−1) ≤M00 + ∆00. (4.15)










where a and b can be found by substituting Λ̃n by M̃
U
00 in Eq. (4.31).
Now we will transform Eq. (4.12) to apply Eqs. (4.13) to (4.15). Let us denote the
right-hand side of Eq. (4.12) as f(~pu), where ~pu is a vector of probabilities composed
of Pr(ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ∀n,m. If we expand the square in f(~pu), we can see that all
addends are positive and proportional to
√
p1p2, where p1 and p2 are elements of ~pu,














After taking the average over all rounds Ms on both sides of Eq. (4.12), applying
Eq. (4.17) on the right-hand side, and cancelling out the term 1/Ms on both sides of
the inequality, we have that
Ms∑
u=1

















We are now ready to apply Eqs. (4.13) to (4.15) to substitute the sums of proba-
bilities in Eq. (4.18) by Nph and Mnm. However, note that, in their application of the
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decoy-state method, Alice and Bob only estimate the value of Mnm for terms of the
form n + m ≤ Scut, so it is only useful to substitute Eq. (4.14) for these terms. With


























where ∆nm = ∆ except for ∆00.
We still need to deal with the sum over the infinitely many remaining terms of the
form n+m > Scut. For them, we apply the following upper bound
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Znm|Fu−1) ≤
Ms∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = Z|Fu−1) ≤MZ + ∆, (4.20)
where ξu = Z denotes that Alice and Bob learn that they have used the Z basis in the
uth round in Ms; and MZ is the number of events of the form ξu = Z obtained by
Alice and Bob. In the last step, we have used Eq. (4.30), using an identical argument

















It can be shown that the infinite sum in Eq. (4.21) converges to a finite value if
max{µ} > α2. (4.22)


























Note that the right hand side of Eq. (4.23) is a function of the measurement counts
Mnm, which cannot be directly observed. They must be substituted by the upper
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bounds MUnm obtained via the decoy-state analysis, as explained below. After doing
so, we obtain Eq. (4.1). The failure probability ε associated to the estimation of Nph
is upper-bounded by summing the failure probabilities of all concentration inequalities
used. That includes each application of Eqs. (4.30) and (4.33), which fail with proba-
bility εa; and each application of the multiplicative Chernoff bound in the decoy-state
analysis, which fails with probability εc. In the case of three decoy intensities and
Scut = 4, we have ε = 9εc + 10εa. In our simulations, we set εc = εa for simplicity.
4.4.3 Decoy-state analysis
Since Alice and Bob’s Z-basis emissions are a mixture of Fock states, the measurement
counts Mnm have a fixed value, which is nevertheless unknown to them. Instead, the
users have access to the measurement counts Mµν , the number of rounds in MZ in
which they selected intensities µ and ν, respectively. To bound Mnm, we use the decoy-
state method [32–34]. This technique exploits the fact that Alice and Bob could have
run an equivalent virtual scenario in which they directly send Fock states |n,m〉 with






where pµν = pµpν and pnm|µν = pn|µpm|ν . In particular, each of the instances in which
Alice and Bob chose the Z basis, sent n and m photons, and Eve announced a detection
is assigned to intensities µ and ν with a fixed probability pµν|nm, even if Eve employs a
coherent attack. This implies that these assignments can be regarded as an independent
Bernoulli trial, and Mµν can be regarded as a sum of independent Bernoulli trials. The





In the actual protocol, Alice and Bob know the realisations Mµν of these random
variables. By using the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound [52, 53], stated in Sup-
plementary Note F, they can compute lower and upper bounds EL[Mµν ] and EU[Mµν ]
for E[Mµν ]. These will set constraints on the possible value of the terms Mnm. We are
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interested in the indices (i, j) such that i + j ≤ Scut and i + j is even, and an upper
bound on each Mij can be found by solving the following linear optimisation problem
maxMij









This problem can be solved numerically using linear programming techniques, as
described in the Supplementary Note 2 of [35]. While accurate, this method can be
computationally demanding. For this reason, we have instead adapted the asymptotic
analytical bounds of [42, 54] to the finite-key scenario and used them in our simulations.
The results obtained using these analytical bounds are very close to those achieved by
numerically solving Eq. (4.26). This analytical method is described in Supplementary
Note B.
4.4.4 Concentration inequality for sums of dependent random vari-
ables
A crucial step in our analysis is the substitution of the sums of probabilities in Eq. (4.18)
by their corresponding observables in the protocol. Typically, this is done by applying
the well-known Azuma’s inequality [39]. Instead, we use the following recent result
[38]:
Let ξ1, ..., ξn be a sequence of random variables satisfying 0 ≤ ξl ≤ 1, and let Λl =∑l
u=1 ξu. Let Fl be its natural filtration, i.e. the σ-algebra generated by {ξ1, ..., ξl}.



















































In our analysis, we apply Eqs. (4.27) and (4.28) to sequences ξ1, ..., ξn of Bernoulli
random variables, for which E(ξu|Fu−1) = Pr(ξu = 1|Fu−1).
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a , and where each of the bounds in Eq. (4.30) fail with probability
at most εa.
The bound in Eq. (4.30) scales with
√
n, and it is only tight when Λn is of comparable
magnitude to n. When Λn  n, one can set a and b in Eq. (4.27) appropriately to obtain
a much tighter bound. To do so, one can use previous knowledge about the channel to
come up with a prediction Λ̃n of Λn before running the experiment. Then, one obtains
the values of a and b that would minimise the deviation term if the realisation of Λn

































−n2 ln εa(9Λ̃n(n− Λ̃n)− 2n ln εa)
)


















After fixing a and b, we have that
n∑
u=1
Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) ≤ Λn + ∆′, (4.33)










In our numerical simulations, we have found the simple bound in Eq. (4.30) to be
sufficiently tight for all components except the vacuum contribution M00. For this
latter component, we use Eq. (4.33) instead. However, note that the users do not know
the true value of M00, even after running the experiment. Instead, they will obtain an
upper-bound MU00 on M00 via the decoy-state method, and they will apply Eq. (4.33)
to this upper bound. Therefore, to optimise the bound, the users should come up with
a prediction M̃U00 on the value of M
U
00 that they expect to obtain after running the
experiment and performing the decoy-state analysis, and then substitute Λ̃n → M̃U00 in
Eq. (4.31) to obtain the optimal values of a and b. To find M̃U00, one can simply use
their previous knowledge of the channel to come up with predictions M̃µν of Mµν , and
run the decoy-state analysis using these values to obtain M̃U00.
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distribution with fully discrete
phase randomization
5.1 Abstract
Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) can overcome fundamental secret-
key-rate bounds on point-to-point QKD links, allowing us to reach longer distances than
ever before. Since its introduction, several TF-QKD variants have been proposed, and
some of them have already been implemented experimentally. Most of them assume
that the users can emit weak coherent pulses with a continuous random phase. In
practice, this assumption is often not satisfied, which could open up security loopholes
in their implementations. To close this loophole, we propose and prove the security of a
TF-QKD variant that relies exclusively on discrete phase randomization. Remarkably,
our results show that it can also provide higher secret-key rates than an equivalent
continuous-phase-randomized protocol.
5.2 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users, Alice and Bob, to generate a shared
secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, with unlimited computational power.
Despite its great potential, QKD has yet to overcome important practical problems
before it is ready for widespread use. One of the most important challenges is how
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to perform QKD at long distances, given that, in optical fibres, the loss increases
exponentially with the channel length. Even with a GHz repetition rate, it would
take 300 years to successfully send a single photon over 1000 km of standard optical
fibres [1]. Another crucial issue is to guarantee that a particular implementation of a
QKD protocol is secure. That is, we have to show that QKD implementations satisfy all
assumptions made in their corresponding theoretical security proof, or to devise security
proofs that match the realities of QKD experiments. In this work, we address the latter
issue for twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [2], one of the key candidates for improving key-
rate scaling with distance.
Fundamental bounds show that the key rate of repeaterless QKD protocols scales
at best linearly with η [3], where η is the transmittance of the channel connecting
Alice and Bob. TF-QKD breaks this limitation, offering a key rate that scales with
√
η. The key enabling idea behind the operation of TF-QKD is to effectively generate
an entangled state between the two users in the space spanned by vacuum and single-
photon states. To do so, we need a repeater node that performs entanglement swapping,
using single-photon interference, as well as phase stability across the channel, to make
sure the generated state is in the desired superposition form. This approach requires
only one photon to survive the path loss over half of the channel, thus the improved
scaling with distance. Note that TF-QKD is not the only protocol that achieves this
scaling. Other protocols, inspired by quantum repeater structures, can achieve the
same key-rate scaling by using quantum memories [4, 5] or quantum non-demolition
measurements [6]. However, TF-QKD is, experimentally, in a more advanced state than
such alternatives. In fact, certain variants of TF-QKD have already been implemented
[7–10], and a distance record exceeding 500 km has already been achieved [11, 12]. The
issue of implementation security is crucially relevant for these experiments.
One of the main constraints on a QKD system is given by the type of optical encoder
needed in the implementation of the protocol. Its corresponding security proof would
then need to address such practical constraints. The single-photon version of TF-QKD
has a simple theoretical description [13], but it is difficult to implement in practice.
Thus, a significant research effort has focused on developing practical variants [13–16]
in which the users encode weak coherent pulses (WCPs). These variants differ in their
protocol descriptions and/or security proofs, but, so far, all of them rely on the decoy-
state method [17]. That is, they either use decoy states in their key mode [14, 15],
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i.e., to generate the key, and/or in their test mode [13, 16], i.e., to estimate Eve’s side
information on the key.
Conventional decoy-state techniques require the emission of phase-randomized co-
herent states (PRCS), and assume that the users are ideally able to randomize the
phase of their pulses continuously and uniformly. This is, however, difficult to achieve
in practice. Experimentally, there are two approaches to randomize the phase of a
coherent pulse: passive and active. Passive randomization consists of turning the laser
off and then on again to generate the PRCS. In addition to the impracticality of this
approach in a high-speed QKD system, it is hard to guarantee experimentally that the
generated phase genuinely follows a uniform distribution [18]. In fact, experiments have
shown that, in practice, there are phase correlations between adjacent pulses [19, 20].
In an active randomization procedure, a phase modulator is used, in combination with
a random number generator. This approach fits the TF-QKD variant of Refs. [13, 16]
very well, since one already needs a phase modulator to produce the phase-locked coher-
ent states emitted in the key mode. However, it randomizes the phase over a discrete,
not continuous, set of values. Thus, none of these two approaches necessarily satisfy
the assumptions of the decoy-state method, which could open security loopholes in the
experimental implementations of TF-QKD.
In this work, we address this security loophole, by proposing and proving the secu-
rity of a TF-QKD variant that relies exclusively on discrete phase randomization. Note
that the use of discrete randomization has already been considered in Ref. [18], in the
context of a decoy-state BB84 protocol, where it was treated as a source flaw. Its au-
thors found that, for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, the secret key rate obtainable using
discrete randomization is always strictly worse than using continuous randomization,
although the former quickly approaches the latter as the number of discrete random
phases increases. In fact, in that protocol, one can obtain a performance reasonably
close to the continuous case using as few as ten discrete random phases. However, it
is not immediately clear whether this behaviour would hold for the TF-QKD variants
in [13–16], given that: (i) their security proofs are quite diverse, and some of them
very different from that of decoy-state BB84; and (ii) in TF-QKD, both users emit
quantum states, and thus the source flaw is present in both users. In fact, recent works
have found that the security issue arising from flawed sources that leak information has
a much bigger impact in measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [21] than in
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BB84 [22]. In principle, the same could be true for other kinds of source imperfections,
such as the use of discrete phase randomization.
The quantum phase of our TF-QKD variant is similar to that of Ref. [13], with
the main difference being that we use discrete, not continuous, phase randomization
in test mode. However, unlike in the case of decoy-state BB84 [18], we find that our
key rate does not simply approach that of Ref. [13] as the number of phase slices
increases. Instead, perhaps surprisingly, we can actually obtain higher secret-key rates
than Ref. [13], with as few as eight discrete random phases. The reason is that discrete
randomization allows us to postselect the test-mode rounds in which the users’ phase
choices exactly matched, i.e., they were exactly the same, or their difference was exactly
π. As we will see, this postselected data allows for a tighter estimation of the phase-
error rate. Intuitively, this is because, in TF-QKD, it is advantageous if the users
share the same global phase reference, something that can be equivalently achieved by
postselection.
We note that the concept of phase postselection has appeared in other TF-QKD
variants [14, 15, 23], although in combination with continuous-phase-randomized sig-
nals. Refs. [14, 15] postselect the signals with a similar, not identical, phase. This
introduces challenges in the security analysis, and it is not clear if this approach could
be used for the type of TF-QKD variant considered in this work. Ref. [23] assumes
that signals with an identical phase are postselected. While certainly interesting from
a theoretical point of view, this protocol is not implementable in practice, since Al-
ice and Bob will never choose exactly the same phase when using continuous phase
randomization.
Similarly to other protocols that rely on discrete randomization [18], we use nu-
merical techniques as part of our security proof. In particular, inspired by the work of
Ref. [24], we use semidefinite programming (SDP) techniques to estimate the phase-
error rate. We note that, in Ref. [24], the authors already apply their generic numerical
technique to prove the security of a TF-QKD protocol with discrete phase random-
ization. However, in practice, their procedure can only be applied when just a few
discrete random phases are used, since the number of constraints grows very quickly
as the number of phase values increases. Here, we exploit the particularities of our
protocol to introduce an analysis that uses a much smaller number of carefully chosen
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constraints, and is efficient even with a large number of discrete phases. This allows us
to investigate how the key rate improves when increasing the number of phase values.
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Protocol description
Our protocol is very similar to that of Refs. [13, 16]. Alice and Bob send quantum
signals to an untrusted middle node Charlie, who (ideally) interferes them at a bal-
anced 50:50 beamsplitter, performs a photodetection measurement, and reports the
outcome. These signals belong to one of two “modes”, key and test, selected at ran-
dom. Key-mode emissions are used to generate the raw key, while test-mode emissions
are used to estimate Eve’s side information. In key mode, the users send phase-locked
coherent states
∣∣±√µ〉. In test mode, the users send phase-randomized coherent states
of different intensities. Unlike in Refs. [13, 16], the phases of the test-mode states are
randomized over a discrete set, rather than a continuous range. The detailed protocol
steps are the following:
(1) Preparation
Alice (Bob) randomly choose the transmission mode, key or test, and
(1.1) If she (he) chooses key mode, she (he) generates a random bit bA (bB),
prepares an optical pulse in the coherent state
∣∣(−1)bA√µ〉 (∣∣(−1)bB√µ〉),
and sends it to Charlie.
(1.2) If she (he) chooses test mode, she (he) selects a random intensity βa (βb) ∈
{β1, . . . , βd−2, µ, βv}, where d is the number of intensities, µ is the same
intensity used in key mode, and βv = 0 is a vacuum intensity. Then, she (he)
selects a random phase θa (θb) =
2πm
M , where m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M−1} and M
is the number of random phases, prepares the state
∣∣√βaeiθa〉 (∣∣√βbeiθb〉),
and sends it to Charlie.
(2) Detection
An honest Charlie interferes Alice and Bob’s signals at a 50:50 beamsplitter, fol-
lowed by threshold detectors Dc and Dd, placed at the output ports corresponding
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to constructive and destructive interference, respectively. A round is considered
successful if exactly one detector clicks, and unsuccessful otherwise. After the
measurement, Charlie reports whether or not the round was successful, and, if it
was, he reports which specific detector clicked.
(3) Sifting
For all successful rounds, Alice and Bob disclose their choices of key mode or
test mode, keeping only data from those in which they have used the same mode.
Then,
(3.1) They calculate the gain psucc of their key mode rounds, and generate their
sifted keys from the values of bA and bB corresponding to these rounds.
Then, they publicly disclose a small random subset of their sifted keys.
With this information, they estimate the fraction of the sifted key, psame|succ
(pdiff|succ), that originated from emissions in which their phase choices agreed
(disagreed). Bob then flips his sifted key bits corresponding to the rounds
in which Dd clicked. Based on that, Alice and Bob estimate the bit error
rate ebit.
(3.2) For all values of β, Alice and Bob calculate the gains {Qβ} of the test mode
rounds in which they both used intensity β and the same phase θa = θb.
They also calculate the gains {Q−β } of the rounds in which they both used
intensity β and opposite phases θa = θb ± π.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob use the values of {Qβ} and {Q−β } to estimate the amount of key
information IAE that may have been leaked to an eavesdropper.
(5) Postprocessing
Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification to obtain a
secret key.
Since this is a discretely-modulated MDI-type protocol, in principle, one could di-
rectly use the numerical techniques of Ref. [24] to prove its security. However, the SDP
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in Ref. [24] requires one constraint, in the form of an inner product, for each combina-
tion of emitted states. The number of different states in this protocol can make such an
approach infeasible in practice. Namely, since Alice and Bob send [(d− 1)M + 1]2 dif-
ferent joint states 1, one needs to solve the dual problem of an SDP with [(d− 1)M + 1]4
inner-product constraints, plus the constraints related to the measurement results of
the protocol. Thus, even for M = 4 and d = 3, the simplest case considered in the nu-
merical results of this paper, one needs to solve a SDP with more than 6561 constraints.
For M = 12 and d = 3, the number of constraints grows to more than 390625. This
can make the implementation of such techniques infeasible on conventional computers
[25, 26].
In the following, we provide a security analysis that requires to solve the dual
problem of two SDPs with only (d−1)(d−2)M+2d+M−1 constraints each. That is, for
the examples considered above, we have SDPs with 17 and 41 constraints, respectively,
which can be quickly solved using any commercial off-the-shelf laptop.
5.3.2 Security analysis
In our security analysis, we consider the asymptotic scenario in which the users emit
an infinite number of signals. Also, for simplicity, we assume collective attacks. We
note that, in the asymptotic regime, security against collective attacks implies security
against general attacks, thanks to results such as the postselection technique [27].
We consider the virtual protocol in which Alice replaces her key mode emissions by












where A is a virtual qubit ancilla that she keeps in her lab, and a is the photonic
system sent to Charlie; and Bob replaces them by a similarly defined |ψ〉Bb. We assume
that Eve controls not only the quantum channels, but also the untrusted middle node
Charlie, and the announcements he makes. As mentioned in the protocol description,
for each round, Alice and Bob expect to receive two announcements: whether the
round was successful, and, if so, whether Charlie obtained constructive or destructive
1To compute the number of states, note that the set of test-mode states contains the set of key-mode
states, so one only needs to count the former. Also, when Alice or Bob choose the vacuum intensity,
they send the same vacuum state, independently of their choice of random phase.
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interference. However, the latter announcement only determines whether or not Bob
flips his sifted key bit, which does not affect Eve’s side information on Alice’s key. Thus,
from a security standpoint, we can describe Eve’s collective attack as a two-outcome
general measurement {M̂ab, M̂fab} on the photonic systems ab, where M̂ab (M̂
f
ab) is
the Kraus operator corresponding to the announcement of the round as successful







∥∥∥M̂ab |ψ〉Aa |ψ〉Bb∥∥∥2 is the probability that Eve announces a key mode
round as successful.
In our virtual protocol, after Eve’s announcements, Alice and Bob perform the
joint measurement {Ôsame, Ôdiff}, with Ôsame = |00〉〈00|AB + |11〉〈11|AB and Ôdiff =
|01〉〈01|AB + |10〉〈10|AB, on the ancillas corresponding to the successful rounds, learning
whether they used the same or different phases. Note that this is a valid virtual
protocol step, since it commutes with the Z-basis measurement that Alice and Bob
would perform to generate their sifted keys. Depending on the result of their joint































where psucc,same = psuccpsame|succ (psucc,diff = psuccpdiff|succ) is the probability that Alice
and Bob use the same (different) phases in a key mode round and Eve reports the
round as successful. This allows us to define the quantities
eph,same = ‖AB〈++|Ψsame〉‖2 + ‖AB〈−−|Ψsame〉‖2, (5.5)
eph,diff = ‖AB〈++|Ψdiff〉‖2 + ‖AB〈−−|Ψdiff〉‖2, (5.6)
where eph,same (eph,diff) is the phase-error rate of the successful key mode rounds in
which Alice and Bob used the same (different) phases. Eve’s side information of the
sifted key (per key bit) can now be bounded by
IAE ≤ psame|succh(eph,same) + pdiff|succh(eph,diff), (5.7)
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where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon binary entropy function.
The secret key rate that Alice and Bob can distill is
R ≥ psucc [1− IAE − fh(ebit)] , (5.8)
where f is the error correction inefficiency.
The objective of our security analysis is to obtain upper bounds on eph,same and
eph,diff , using the the data obtained in the test rounds. The procedure is very similar
for both terms; we will first explain eph,same.
5.3.2.1 Estimation of eph,same
First, we rewrite Eq. (5.3) as
|Ψsame〉 =

































Pn|µ |λn〉ab , (5.11)
where N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd) numbers, |λn〉ab is the n-photon
















Finding a way to estimate the quantity in Eq. (5.14) is critical for our security proof.










∥∥∥M̂ab |λn〉ab∥∥∥2 is the yield probability of the state |λn〉ab. Let us assume that
Alice and Bob used continuous phase-randomization on their test mode emissions, and
kept only the data from the events in which they use the same intensity and the same
phase. Then, the resulting post-selected state, given that they both chose intensity β,











Pn|β |λn〉〈λn|ab , (5.16)
where Pn|β follows a Poisson distribution and is given by Eq. (5.13). Then, one could
apply the standard decoy-state method to estimate the yield probabilities Yn, ∀n ∈ N0,
and plug these in Eq. (5.15) to estimate eph,same in Eq. (5.14). Essentially, this is
the approach of Ref. [23]. However, note that if Alice and Bob use continuous phase-
randomization, the probability that they select exactly the same phase θ is zero, and
the resulting protocol is not implementable in practice.
Here, we use the same test-mode phase-postselection idea as in Ref. [23], but we
employ discrete phase randomization, which results in a protocol that is actually im-
















where ρβ is the post-selected state when Alice and Bob both used intensity β and the













and Pn|β is given by Eq. (5.13). Note that for the vacuum intensity βv, we have
ρβv =
∣∣∣λβv0 modM〉〈λβv0 modM ∣∣∣
ab
= |λ0〉〈λ0|ab . (5.20)
Unlike the states |λn〉 in Eq. (5.16), the states
∣∣∣λβnmodM〉 in Eq. (5.17) have a slight







are not necessarily equal for two different intensities β1 and β2, which prevents us
from applying the standard decoy-state method. Instead, we use a similar idea as in
Ref. [24], defining the Gram matrix G of the set of Eve’s post-measurement states,
and constructing a semidefinite program in which the objective function and all the
constraints are linear functions of entries of G. In our case, we define G as the Gram
matrix of the vector set
{
M̂ab
∣∣∣λβnmodM〉}, ∀β ∈ T and n ∈ {0, 1, ...,M − 1}, where T
is the set of all test-mode intensities, except vacuum. The entries of G are Gij = 〈i|j〉,
where |i〉 denotes the i-th element of the vector set.




〈λeven|M̂ †abM̂ab|λeven〉 . (5.22)
















it becomes clear that the right-hand side of Eq. (5.22) is a linear function of elements
of G.
Our constraints are the following:








〈λodd|M̂ †abM̂ab|λodd〉 . (5.24)







where Qβ is the measured gain of the state ρβ. Note that Y
β
nmodM is a (diagonal)
element of G, thus Eq. (5.25) is a linear function of elements of G.
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 Using the trace distance inequality [18], we obtain



















 Our next constraint is based on the inequality




F β1,β2n (1− F β1,β2n )(1− Y β2nmodM )Y
β2
nmodM




which holds when Y β2nmodM ≤ F
β1,β2
n [28]. This bound is tighter than the trace
distance inequality in Eq. (5.26), but cannot be directly added to the SDP, since
it is a non-linear function of Y β2nmodM , an element of G. The only exception is the
case n = 0 and β2 = βv, since from Eq. (5.20), we have that
Y βv0 modM = Y0 = Qβv , (5.29)
and Qβv , the gain of the vacuum intensity, is directly measurable from the proto-
col. Thus, substituting n = 0, β1 = β, β2 = βv and Y
βv
0 modM = Qβv in Eq. (5.28),
we have the inequality
Y β0 modM ≤ 1−Qβv +2
√
F β,βv0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1−Qβv)Qβv +F β,βv0 (2Qβv−1), (5.30)
which is a linear function of Y β0 modM . Equation (5.30) holds when Qβv ≤ F
β,βv
0 ,
which should always happen in practice, since Qβv ≈ 0 and F β,βv0 ≈ 1.
 For our final constraints, we use the fact that Y βnmodM ≤ 1, ∀n, β. To reduce the
number of constraints, we only include the case β = µ.





















nmodM , ∀β ∈ T ;
Y µnmodM ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1};




1− F β1,β2n , ∀β1, β2 ∈ T , n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1};
Y β0 modM ≤ 1−Qβv + 2
√
F β,βv0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1−Qβv )Qβv + F β,βv0 (2Qβv − 1), ∀β ∈ T ;
(5.31)
where T = {β1, . . . , βd−2, µ} is the set of all test-mode intensities, except vacuum.
5.3.2.2 Estimation of eph,diff
The procedure to estimate eph,diff is very similar to that of eph,same. In this case, we
rewrite Eq. (5.4) as
|Ψdiff〉 =

























∣∣λ−n 〉ab , (5.34)
|λ−n 〉ab is the n-photon two-mode Fock state defined by∣∣λ−n 〉ab = 1√2nn! (a† − b†)n |00〉ab , (5.35)
and Pn|µ is given by Eq. (5.13). In this case, the state after post-selecting the test
mode emissions in which Alice and Bob both used intensity β and opposite phases
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Pn|β is given by Eq. (5.13), and P
β
nmodM is given by Eq. (5.19).
Similarly as in the previous subsection, we re-express |λ−even〉 and


























follow a similar procedure as in the last subsection to construct the objective function
and the constraints. In the end, we have that our upper-bound on eph,diff is the solution



















nmodM , ∀β ∈ T ;
Y µ,−nmodM ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1};




1− F β1,β2n , ∀β1, β2 ∈ T , n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1};
Y β,−0 modM ≤ 1−Q−βv + 2
√
F β,βv0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1−Q−βv )Q
−
βv
+ F β,βv0 (2Q
−
βv
− 1), ∀β ∈ T ;
(5.40)





Here, we simulate the secret key rate obtainable as a function of the overall Alice-Bob
loss, which includes the inefficiency of Charlie’s detectors, for different values of M ,
the number of random phases. For the sake of our numerical simulations, we assume
that there is no eavesdropper, and we only model the imperfections in the system to
simulate the values one may obtain in a real experiment. We assume a misalignment
error rate of 2%, matching the results of a recent experiment [7], and a dark count
probability of 10−8 per pulse. In all curves, we assume that Alice and Bob use three
different test-mode intensities {β1, µ, βv}, where βv = 0 is a vacuum intensity and µ is
the same intensity used in key mode. We optimize over the value of µ and β1, with
the condition that µ, β1 ≥ 10−4. This condition is motivated by the fact that it is
experimentally difficult to produce a laser pulse with a very small, but fixed, intensity.
In our channel model, we make the additional assumption that, when Charlie ob-
tains a click on both detectors, he announces the round as successful, and randomly
chooses which detector he reports as having clicked. While this is a slight deviation
from the protocol described in Section 5.3.1, it greatly simplifies all gain and yield
formulas, at the cost of introducing some additional errors. In the low-loss regime,
when double clicks are relatively common, this assumption slightly lowers the key rate
obtainable. At medium to high losses, when the probability of a double click is almost
zero, the effect vanishes. Under this assumption, we have that
Qβ = Q
−





where d is the dark count probability of each detector, and η is the overall Alice-Bob
loss. Moreover, psucc = Qµ, and psame|succ = pdiff|succ = 1/2, due to the symmetry of
the setup. The bit error rate of the sifted key is given by
ebit =





where emis is the misalignment error probability. To obtain a reliable upper bound on
eph,same and eph,diff , we need to substitute the above values in Eq. (5.31) and Eq. (5.40),
and numerically solve the dual problem of each SDP [24, 29]. Note that, due to the
symmetry assumed in our channel model, the SDPs in Eq. (5.31) and Eq. (5.40) end
up being identical; in our simulations, we only solve their dual problem once, since its
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solution provides an upper-bound on both eph,same and eph,diff . To solve this SDP dual
problem, we have written a MATLAB program that uses the CVX toolbox [30], which
we run on a commercial laptop.
In Fig. 5.1, we see that the protocol can overcome the repeaterless bound [3] with as
few as four random phases. For the ideal case of M →∞, we use Eq. (5.15), assuming
that Alice and Bob are somehow able to estimate the exact values of Yn, ∀n, using the
data collected in test mode. These values are given by Y0 = 2d(1− d) and, for n > 0,
Yn = (1− d)(1− (1−
√
η)2 + 2d(1−√η)n). (5.43)
As explained in the discussion following Eq. (5.15), the case of M →∞ is not actually
implementable in practice, but it provides an upper-bound on the secret key rate ob-
tainable for finite values of M . Notably, Fig. 5.1 shows that one can get very close to
this ideal scenario with only M = 12 random phases.
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This work, M = 4
This work, M = 6
This work, M = 8
This work, M = 12
Ideal case, M →∞
Repeaterless bound [3]
Figure 5.1: Secret key rate for our discrete-phase-randomized protocol at different
values of M , in comparison to fundamental bound for repeaterless QKD systems
− log2(1− η), where η is the overall Alice-Bob transmissivity.
In Fig. 5.2, we compare the results of our protocol with those of Ref. [13], one of
the best performing TF-QKD variants, in both the asymptotic [31] and finite-key [32]
regimes. The comparison is interesting because the quantum phase of Ref. [13] is almost
identical to ours, the only difference being their use of continuous phase randomization
in test mode. Thus, Fig. 5.2 directly compares the performance of the discrete and
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continuous randomization approaches. Remarkably, we obtain higher secret-key rates
using discrete phase randomization, as long as one uses eight random phases or more.
This may sound surprising at first instance, but it is justified by the fact that, for
the same value of µ, we can obtain a tighter estimation of the phase-error rate in the
discrete-phase version, thanks to the test-mode phase postselection. This can be seen
in Fig. 5.3(a), where we compare the upper-bound on the phase-error rate of the two
protocols for a fixed value µ = 0.06. In a practical setting, one would optimize over
the value of µ, in which case the two protocols result in similar bounds for the phase-
error rate, see Fig. 5.3(b). But, this will be achieved at a higher value of µ for our
protocol, see Fig. 5.3(c), which results in a higher gain, see Fig. 5.3(d), and hence a
higher secret-key rate.
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This work, M = 8
This work, M = 12
Ref. [13]
Figure 5.2: Comparison between the results of this work and those of Ref. [13], which
uses continuous phase randomization in its test-mode emissions. For simplicity, to
compute the results in [13], we assume that Alice and Bob’s test-mode rounds provide
perfect estimates of the yield probabilities Ynm for n+m ≤ 4, while the rest are upper-
bounded by one. This is an ideal scenario and, as shown in [13], the results will be
slightly worse once one considers the imperfect estimates that result from the use of a
finite set of decoy states, as we do for the results in this work.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison between the value of some terms in our analysis, for the ideal
case M →∞, and the analysis in Ref. [13]. (a) Upper-bound on the phase-error rate,
assuming a fixed value µ = 0.06. (b) Upper-bound on the phase-error rate, for the
value of µ that optimizes the key rate in each analysis. (c) Value of µ that optimizes
the key rate in each analysis. (d) Key mode gain for the value of µ that optimizes the
key rate in each analysis.
5.5 Conclusion and discussion
Most previous variants of TF-QKD have relied on the emission of weak laser pulses with
a continuous random phase, which is difficult to achieve and certify in practice. Here,
we have proposed a practical TF-QKD variant that uses discrete phase randomization
instead. Its security proof relies on post-selecting the test-mode rounds in which the
users’ phase values exactly matched, which is not practically possible with a contin-
uous randomization approach. Consequently, our discretely-randomized protocol can
actually result in higher key rates than an equivalent protocol based on continuous
randomization. This is interesting, given that discrete randomization is usually consid-
ered to be a source flaw. In fact, previous analyses of decoy-state QKD with discrete
randomization [18] obtained strictly worse results than their continuous counterparts.
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Our security proof relies on a customised version of numerical techniques for MDI-
QKD protocols based on semidefinite programming, which has a substantially reduced
complexity as compared with the generic approach.
There are several ways by which we can improve our analysis to account for addi-
tional imperfections in a real implementation. For instance, in our analysis, we assume
that the users can modulate the phase of their pulses precisely. It would be interesting
to find out how they key-rate bounds change when the phase modulator, while fully
characterized, is imperfect. Also, we have considered the asymptotic regime in which
Alice and Bob run the protocol for infinitely many rounds. It remains an open ques-
tion whether discrete randomization could still offer an advantage in a finite-key setting.
Since state-of-the-art numerical finite-key proofs can only prove security tightly against
a restricted class of eavesdropping attacks [33, 34], important developments are needed
before we can rigorously answer this question.
We note that, shortly after the first version of this manuscript was uploaded to
the arXiv, Zhang et al uploaded another manuscript [35] proposing an alternative TF-
QKD protocol with discrete phase randomization. The main difference seems to be
that in our protocol, only two phases are encoded in key mode, while in their proposal,
M phases are encoded in the key mode, i.e. as many as in the test mode. This
symmetry simplifies the phase-error rate formula. However, while the secret key rate
of our protocol increases with M , theirs approaches zero as M grows, due to the sifting
factor.
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In the previous chapters, we have analysed the security and performance of novel QKD
protocols in realistic conditions. Here, we summarise our main results, and identify
some open lines of investigation that could be addressed in future work.
6.1 Summary
Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on ran-
dom sampling theory
In a BB84-type protocol, when Alice’s source is basis independent, one can invoke a
random sampling argument to directly estimate the phase-error rate in one basis using
the observed bit-error rate in the other basis. This is especially important in the finite-
key regime, since it makes it very easy to deal with finite-key statistical fluctuations in
the estimation of the phase-error rate. Conversely, when Alice’s source is basis depen-
dent, Eve can at least partially distinguish Alice’s basis choice. Thus, under a coherent
attack, Eve can cause the detection statistics of a particular round to depend on the
basis choices made in other rounds. To deal with this dependency, previous works have
often relied on Azuma’s inequality, which offers a worse performance than concentration
inequalities used to solve random sampling problems. In Chapter 2, we have introduced
a technique that, for some QKD protocols with basis-dependent sources, can reduce the
phase-error rate estimation task to a random sampling problem, which can be solved
more tightly. In particular, we have shown that our technique can be used to prove the
finite-key security of the loss-tolerant protocol [1] for both its prepare-and-measure and
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measurement-device-independent versions, if the users probabilistically assign a tag to
each detected emission. Our analysis obtained significantly better key rates than the
previous finite-key security proof of the loss-tolerant protocol [2] based on Azuma’s
inequality.
Finite-key analysis for memory-assisted decoy-state quantum key distribu-
tion
In Chapter 3, we analysed the performance of MA-QKD in practical conditions that
previous works [3–6] had not considered. Namely, we assumed that the users employ
WCP sources, in combination with the decoy-state method, and took into account the
statistical fluctuations that inevitably arise when the protocol is run for a finite number
of rounds. To perform our simulations, we developed a model for the heralded loading of
a QM using attenuated laser sources in the presence of polarisation misalignment. We
also proposed a simple and high-performance finite-key statistical fluctuation analysis
that is valid for both decoy-state MDI-QKD and decoy-state MA-QKD. Our simulation
results suggested that decoy-state MA-QKD is inherently more resilient to statistical
fluctuation effects than its equivalent no-memory MDI-QKD counterpart. Thus, in the
finite-key regime, decoy-state MA-QKD could offer large key-rate advantages over much
shorter channel lengths than previously thought, even when implemented with today’s
imperfect QMs. The main reason for this behaviour is that, in MDI-QKD, the multi-
photon components of X-encoded weak coherent pulses can, by themselves, cause two
detectors to simultaneously click in Charlie’s measurement apparatus. These spurious
events are interpreted and announced as successful BSM results by Charlie, which adds
statistical noise to the parameter estimation task. Conversely, these events are absent
in MA-QKD, allowing for a tighter estimation of the relevant parameters. This result
is important for experimental groups aiming to implement a MA-QKD system that can
offer a true advantage over an equivalent memory-less setup in realistic conditions.
Tight finite-key security for twin-field quantum key distribution
In Chapter 4, we considered the finite-key security of the TF-QKD variant proposed
by Ref. [7]. This protocol offers high performance and is well-suited for experimental
implementation, but its asymptotic security proof is non-standard and poses particu-
larly difficult challenges when considering the finite-key regime. Namely, it does not
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rely on two mutually unbiased encoding bases, which makes it difficult to consider the
effect of statistical fluctuations when using the test-mode observed data to estimate
the phase-error rate of the key-mode emissions. Moreover, its direct expression for the
phase-error rate is a function of infinitely many estimation parameters, and it is impos-
sible to estimate all of them in practice. The asymptotic security proof could trivially
bound some of these and reduce the expression to a finite number of parameters. How-
ever, this trivial bound cannot be applied in the finite-size setting. In Chapter 4, we
proposed a tight finite-key security proof for the protocol that takes into account the
above challenges. In doing so, we showed that the protocol can overcome fundamental
bounds on the secret-key rate of point-to-point protocols in a run of about 1010 trans-
mitted signals. Moreover, we showed that the asymptotic performance advantage that
this protocol offers with respect to other TF-QKD variants also holds in the finite-key
regime, for many practical regimes of interest.
Twin-field quantum key distribution with fully discrete phase randomisation
The security proofs of previous TF-QKD variants [7–12] assumed that the users can
emit weak coherent pulses with a continuous random phase, either to generate the key
or to estimate its phase-error rate. However, in practice, this is difficult to achieve,
and it is comparatively much easier to randomise the phase of the pulses discretely.
In Chapter 5, we considered the security and performance of a TF-QKD variant that
relies only on discrete phase randomisation. Previous work on QKD with discretely-
randomised sources [9] had treated its presence as a source flaw, and focused on showing
that its impact on the key rate is small when the number of random phases is sufficiently
high. However, in our TF-QKD variant, we found that the use of discrete randomisation
allowed us to introduce post-processing steps that are not possible in an equivalent
continuously-randomised protocol. Namely, it allowed us to post-select the test-mode
rounds in which the users employed exactly the same phase, which results in a better
estimation of the phase-error rate. As a result, we found that our variant can achieve
higher secret-key rates than the equivalent continuously-randomised protocol proposed
by Ref. [7], when using eight discrete random phases or more. To prove the security of




Using semi-definite programming to prove the finite-key security of QKD
In recent years, numerical techniques based on semi-definite programming have started
to be applied to prove the security of QKD protocols [13–15]. Their main advantage
over analytical proofs is their flexibility, as they can be easily applied to different
protocols, and even take into account device imperfections. However, they currently
have some limitations that hinder their use in practical implementations. Typically,
these numerical techniques work by using the observed outcomes of the protocol to
restrict the space of Eve’s possible attacks, and then finding the worst-case scenario
that is consistent with these restrictions. Because of this, they are difficult to apply
when Eve performs a general attack, since in that case, her attack is described by an
operator acting on the photonic systems of all rounds in the protocol at once, which
means that the space of Eve’s possible attacks is enormous. Thus, numerical security
proofs often assume collective attacks, thanks to which Eve’s action can be described
by an operator acting only on the photonic system(s) of a single round, which makes
the space of possible attacks much smaller. As explained in Section 1.1.2.1, in the
asymptotic regime, security against collective attacks often implies security against
general attacks, but in the finite-key regime, it does not. In a future work, it would be
interesting to consider whether semi-definite programming techniques could be used to
prove the finite-key security of QKD against general attacks. To do so, one would need
to find a way to reduce the problem so that it can be solved using these techniques.
Finite-key analysis of twin-field QKD with discrete phase randomisation
In Chapter 4, we proved the finite-key security of the TF-QKD variant proposed in
Ref. [7], and in Chapter 5 we proved the asymptotic security of a similar variant in
which the users employ discrete, rather than continuous, phase randomisation in their
test-mode emissions. In a future work, it would be interesting to attempt to prove
the finite-key security of the discrete TF-QKD variant introduced in Chapter 5, using
the techniques developed in Chapter 4. This is complicated by the fact that discrete
randomisation made it difficult to obtain a closed form expression for the phase-error
rate, and we relied on numerical techniques based on semi-definite programming for
our asymptotic proof. To prove the finite-key security of the protocol against general
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attacks, one would either have to find a closed form expression for the phase-error rate,
or to find a way to reduce the problem so that it is solvable using numerical techniques,
as explained in the previous paragraph.
Addressing other imperfections in the security of TF-QKD
In this thesis, we have addressed two important points for the implementation security
of TF-QKD: statistical fluctuations in realistic implementations, and the use of discrete
phase randomisation. In future work, it would be interesting to consider further prac-
tical imperfections, such as preparation flaws or information leakage from the users’
sources. A previous attempt to do this [16] resulted in a secret-key rate that scales
with O(η), rather than O(
√
η) as in standard TF-QKD. In future work, it would be




Investigating the finite-key resilience of MA-QKD
In Chapter 3, we simulated the finite-key performance of decoy-state MA-QKD, and
found that the protocol is more resilient to statistical fluctuations than the correspond-
ing memory-less MDI-QKD setup. In our simulations, we assumed a particular model
for the heralded loading process of the QMs. However, there are many different quan-
tum memory proposals, and the mechanisms to obtain a heralded loading vary consid-
erably between these. For example, the memory loading procedure used in the recent
experiment by Ref. [17] differs considerably from the model assumed in our simulations.
In future works, it would be interesting to consider whether decoy-state MA-QKD’s re-
silience to statistical fluctuation effects holds for different QM implementations and
heralded loading procedures.
Applying random sampling theory to prove the finite-key security of other
basis-dependent protocols
Traditionally, random sampling theory has only been applied to prove the finite-key
security of protocols with a basis-independent source. However, in Chapter 2, we
have shown the possibility of using random sampling results to prove the security of
protocols with a basis-dependent source. In particular, we first showed how to reduce
the estimation task of a simplified basis-dependent scenario to a random sampling
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problem, and then showed that the loss-tolerant protocol becomes equivalent to our
simplified scenario after the users assign random tags to their emissions. In future
work, it would be interesting to consider whether other basis dependent protocols,
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Let X (X′) denote Alice’s (Bob’s) sifted key of length MX before the post-processing
step of the protocol. Through the error correction and verification steps, Bob should
have turned X′ into a copy of X, except with a small error probability. Then, Alice and
Bob apply a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing to obtain a
shorter secret key of length `. The objective of this Note is to prove that this key is
εs-secret, with εs ≤
√
ε+ εPA, where ε is the failure probability of the estimation of the
phase-error rate, and εPA appears in the key-rate formula in Eq. (4.4) of the main text.
For this, we will make use of the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma [1, 2], according to








where E′ represents Eve’s total side information about X, Hεmin(X|E′) is the ε-smooth
min entropy of X conditioned on E′, and ρ is the quantum state that Alice has measured
to obtain X. Let E denote Eve’s side information before the error correction step. By
the chain rule for smooth min-entropies [2],







) is the number of bits revealed in the error correction (verification)
step of the protocol. We will also make use of the following theorem, introduced in [3],
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which we reproduce here for completeness.
Theorem [3]: Let ε > 0, ρAEB be a tripartite quantum state, X = {Mx} and
Z = {Nz} be two POVMs on A, and X (Z) be the result of the measurement of X (Z).
Then,
Hεmin(X|E)ρ +Hεmax(Z|B)ρ ≥ q, (A.3)








To apply this theorem, we consider a slightly modified but equivalent scenario to
the virtual protocol defined in Methods. In step (4.1), we imagine that Alice and
Bob now first measure all the quantum coins Ac and Bc in Ms, learning their choice
of basis. Then, for the successful rounds in which they both used the Z basis, they
measure their ancillas, learning their choice of state. Let us denote by k the result of
both these measurements. Conditioned on this result, the state of Alice’s and Bob’s
X-basis ancillas A and B, together with Eve’s side information E on them, will be in
some state ρ(k). Note that if Alice measures all her MX(k) qubits A in the X basis,
she will obtain a raw key X that is identical to the one she would have obtained in the
real protocol; while if she measures them in the Z basis, she will obtain a raw key Z
that is identical to that of the virtual protocol.
Let X = {Mx} (Z = {Nz}) denote Alice’s overall POVM if she chooses to
measure all her qubits A in the X (Z) basis. The elements Mx of X are of the
form |x1x2x3...〉〈x1x2x3...|, where xn ∈ {+,−} is the result of the measurement
of round n ∈ {1, ...,MX(k)}. Conversely, the elements Nz of Z are of the form
|z1z2z3...〉〈z1z2z3...|, with zn ∈ {0, 1}. Since Mx and Nz are rank 1 projective mea-







‖〈x1x2x3...|z1z2z3...〉‖2 = 2−MX(k), (A.5)
where in the last step we have used the fact that ‖〈xn|zn〉‖2 = 1/2, independently of
the value of xn and zn. From Eq. (A.3), it follows that
Hεmin(X|E)ρ(k) +Hεmax(Z|B)ρ(k) ≥MX(k). (A.6)
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Now, let us assume that Bob measures his systems B using POVM Z, obtaining
a string Z′ that is identical to the one that he would obtain in the virtual protocol.
Clearly, the result of a measurement of B cannot contain more information about Z
than system B itself, and therefore
Hεmax(Z|Z′)ρ(k) ≥ Hεmax(Z|B)ρ(k). (A.7)
Combining Eqs. (A.2), (A.6) and (A.7), we have that




Based on the outcome k, Alice and Bob will use Eq. (4.1) of the main text to










eph is the fraction of bits that differ between Z and Z




max (Z|Z′)ρ(k) ≤MX(k)h(eUph(k)). (A.9)
Substituting ε =
√












Alice and Bob extract a key of length `(k), given by Eq. (4.4) of the main text, from
the state ρ(k). Substituting `(k) and Eq. (A.10) in Eq. (A.1), we have that the security
parameter of the key, conditioned on the outcome k, can be upper-bounded by
εs(k) ≤
√
ε(k) + εPA. (A.11)
We are interested in the overall secrecy parameter εs, given by the average over k of









































ε(k) ≤ εPA +
√∑
k




where in the second to last step we have applied Jensen’s inequality, and in the last
step we have applied Eq. (A.12).
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A.2 Analytical estimation method
In this Note, we present an analytical method to obtain the upper bounds MUnm in
Eq. (4.1) of the main text, using the observed quantities Mµν . First, we explain the
general idea behind the procedure, and then we obtain specific analytical bounds for the
case of three decoy intensities and Scut = 4, which we use in our simulations. We have
numerically verified that the choice of three decoy intensities is optimal for reasonable
block size values below 1012 transmitted signals.







by defining M̂µν = eµ+ν E[M
µν ]
pµpν
. To obtain an upper bound for a specific term Mij in













Then, we rewrite the R.H.S. of Eq. (A.16) as







where we have singled out the index (i, j), ensured that cij > 0, and defined S+ (S−)
as the set of pairs (n,m) 6= (i, j) such that cnm is a positive (negative) number. From




















where UB{x} (LB{x}) denotes an upper (lower) bound on x.
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Now, we find an expression for each of the bounds within Eq. (A.18). First, note
that Ω is a linear combination of the expected values E[Mµν ] as in Eq. (A.14). While
these are unknown to the users, they can obtain lower and upper bounds EL[Mµν ] and
EU[Mµν ] using the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound presented in Appendix A.6.
To obtain UB{Ω}, we simply replace each term E[Mµν ] in Eq. (A.15) by either its
upper or lower bound, depending on whether its coefficient in Ω is positive or negative.
Second, we use the fact that Mnm ≥ 0 to find the trivial lower bound











where we have chosen cmax such that cmax ≥ |cnm| for all the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, and
the last lower bound depends on the particular Mij that we are trying to estimate, as










Bounds for three decoy intensities
Now, we obtain explicit lower bounds for the case in which Scut = 4 and each of
Alice and Bob use three different intensity settings, satisfying µ0 > µ1 > µ2 and
ν0 > ν1 > ν2, respectively. For this, we take inspiration from the asymptotic analytical
bounds derived in [4]. First, we define
KaS ,aI ,bS ,bI = κaIA κ
bI
B M̂
aS ,bS − κaSA κ
bI
B M̂
aI ,bS − κaIA κ
bS
B M̂
aS ,bI + κaSA κ
bS
B M̂
aI ,bI , (A.21)
which is a function of some intensities that satisfy aS > aI and bS > bI , with aS , aI ∈
{µ0, µ1, µ2} and bS , bI ∈ {ν0, ν1, ν2}. The coefficients κµA and κνB depend on the specific
Mij that is to be estimated, but we have omitted this dependence from the notation
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for simplicity. Using the previous equation, we now define
Ω = wµ1µ2A w
ν1ν2
B K
µ0,µ1,ν0,ν1 − wµ0µ1A wν1ν2B Kµ1,µ2,ν0,ν1






where the coefficients wµνA and w
µν
B also depend on the particular Mij that we want
to estimate. If we rewrite Ω as Ω =
∑2
k,l=0 ĉµkνlM̂
µkνl , it is easy to prove that if






B are all positive, the coefficients ĉµkνl are always
positive (negative) when k+ l is even (odd). Thus, one can find upper (ΩU) and lower
(ΩL) bounds on Ω by properly replacing each M̂µkνl by either its upper or lower bound,
as explained in the introduction of this Note.
Upper bound on M00
By substituting κµA = κ
µ





2ν − ν2µ) in Ω, we obtain the
following function Ω00:















µ1ν1 [µ0µ1 (µ0 − µ1)µn2 − µ0µ2 (µ0 − µ2)µn1 + µ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2)µn0 ]
× [ν0ν1 (ν0 − ν1) νm2 − ν0ν2 (ν0 − ν2) νm1 + ν1ν2 (ν1 − ν2) νm0 ] , (A.24)















by zero since all the coefficients satisfy cnm ≥ 0.
Upper bound on M11
By substituting κµA = κ
µ





2− ν2) in Ω, we obtain the following
function Ω11:











































can be shown to be negative for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, with S− = {(n,m)|n ≥
3,m = 1} ∪ {(n,m)|n = 1,m ≥ 3} and non-negative for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S+, with
S+ = {(n,m)|n ≥ 3,m ≥ 3} [4]. According to Eq. (A.19), an upper bound on the sum
of negative terms can be obtained by∑
n,m∈S−
















where cmax ≥ |cnm| for all the pairs (n,m) ∈ S− and So = {(n, 0)|n ≥ 0}∪{(0,m)|m ≥
0}. In Eq. (A.28), the second inequality comes from the fact that we have set to zero
all those terms Mnm, with (m,n) 6= (1, 1), which do not belong to S− nor to So because





























Finally from Eqs. (A.18) and (A.28), an upper bound on M11 is given by
M11 ≤MU11 =
ΩU11 + cmax(Mz −ML0A −ML0B +MU00)
c11 + cmax
, (A.30)
where ML0A and M
L





n=0Mn0, respectively, and we have lower bounded the term
∑∞
n,m=3 cnmMnm
by zero. Since M0A and M0B depend only on a single emitter, we can estimate them
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where M̂µ = eµ E[M
µ]
pµ










µ ∈ {µ0, µ1, µ2} and ν ∈ {ν0, ν1, ν2}; and the upper and lower bounds included in
Eqs. (A.31) and (A.32) are obtained accordingly to Eq. (A.64).
Upper bound on M22
By substituting κµA = κ
µ




B = (µ − ν) in Ω, we obtain the following
function Ω22:










can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n,m) [4]. Then, an upper bound










Upper bounds on M02 and M04
By substituting κµA = µ, κ
µ
B = 1, w
µ0µ1
A = (µ0 − µ1)µ0, w
µ1µ2
A = (µ1 − µ2)µ2 and
wµνB = (µ− ν) in Ω, we consider the following function Ω02:













µn0µ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1µ0µ2 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2µ0µ1 (µ0 − µ1)
] [





can be shown to be non-negative for all pairs (n,m) [4]. Then, an upper bound on





where we have lower bounded all the terms cnmMnm in Eq. (A.36), with the exception





Upper bounds on M20 and M40
By substituting κµA = 1, κ
µ
B = µ, w
µν
A = (µ − ν), wν0ν1B = (ν0 − ν1)ν0 and wν1ν2B =
(ν1 − ν2)ν2 in Ω, we obtain the following function Ω20:











µn0 (µ1 − µ2)− µn1 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2 (µ0 − µ1)
] [





can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n,m) [4]. Then, an upper bound





where we have lower bounded all the terms cnmMnm in Eq. (A.40), with the exception
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Upper bound on M13
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1, w
µν
A = (µ
2 − ν2) and wµνB = (µ − ν) in Ω, we obtain a
function Ω13 such that:



























can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S+, being S+ = {(n,m)|n = 1,m ≥
2} and negative for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, being S− = {(n,m)|n ≥ 3,m ≥ 2} [4]. Then,
by following a similar procedure to that used to derive Eq. (A.30), an upper bound on
M13 can be obtained as
M13 ≤MU13 =








, and ML0A and M
L
0B are given by Eqs. (A.31) and (A.32),
respectively.
Upper bound on M31
By substituting κµA = κ
µ
B = 1, w
µν
A = (µ − ν) and w
µν
B = (µ
2 − ν2) in Ω, we obtain a
function Ω31 such that:




























can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S+, with S+ = {(n,m)|n ≥ 2,m = 1}
and negative for the pairs (n,m) ∈ S−, with S− = {(n,m)|n ≥ 2,m ≥ 3} [4]. Then,
by following a similar procedure to that used to derive Eq. (A.30), an upper bound on
M31 can be obtained as
M31 ≤MU31 =










, and ML0A and M
L
0B are given by Eqs. (A.31) and (A.32),
respectively.
A.3 Channel model
For our simulations, we use the channel model of [6], which we summarize here. We
model the overall loss between Alice (Bob) and Charlie by a beamsplitter of trans-
mittance
√
η, which includes the channel transmissivity and the quantum efficiency
of Charlie’s detectors. We consider that the quantum channels connecting Alice and
Bob with Charlie introduce both phase and polarisation misalignment. We model
the phase reference mismatch between Alice and Bob’s pulses by shifting Bob’s sig-
nals by an angle φ = δphπ. We model polarisation misalignment as a unitary op-
eration that transforms Alice’s (Bob’s) polarisation input mode a†in (b
†
in) into the













out − sin(θB)b†out⊥). The rotation





With this channel model, it can be shown [6] that the probability that Charlie
reports a successful detection, given that both users employ the X basis, is given by
QX = (1− pd)(e−γΩ(φ,θ) + eγΩ(φ,θ))e−γ − 2(1− pd)2e−2γ , (A.50)
where γ =
√
ηα2, θ = θA − θB, and Ω(φ, θ) = cosφ cos θ. The probability that Alice
and Bob end up with different key bits is given by
eX =
e−γΩ(φ,θ) − (1− pd)e−γ
e−γΩ(φ,θ) + eγΩ(φ,θ) − 2(1− pd)e−γ
, (A.51)
while the probability that Charlie reports a successful detection, given that both users
employ the Z basis and select the intensities µ and ν, respectively, is


















e(z/2)(t+1/t)t−1dt is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
In our simulations, we assume that the observed measurement counts equal their




µν , where Mµν
denotes the number of successful rounds in which Alice and Bob select the Z basis and
the intensities µ and ν, respectively. Also, we assume that the bit-error rate of the
sifted-key equals the probability given by Eq. (A.51).
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A.4 Additional simulation results
Results for pd = 10
−9
In Fig. A.1, we show the results obtainable for a dark count probability of 10−9 instead
of 10−8, which may be feasible using state-of-the-art SSPD detectors [7]. Compared
with Fig. 4.2 in the main text, we see that, for sufficiently large block sizes, the protocol
can now reach longer distances. However, for the case N = 1010, the curve in Fig. A.1
is almost identical to that of Fig. 4.2 in the main text.
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Figure A.1: Results obtainable for the channel parameters in the main text, but a dark
count probability of 10−9.
Comparison with sending-or-not-sending
In Fig. A.2, we provide a more in-depth comparison of the key rate obtainable for a
broader range of values of the phase reference mismatch δph and the block size N . We
can see that, in general, our protocol performs better for larger block sizes and lower
misalignment values, while the opposite is true for the sending-or-not-sending variant.
A.5 Proof of Equation (12) in the main text
Let us consider the evolution that the initial quantum state |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗N , where |φ〉 =
|ψ〉AcAa⊗|ψ〉BcBb and |ψ〉 is given by Eq. (4.10) in the main text, experiences before step
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Figure A.2: Comparison between the results in this work (solid) and those of sending-or-
not-sending TF-QKD [8, 9] (dashed), for several values of the phase-reference mismatch
parameter δph and the block size N . The rest of the parameters are those in the main
text.
(4.1) of the virtual protocol, by taking into account all operations applied to it. After
Eve’s measurement in step (2), it is transformed to M̂eve |Φ〉, where M̂eve is the operator
associated with her outcome. Let us reorder |Φ〉 as |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗M |φ〉⊗M̄ , writing first
(last) the M (M̄) successful (unsuccessful) rounds. In the virtual sifting step, Alice and
Bob measure all subsystems Ac and Bc, using measurement operators {Ôs = |00〉〈00|+
|11〉〈11|, Ôd = I − Ôs}. Again, let us reorder |Φ〉 = |φ〉⊗Ms |φ〉⊗Md |φ〉⊗M̄s |φ〉⊗M̄d ,
writing first (second) the Ms (Md) successful rounds in which the users used the same
(a different) basis, and third (fourth) the M̄s (M̄d) unsuccessful rounds in which the
users used the same (a different) basis. The unnormalised quantum state just before














= M̂eve(Ôs |φ〉)⊗Ms(Ôd |φ〉)⊗Md(Ôs |φ〉)⊗M̄s(Ôd |φ〉)⊗M̄d ,
(A.53)
where we have used the fact that M̂eve commutes with the sifting operators, as they
act on different systems. Next, in step (4.1), Alice and Bob measure the registers Ac,
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Bc, A and B for all rounds inMs, one by one. Let u ∈ {1, ...,Ms} index the rounds in
Ms, let ξu be the outcome of the measurement of the u-th registers, and let M̂u denote
its associated measurement operator. Note that M̂uÔs = M̂u. The unnormalised state
just before their measurement of the u-th registers is
|Φu〉 = M̂eve(⊗u−1l=1 M̂l |φ〉)(Ôs |φ〉u)(Ôs |φ〉)⊗(Ms−u)(Ôd |φ〉)⊗Md(Ôs |φ〉)⊗M̄s(Ôd |φ〉)⊗M̄d ,
(A.54)
where we have highlighted the initial quantum state of the u-th round, renaming it as
|φ〉u. Since we are interested in the reduced state of the round u, we trace out the other
rounds, which we denote by ū:















∣∣ M̂eve(⊗u−1l=1 M̂l |φ〉)(Ôs |φ〉)⊗(Ms−u)(Ôd |φ〉)⊗Md(Ôs |φ〉)⊗M̄s(Ôd |φ〉)⊗M̄d ,
(A.56)
and the states {
∣∣~̄u〉} represent a basis for all the subsystems Ac, A, Bc, B, a and b
of all the rounds in the protocol except the u-th round in Ms . The operator σ̂u is
unnormalised, and its trace denotes the joint probability of all previous measurement
outcomes in the protocol. This includes Eve’s measurement outcomes and Alice and
Bob virtual sifting results, which we collectively denote as the event ξ; as well as Alice
and Bob’s measurement outcomes ξ1, ..., ξu−1 of the previous u − 1 registers. That is,
Tr[σ̂u] = Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1). The probability that Alice and Bob learn that they used
the Z basis and sent Fock states |n,m〉 in the u-th round ofMs, conditioned on all the
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previous events, is
Pr (ξu = Znm|ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) =
Tr
[

















∥∥∥M̂~̄u 〈11|AcBc 〈nm|AB |φ〉u∥∥∥2
















Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
,
(A.57)
where in the second equality we have used ÔsM̂~̄u = M̂~̄uÔs and Ôs |11〉AcBc = |11〉AcBc .





M̂~̄u. Since Êu is a sum of positive semi-definite operators, it is
















Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
.
(A.58)
Using an identical approach, we can show that the probability that Alice and Bob
will learn that they used the X basis and sent cat states |Ci〉 |Cj〉 in the u-th successful
round is
Pr (ξu = Xij |ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1) =
p2X
∥∥∥√Êu |Ci〉a |Cj〉b∥∥∥2
Pr(ξ, ξ1, ..., ξu−1)
. (A.59)
Now, we want to relate the probability terms on the left hand side of Eqs. (A.58)
and (A.59). For this, we use the approach of [6] and apply the Cauchy-Schwartz
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Combining the three previous equations, we obtain




















and since a phase error occurs when ξu ∈ {X00, X11}, its probability is upper-bounded
by
















Note that, since all probabilities are conditioned on ξ, we can remove it from the
conditions and work on the probability space in which the event ξ has happened. Also,
to match the notation in Eqs. (4.13) to (4.15) of the main text, we rewrite Eq. (A.62)
as














where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by ξ1, ..., ξu−1.
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A.6 Inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound
Here, we state the result that we use to obtain the lower and upper bounds required in
Eq. (4.26) of the main text. Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of a sum of n independent
Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the observation of the outcome χ, its









except with a probability εc, where δ



























where W0 and W−1 are branches of the Lambert W function, which is the inverse of
the function f(z) = zez.
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